Why Quad Alliance Is A Turning Point For India-China Ties

Mar 21, 2021

India’s tightrope walk ended soon after Chinese troops occupied positions along the Line of Actual Control in east Ladakh in May last year, clearly violating India’s claim lines. The strength of the mobilisation and ingress in the Pangong lake area signalled an intent to bend the LAC permanently to suit China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping’s objectives.

The Quad summit hosted by US President Joe Biden on March 12 caps an extraordinary year that saw a fundamental shift in India’s response to China’s border aggressions, precipitating a showdown that has been in the making, but one which many had felt might be averted by balancing border discord with economic interests.

India’s tightrope walk ended soon after Chinese troops occupied positions along the Line of Actual Control in east Ladakh in May last year,  clearly violating India’s claim lines. The strength of the mobilisation and ingress in the Pangong lake area signalled an intent to bend the LAC permanently to suit China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping’s political and strategic objectives.

The idea was to decisively show India its place in a scheme of things where China is unchallenged hegemon. Xi’s motivations might be several. Decades ago, Mao Zedong’s decision to launch a border war with India was seen to have been triggered, at least in part, by a rising irritation with what he saw as Jawaharlal Nehru’s “pretensions” on the world stage as a leader of non-aligned countries. India’s decision to back demands for an international inquiry into origins of Covid in China might well have angered the communist leadership and read as an upstart act needing chastisement.

But India’s apparent insouciance apart, the need to secure interests along the Karakoram highway and its CPEC projects, as well as a realisation that accelerated civilian and military infrastructure on the Indian side is altering the odds on the LAC, undercutting Beijing’s ability to spring nasty surprises, might be reasons why China used military manoeuvres on the Tibetan plateau as a launch pad for a confrontation along the LAC

Xi’s actions — such military moves can hardly be ascribed to regional commanders — had an unexpected result. Instead of the usual effort to resolve tensions through dialogue without further raising temperatures, India responded with an unprecedented counter mobilisation. It became apparent that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech to soldiers in Ladakh in July was not mere optics.

The savage clash in Galwan in June had highlighted risks of the strategy, but India was committed to going toe to toe with a militarily and economically superior opponent. In the best times, irrespective of regimes in office, Indian leaders have understood that ties with China are largely about “managing” things. It was hoped deepening economic engagement might reduce the risk of conflict, but the dramatic meltdown in China-Japan ties, despite far deeper economic ties, showed this was a false hope.

The immutable fact remained that China saw India as a neighbour whose burgeoning ambitions need to be checked by the threat of border incursions and support for Pakistan’s hostile actions, a proxy who serves as the first line of defence.

Courtesy: ET