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New
Delhi, 24 April 2002
The
military industrial capability is impressive but the mindset is
missing!
The
21st Century and the Information Revolution have truly
dawned together. Learning from the lessons of the Gulf war, Op
Enduring Freedom and our own Kargil war, the Indian Armed Forces
realise that the computing power of weapon systems, UAVs (Army and
Air Force operate the Israeli Searcher and the Navy has ordered it)
and Cruise missiles, hold many keys to newer and more accurate
methods of combat with least loss of life. This message has not been
lost on mid level officers especially in the Navy and the Air Force
and they know India, with latent strengths in information
technology, has the potential to benefit, as this strength can be
married with foreign experience, who are hungry for collaborations.
The
BRAHMOS experiment was a one off trial by DRDO, but why not open up
the market to others, now that US sanctions are off. However most
officers in uniform also know that bureaucrats and politicians and
to a large extent the aged senior officers (retirement age of Chiefs
is 62 now) with little exposure to the newer systems –– have an
old mindset and on top of that the inter-services rivalry skews the
decision-making.
The
experiences of the Kargil war have highlighted the need to modernise
and employ advanced technological equipment and systems to gain
success even during peace-time, but the Armed Forces are engaged in
a futile proxy war with Pakistan which claims lives and no one seems
to mind.
India
has a healthy defence budget of $14 billion, which is 2.8% of
the GNP and last year MOD could not spend over $1billion because of
the dilatory and preferential system being followed. It may be noted
that pensions, nuclear and space applications for defence are
provided for separately under the PMO, hence there is more money in
the kitty.
The
opening up of the auto industry has shown that the day can come when
foreign defence companies especially from Israel, South Africa,
France and Russia may be tempted to invest in India –– if the
Government encourages transparency in publicising India's defence
needs. Today the approach is sectoral and Israel has become the
second largest supplier thus milking India. The CAG report has shown
how secretive and how arbitrary the defence purchases have been. As
an example, the cost of the Barak missile system at $40 million per
set is a scream, now that Raytheon has shown that 8 AN/TPQS Fire
Finder radars can be bought from USA for $146 m. It is cheaper than
Ukraine's offer, even though it is under Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) rules, which in the past the Indian mindset had opposed. For
obvious reasons they wished to deal directly with firms. The whole
approach was exposed by the Tehelka scam.
While
the path is being paved by globalisation and liberalisation in the
consumer goods sector and inflation is down, the military sector is
getting even tighter with the Defence PSUs going on strike while the
Army stands mobilised. DRDO, the arm that was set up to deliver
latest equipment has mostly concentrated to reinvent the wheel, with
laboratories all over the country manned by under-qualified staff.
No one has audited their performance and when Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat
tried to question it, he was sacked. Even after defence agents were
legalised, is it not surprising that no one has come forward to be
registered as defence Agents? The rules framed are draconian and yet
names are whispered loudly.
The
only major indigenous DRDO programmes that succeeded were in the
field of missiles like AGNI, because the Russians gave unstinting
support to ISRO for the PSLV, GSLV and the cryogenic engines. The
other success story was Sonars for the Navy, because the Navy helped
itself –– it has its own R & D unit –– the WEESE. In
contrast the Arjun MBT, LCA, ALH and ATV programmes are all
struggling.
IDC
have been alluding to foreign collaborations which may be easily
available to get such projects consummated, but that will require a
new mindset. Otherwise mistakes will continue to plague us ––
like the AVRO 748, that DRDO's CAB tried to convert into an AWACS
but only succeeded in crashing it, with experienced staff on board
and the ALH engine and gear box problems, and such. The Armed Forces
will, of course, accept what is provided by DRDO in the same spirit
as they have accepted decisions like the CDS concept without a CDS.
It is the mindset.
The
challenge is to translate India’s defence sector with
collaborations and use the powerful computing programmes, latest
electronics, CAD, CAM and such tools that are now universally
available. Infosys, TCS and WIPRO who have defence contracts have
displayed this ability. These same tools were also successfully
employed in India’s nuclear tests and space and missile programmes
by ISRO, BARC and DRDO.
One
can therefore state with a modicum of confidence that India’s
defence industries will come of age in the next decade ––
provided the leaders stop hiding behind the antiquated Official
Secrets Act of 1927. They need to display confidence in opening up
the sector to private participation and permit the Government owned
units freedom to collaborate with nations willing to do so in
defence technology for mutual benefit.
In
the 1990s, Singapore was willing to invest in joint efforts with
India's DRDO to produce the multimode radar for the LCA but India
was not willing. More recently an A50 AWACS from Russia was taken on
lease and to study its sub systems for reverse engineering, but an
order is still to be placed. A number of SAM missiles, naval
torpedoes and army projects are ready to take off, if assisted by
foreign expertise and collaboration of experienced companies, but
bureaucratic resistance, vested interests, interference and frequent
changes in QRs by the Services themselves, have ensured that
projects have languished. This has encouraged lobbies to pitch for
imports and stall home grown projects.
