New Delhi, 27
March 2003
Mohan
Guruswamy makes a forthright and forceful case for single point
Security Leadership in the fight against terrorists and militants in
Kashmir
Time
to go Mr. Advani!
By
Mohan Guruswamy
It
seems like many serial killers, politicians too like to visit the
scene of their crimes. The Deputy Prime Minister, our iron man and
the Second Sardar, has made quite a practice of it. He just called
on the families of the 24 Kashmiri Pandits killed in Nadimarg on
Monday night. Like he did before at Akhshardam where Islamic
terrorists killed similarly in cold blood or at the Ansal Plaza
where police terrorists staged an encounter or in Jammu or…. In
the years since he became the Second Sardar, LK Advani has traveled
quite a bit on such mournful missions, so much so that he can easily
qualify to be the nations top rudali, or professional mourner
In
1998, soon after terrorists attacked a marriage party in Doda and
killed over a dozen including the bridegroom, LK Advani, then just
Home Minister, expressed a strong desire to resign. I was among the
many who called on him and advised him to desist, arguing that this
is precisely what the country’s enemies wanted him to do. Advani
was not grandstanding either. He genuinely felt that he had failed
to make a difference and that under the circumstances it was just
the right thing to do. I like many others argued that it was much
too early in the day to come to that conclusion and he needed some
more time to do just that. I was wrong.
In
mid 1994 a senior serving general of the Indian Army met LK Advani
at my residence to brief him about the situation in Jammu and
Kashmir. The meeting was arranged at the initiative of the then Army
Chief who strongly felt that the situation in Kashmir was not at all
good and that the government of the day was drifting with the
current rather than shaping events with policy. He wanted the head
of the main opposition party and then conceivably the next Prime
Minister to be fully in the know of things. The main problem seemed
to be the lack of a coordinated and therefore effective campaign to
combat the insurgency. Despite the state still being under central
rule, the various security forces deployed were pulling in different
directions and caught in a vicious turf war. The Indian Army
strongly felt the need for a single command to direct the campaign
and had mooted the setting up of a Unified Command.
The
general, a thoughtful person, patiently explained to Advani the
problems involved in tackling an insurgency, particularly under the
watchful eye of the media in general and human rights activists in
particular. He also explained to the Sardar in waiting that nowhere
in the world was an insurgency successfully combated without the
dynamic leadership of a single commander. Whether it was in Malaya
where Gen. Gerald Templar was the supreme commander or in the
Philippines where it was the charismatic Ramon Magsaysay or even in
Punjab where KPS Gill had become the supremo, it was always a single
leader who provided the dynamic and charismatic leadership to drive
the forces deployed to make a supreme effort to beat back the
adversary. The security forces deployed in J&K each reported to
its immediate master and were more hung up about protocol and turf
rather than the problem on hand. The general readily conceded that
in Punjab, KPS Gill a mere DG of Police and hence not ranking more
than a Corps Commander, by dint of his personality and with the full
support of the Chief Minister had managed to even co-opt the Indian
Army in a subsidiary role. It was probably a mere coincidence that
the GOC of the 11 Corps, Lt.Gen. BKN Chibber became the Governor of
Punjab immediately after retirement? The point was that an
anti-insurgency campaign required a single commander willing to take
the responsibility and make major decisions, rather than a warring
bureaucracy more intent on shifting the blame and passing the buck.
Advani listened intently, made notes and even took the matter up
with the then Prime Minister who in his typical manner preferred not
to make a decision.
It
was not just that. That the state government was corrupt and
inefficient was bad enough. The central forces too seemed too caught
up in it. Under the circumstances deliberate human rights violations
were inevitable only to stoke another cycle of alienation and anger.
The general repeatedly emphasized that deploying more armed forces
was not the solution. The solution lay in providing the state with a
caring administration and effective security management. The
military could do only so much and it was for the government to
ensure that it was put to the best use. Advani seemed to understand
what was needed, and unlike the loudmouths in his party like
Madanlal Khurana and Murli Manohar Joshi, seldom spoke of abrogating
Article 370 and putting the state under military control. Thus when
Advani took charge in North Block many of us felt that he would make
a difference. We were wrong.
