New Delhi, 27
April 2003
This
piece is sparked by General Ashok Mehta’s diary of the Anglo–US
war on Iraq in Pioneer’s edit page on 23rd April. The general
depicts the Iraq war as a cake walk, which it was in military terms
because of the US and UK’s overwhelming technological superiority,
but the background of the massive planning over one year has to be
traversed, before any sweeping judgments are made. The logistical
planning was achieved through total computerisation and the build-up
took one year.
Mehta
was in Birmingham last week at a conference where Confidence
Building Measures between India and Pakistan were discussed. In that
same week PM Vajpayee declared in Srinagar that war was not a
solution. India he declared was ready to talk to Pakistan, if that
nation stops cross border terrorism.
Notwithstanding
the simplification of Iraq war by Mehta, there are lessons India
should learn, the paramount one being that war brings about
devastation and derails the economy. It would appear PM Vajpayee
appreciates that and he has not equated Pakistan with Iraq, like his
Ministers have done, because a full scale war with Pakistan at this
juncture of India’s development, which is far ahead of Pakistan,
will retard all the economic progress India has achieved. It will
throw open the nation to a nuclear attack, unless President
Musharraf is bluffing, and India wishes to call his bluff supported
by India’s external intelligence agency RAW. The risks are many,
even if we are capable of a massive retaliatory strike, which many
professionals are skeptical about. Only military leaders can assure
the nation of a second strike capability, not politicians. It must
be made known to Pakistan.
The
second lesson is that it will not be easy to make territorial gains
in the context of our mountainous and populous geography. In Punjab,
Pakistan has constructed bunds and canals whose crossings will be
difficult, like it was even for the powerful US divisions when
crossing the Tigris and Euphrates bridges. They suffered
causalities. The Indian and Pakistani Infantries appear matched in
terms of quality of “foot soldier fighting” which will be
essential for any result. That is the truth India’s strategists
must weigh, before making threats of war. A military likes precise
orders, and can get demoralized if it is alerted too often. Fighting
in Built Up Areas (FIBUA), is fraught with challenges and the Indian
army’s experiences in Kashmir and North East have been many.
Despite bulletproof vests that Indian soldiers now possess,
casualties can be high, as experienced in the Kargil war. Modern
grenade launchers are lethal. US soldiers moved in armoured
carriers.
The
third lesson is, that to achieve victory in today’s war there has
to be meticulous politico- military advance planning, a very high
degree of jointness and interoperability of the three Armed Forces.
Command of the airspace and technological advantage over the enemy
are essential. The Indian politico-military structure for the
prosecution of war is still evolving, despite the lessons of Op
Pawan and Kargil. The three Service Chiefs are operational
commanders who have their own turf to safe guard, stand equal in
status and will have to be guided by the Cabinet control as per
article 74 of the Constitution. The Chairman Chiefs of Staff
Committee is the Navy Chief Admiral Madhvendra Singh. He may not
easily enjoy the powers Field Marshal S F Manekshaw usurped in 1971
because of his closeness to Mrs Gandhi, unless they are conferred
upon him.
In
the India-Pakistan context as in the Iraq war, the final arbiter to
hold ground is the Army and in India it is the largest and senior
service. The Navy and Air Force can at best contribute to cripple
the enemy.
The
CEO in the Parliamentary system is the PM, and he is the de facto
Commander in Chief as Tony Blair was for UK Forces even though they
reported to Gen Tommy Franks. PM Vajpayee will have to bear the
responsibility of approving operational orders at the macro level,
as President Bush and PM Blair did. The National Security Adviser
Brajesh Mishra will have to facilitate as Condelezza Rice did, now
that his position has been made official via the Nuclear Command and
Control doctrine. The UN Charter and Geneva Conventions will need to
be heeded and if India goes to war, it will have to justify it on
the principle of self defence (Chapter 7 Article 51) even if it
echoes USA’s pre-emptive defence philosophy.
If
India decides to got to war, the PM and Cabinet will also have to
weigh the chances of success with the three Chiefs. In any case
Operational Orders must always be ready for issue preferably to
Joint Force Commanders, to prevent blue on blue, friendly fire. This
Joint concept, like we witnessed Gen Tommy Franks execute from
Qatar, is still to evolve in India. It is only being attempted
administratively in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Joint Force
Commanders will need to train for jointness, which exercise is still
to begin at the top, as the Armed Forces await the appointment of a
watered down first amongst equals CDS. Military structures take time
to evolve, and Jointness is now a principle of war.
From
the foregoing the larger military lessons of preparation, command
and control, flexibility and technological advantage need to be
addressed very seriously. Yet the nation can take solace in the fact
the Indian soldier will do his duty and die for his country.
The
Armed Forces are still the best followers of the highest traditions.
The nation and our politicians needs study and think about the
lessons of the Iraq war seriously.
Back
to Top
Disclaimer Copyright |