The
Government’s military industrial tentacles are spread widely.
There are 39 ordnance factories, some of them top of the line,
controlled by the Ministry of Defence. Next are 5 healthy and well
equipped but poorly managed public sector shipyards (Mazagon Dock,
Garden Reach and Goa Shipyard of MOD and VSL and CSL of Ministry of
Shipping). The widely spread aviation units of HAL and electronic
manufacturing units of BEL, the vast array of 50 well equipped DRDO
laboratories and a growing civil sector that now contributes to the
$3 billion procurement programme annually. Mr Rajagopal a former
Chairman of the Ordnance Factory Board, recently stated that the
155mm Howitzer ammunition produced in India was superior to that
supplied by Bofors, and India was self sufficient in ammunition. A
US firm Day and Zimmerman supplied the ammunition plant just before
sanctions were imposed. However all these units have little liberty
to take commercial decisions or even quote prices without reference
to New Delhi's MOD mandarins.
It
is time to take stock and survey the Indian military industrial
scene. A re look is required of the technological inputs, the
commercially viable manufacturing processes to produce weapons and
systems of the high standards that the Armed Forces demand. It needs
a change in the mindset. The will to change is lacking in many areas
but a growing trend is emerging to recognise this infirmity
especially as India is a nuclear power now. Today base technology
can be bought and improved upon. BARC, which has successfully
manufactured the Atom and Hydrogen bombs and many civil firms are
well endowed with the state-of-art facilities. A survey of these is
revealing beginning with the Government assets
Nuclear
Capacity
The
Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) near Mumbai has pursued bomb
making since the 1960s and successive Prime Ministers have secretly
funded it. BARC controls the Kalpakkam Reactor at Chennai for the
Nuclear Submarine Project, Plutonium Processing Plant at Trombay and
a Rare Metals Unit near Mysore that produces Uranium. The technical
knowledge of the scientists coupled with support from DRDL Midhani
and Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) Chandigarh,
produced the chemical explosives, detonators, lenses, the nuclear
trigger and the bomb shell casings for the Pokhran-II explosions in
May 1999. India has its nuclear arsenal at BARC in readiness.
However India is still looking to Russia to execute and build the
Kondakulum Nuclear Mega project and there are 90,000 tons of
equipment for Atomic Energy Commission to bring and that is the way
to go.
Aeronautics
In
the 1950s, Bangalore born Dr Kurt Tank designed the fine HF 24 at
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd but the lack of a supporting engine
throttled the programme. Western pressures to cut off technology and
India's over enthusiastic zeal to design a fly by wire unstable
machine by itself is holding up the LCA. Yet the facilities at
HAL’s eight units spread all over India have manufactured the MIG
27, Dornier-228, and HPT jet trainers with collaboration and SU-30
Mk I is the next project. The National Aeronautical Laboratory (NAL)
at Bangalore has some of the latest computers and is a treasure
house of aviation research, which could handle any 3-D Euler and
Reynolds averaged Navier Stokes equations in the 1980s. India cannot
go it alone in its huge aviation projects for long.
Turbines
and Engines
The
Indian Navy at its dockyards has excellent Gas Turbine maintenance
facilities while the Gas Turbine Research Establishment at Bangalore
is in the final stages of producing the GX-35 US Kaveri engine for
the LCA, which even if successful may not get certification and the
project will have to COMSIM i.e. computer simulation again as at
present the GE 404 is being used for all computations. There is no
dearth of personnel trained in GTs as the IN gets all set to induct
the GE LM 2500 cleared by USA for its Project 17A frigates. In this
field collaborations need to be allowed with ease like the Navy did
for the Pielstick engines.
Materials
aqnd Metallurgrgical Products
The
Mishra Dhatu Nigam a PSU at Hyderabad under the Ministry of Defence
and the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL) of the DRDO
have produced special metals and alloys including molybdenum
technologies. DRDO units now are experts at Carbon technology that
is fitted in the Agni and Prithvi missiles whose nose cones have to
bear temperatures of 30,000º C when the missiles
re-enter the atmosphere. The Units have imported the latest textile
machines to weave the Carbon and other machines to fill the
graphite, again spin offs of the nuclear and space programme.
Foreign collaboration will help sales worldwide and IDC learn that
Israel is negotiating.
Naval
Technology
The
Naval Physical and Oceanography Lab (NPOL) has successfully produced
advanced sonars while the Naval Science and Technology Lab (NSTL)
has manufactured decoys, torpedoes and mines. The Navy has inhouse
expertise in ship design, weapons electronics systems engineering (WEESE)
and the Naval dockyards are capable of maintaining the latest
systems and submarines. The ATV project has another dimension of
knowledge for the nuclear reactor and submarine building. The
Mazagon Dock and Goa shipyards have capacity to turn out ships
faster, if collaborations are entered into with South Eastern and
Middle Eastern countries. Labour costs are cheap in India. The
mindset and openness is the way to go.