The
country was unlucky too. The previous assembly elections in J&K
saw the National Conference under Farooq Abdullah returning to
power. Even though Abdullah had a somewhat dubious mandate, he had
the country’s support and best wishes. Instead of improving the
quality of government he led it into new depths of corruption and
depravity. The Abdullah family and a small coterie of bureaucrats
mostly partied and made a bundle for themselves not caring one whit
of providing a half decent government. To make matters worse the
National Conference was a part of the ruling NDA and could mostly
get its own way. Farooq Abdullah even managed to keep his favorite
bureaucrat, the Chief Secretary, Ashok Jaitley on after retirement
despite the Government of India’s known reservations about him.
Jaitley, who was Farooq’s companion of choice for nightly revelry,
often seemed to carry this spirit well into the next day. Not
surprisingly he frequently clashed with the Indian Army’s Northern
Command and a straight talking Army Commander had to tell him off
at-least once in a formal meeting.
Instead
of stepping in to set right the situation, Advani let control of the
state’s affairs pass into the hands of the PMO where the Prime
Minister’s lethargy, Brijesh Mishra’s inefficiency and the durbar’s
social habits meshed perfectly with Farooq Abdullah’s temperament
and proclivities. The disarray on the ground seemed matched by the
disarray in New Delhi. Instead of setting about to retrieve lost
ground Advani took to bombast and would keep threatening hot
pursuit, cross-border raids, and pro-active steps. Nothing happened.
The terrorists struck at will and still do so giving the Deputy
Prime Minister plenty of opportunity to mourn and indulge in public
hand wringing.
The
nations security apparatus has long been in the doldrums. The
security agencies had enough intelligence to tell them that an
attack on Parliament in December 2001 was imminent. The Delhi Police
too was so informed. Despite this a handful of terrorists drove into
the main compound of the Parliament in a white Ambassador with a
crudely homemade Home Ministry sticker and played havoc. In the
popular outrage that followed the supine stupidity of the police was
turned into an act of great heroism. We even threatened a war on
Pakistan and resorted to a hugely expensive military mobilization.
Instead of finding out why this happened and punishing the slothful
bureaucrats, a whole conspiracy was cooked up with some pretty
dubiously obtained evidence. Mercifully the Delhi High Court has
seen through this and has disallowed such evidence. But the trial
judge was not to be denied. He just denied the High Court
jurisdiction and went about his business.
It
needs little intelligence to recognize that national security can be
best assured only by better management of our security resources.
The state of the police nationwide is well known. In his five years
in the North Block LK Advani has showed little inclination to reform
it’s functioning. Much increased corruption, growing inter and
intra cadre animosities, short tenures at the top, and the
politicization of the Intelligence Bureau are some of the many
problems which blight the nations police forces. The single biggest
lesson he has not been able to internalize is that by merely making
the provisions of the law more draconian and less respectful of
individual rights and basic norms of justice, you cannot combat
terrorism. This is only further down the well-traveled road of state
lawlessness. It only begets more of what it sets out to cure and
blurs the distinction between the state and the terrorists. The only
antidote to terrorism is to deal with it with more professionalism
and greater coordination of the various arms of government.
This
is a slow and laborious road and sadly there are no alternatives to
it.
When
LK Advani went to Srinagar on his way back from Nadimarg, Lt.Gen.
R.Nanavathy, GOC in C, Northern Command, flew in from Udhampur to
meet the Deputy Prime Minister. Nanavathy, who commanded the 19
Division headquartered at Baramula in the early 1990’s, is a
straight talking Gurkha officer thus knows what there is to know
about insurgency in the state. And what did Rustum Nanavathy tell
Advani? He told him just what another general told him in my house
nine years ago. He eloquently pleaded for “greater interaction
between the ministries of Defence and Home Affairs.” In other
words he was confirming that little had changed in the Advani era
either. It is pretty obvious that the military and paramilitary are
still in competition with each other rather than in co-operation.
Quite clearly LK Advani has failed. It is time he went. But he is
now not offering to resign.
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