SPACE–ISRO
The
launching facilities of ISRO and the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre
have time and again proved that India is capable of successfully
producing solid fuel rocket motors and launching space vehicles.
ISRO bought off-the-shelf equipment from abroad. In fact, USA’s
attempt to embargo Russia's sale of cryogenic engines to India
speeded up the solid fuel technology. The DRDO has gained from the
ISRO experience.
Weapons
Systems–SPACE
The
Combat Vehicles R&D establishment at Avadi that manufactures the
T-72 and Arjun tanks, the Defence R & D Laboratory (DRDL)
Hyderabad manufactures the Agni IRBM, the Trishul and Akash SAM
systems, are all in their final stages of development. These have
from time to time received help from India’s Space Agency ––
ISRO which can truly boast of being among the top six in the world
with a talented pool of scientists. If they also seek collaborations
exports can be in their reach.
Civil
Industry
In
any defence project the Government has a big stake and therefore, in
every country subsidies are given to firms to explore local
manufacture. In richer countries two or more firms are asked to
compete as is the case in the Joint Strike Fighter programme. In
Europe, production is being shared between nations. In India, the
Navy set up a warship building project team in the 1970s under the
Director General Quality Assurance, DGQA and civil firms made good
progress, but subsidies were given selectively. Civil Industries for
Defence in India were initially encouraged and permitted to foray
into just a few items but the progress was good. The Leander project
saw Walchand Industries manufacture the shafting, a valve maker from
Ludhiana –– Leader made excellent valves and other ancillary
suppliers supplied switch boards, fire fighting equipment and
lifting gear –– boilers were made locally by a Babcock and
Wilcox licensee, the Bharat Heavy Electricals with its plants at
Bhopal and Hyderabad produced the turbines. Bharat Electricals Ltd
at Bangalore went into collaboration with Signaal of Holland and
supplied C, L and X band radars and forayed into fire control
equipment, including equipment for the Army and Air Force with
communication companies like Racal. Hindustan Aeronautics supplied
the air blowers and UHF radio equipment.
The
scene was beginning to look good but the orders were not
economically viable for the firms to sustain production lines. By
late 1970’s the Soviet Union became the main supplier of ships
(submarines, Petyas, Kashins, Minesweepers and Missile Boats) and
aircraft. Collaborating with the Russians proved difficult with
language and other finance related barriers. Then came a period
where only small items were given out under the indigenisation
programme. It was only in the mid 1990’s after the collapse of the
Soviet Union that the Armed Forces and the Confederation of Indian
Industries got together to encourage defence production by civil
firms. Today many civil firms have excellent facilities to support
the Armed Forces. Clutch Auto supplies clutch assemblies for the
tanks, Larsen and Tubro is engaged in making helicopter harpoon
decks, reactors for the ATV (nuclear submarine project), structurals
and electronic equipment. Small firms like High Energy Batteries at
Chennai have successfully produced indigenous silver zinc batteries
for the A 244 Motofed Whitefield Italian torpedoes , and Silver
Chloride Magnesium batteries for the Naval Science and Technological
laboratory at Vizag engaged in upgrading the Russian CET torpedoes.
Standard Batteries have very successfully provided large batteries
for the Russian Kilo and Foxtrot Class Submarines and bagged exports
orders from Algeria, again proving capability. ECIL produces a wide
range of fuses, Kirloskars a private firm produces the Pielstick
engines. A vehicle maker Mahindra & Mahindra has collaborated
with with Plasan Sasa of South Africa to make armoured vehicles.
Of
late, the Army and the Air Force have also taken to indigenisation
seriously but relied heavily on the Government owned Ordnance
Factories, DRDO and Hindustan Aeronautics in the case of the Air
Force. The main reason why more civilian firms have not entered the
scene is because of secrecy, lack of transparency, including secrecy
in disclosing pricing of items that are imported. This has had its
fallout in stunting local growth of the small and medium enterprises
and an unambiguous policy on defence purchases. The Mumbai–Pune
area has formed DEMA (Defence Electronics Manufacturers Association)
with 38 entrepreneurs, which has taken on the challenge to goad the
Government to offer cost of development. Some success has been
registered and forebodes well for the future but still the whole
matter is secretive and clouded with corruption.
Conclusion
India
haphazardly but surely has attained R & D capacity and can
produce defence equipment. It can be propelled to become fairly self
reliant though not self-sufficient and look to exports. It would be
essential to permit and even force some of the Government owned
units including DRDO to seek collaboration from abroad and even
encourage foreign participation and transfer of technology. The lack
of an approved perspective plan, fissiparous decision making
agencies and the temptation to buy off the shelf from abroad still
pervade the scene. It is true the Chiefs of Armed Forces have a
stake in self-reliance but they are also charged with the
responsibility of defending the country in the event of war. These
are the challenges when one survey India’s military industrial
complex.
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