Why OROP is Eminently Affordable
Nitin
Gokhale
As veterans take turns to go on a relay hunger strike across India
and mainly at Delhi’s Jantar Mantar over the non-implementation of
the ‘One Rank One Pension’ demand, I went looking for the so-called
complicated and tedious formula that has apparently kept the
government tied up in knots.
After talking to experts and pouring over many documents—not my cup
of tea really, but I thought I owed it to my father who retired in
May 1982 as a Subedar Major and who checks with me every week
whether OROP will ever be implemented—I have managed to conclude
that all arguments about burgeoning defence pension bill being
un-affordable to the government is nothing but a myth.
Let me explain.
Before proceeding further however, it must be clarified that the
current defence pension expenditure of Rs 54,500 crores (2015-16)
also includes defence civilians who approximately number 400,000.
Now, the perceived exponential rise in pension bill needs to be put
in the correct perspective. The figure would rise in absolute
numbers of course but when viewed as a percentage of the nation’s
GDP, the expenditure on defence pension shows an overall declining
trend as the table below will illustrate:
The defence pensions as a percentage of GDP thus shows a clear long
term declining trend despite an absolute rise in numbers (the spike
in 2009-10 was due to payment of arrears for years 2006, 2007 and
2008 after the award of the 6th pay commission).
Now why does the military have higher number of pensioners as
compared to their civilian counterparts? Simple. The nation needs a
young army and therefore soldiers are recruited young and retired
early (most of them between 34-37 years). On the contrary, all
non-military government employees (including jawans of the Central
Armed Police Forces—CAPFs) have the luxury of serving till the age
of 60. The ratio of pensioners to serving personnel in the military
is thus 1.7:1 as against 0.56:1 among the civilians. But that’s the
price the nation needs to pay for maintaining a standing army.
Had the long-standing recommendations for lateral absorption of this
vast, disciplined and ready made pool of manpower in various
non-military organisations been implemented, perhaps the pension
bill could have been reduced but that has not happened because of
lack of political will and bureaucratic resistance.
There is one more reason why the military pension bill will further
reduce in terms of percentage of the GDP: All civilians in defence
ministry who joined service on or after 1 January 2004, have now
come under the ambit of the contributory National Pension Scheme
(NPS). Soldiers unfortunately cannot be brought under the ambit of
the NPS because of their short service span. The benefit of NPS, it
should be noted, accrues over a long span of time (30 years or more)
deriving the benefit from the power of compounding the accrued
amount!
Now to the second part of the entire issue: the complexity of
calculations.
The format of the existing pension tables issued by the government
gives pension of a soldier based on two variables – his rank and
length of service. The pension for a given rank for higher length of
service will be higher. Hence, if a Sepoy gets Rs 5,480 as pension
on retiring at 17 years of service, a Sepoy retiring at 18 years of
service would be getting pension higher than Rs 5,480. Ideally, the
pension of a Sepoy retiring at 18 years of service should be 3 per
cent higher, i.e Rs 5,614. But due to various reasons the difference
is invariably not three per cent. It is due to this anomalous
situation that annual reviews are required for OROP which will have
additional financial implication. However, the outgo for government
will decline with each subsequent annual review and in steady state
will be almost zero, when for a particular rank, pensions for each
year of service will be approx three per cent higher than preceding
year of service.
How pension Bill will actually decline
Bunching Effect Will Peter Out. Bunching of
salaries, and hence pensions, for a particular rank happens for a
number of reasons. Bunching implies same salary, and hence
pension, for a particular rank even with different years of
service, despite the Running Pay Band System introduced by 6th
Central Pay Commission—CPC--(salary increases automatically with
three per cent annual increment in Running Pay Band System; hence
higher salary for higher number of years of service).
For example, take the case of Majors, with 13, 14, 15, 16 years of
service in December 2004. When Lt Col was made a non-selection grade
rank (earlier selection grade rank around 16-18 years of service) in
13 years of service, all Majors with service higher than 13 years
were made Lt Cols together on the same date and fixed into the same
5th CPC pay scale of Lt Col. Their replacement scales in
6th CPC, hence, were also same. Now these Lt Cols (if not
promoted to Col subsequently) of different years of service will
keep getting same pay of Lt Col/ Col (Timescale--TS) till they
retire; they will get same pension on retirement also. Once OROP is
implemented, pension figures of the rank of Col (TS) for years 30,
31, 32, 33 years (they may reach retirement age of 54 in different
years) may be same instead of being separated by approx three per
cent annual difference. Now if, annual review of OROP tables is
carried out, using these ‘Bunched Up’ pension figures, the pension
for Col (TS) of 33 years will be higher than Col (TS) of 33 years of
previous year’s OROP table by approximately three per cent since the
erstwhile year’s serving Col of 32 years will get three per cent
increment and may retire with three per cent higher pension in 33
years.
Here is another example. In the 5th pay commission, a
Naik used to get an annual increase of Rs 85. However, post the 6th
Pay Commission, the annual increment is three per cent of Basic Pay
plus Grade Pay which is much higher i.e, approximately Rs 300. Thus,
a Naik with 19 years of service who was enrolled in year 1996 (5th
Pay Commission regime) would have got 10 annual increments at lower
5th Pay Commission rate and nine higher increments in 6th
Pay Commission scale. On the other hand, a Naik who was enrolled
much later say in the year 2000, has just 6 lower rate annual
increments in his salary and nine higher rate annual increments.
Thus, rate of salary progression for this Naik (2000 entry) is
higher; when these two Naiks retire (in different years) after
completing 24 years of service, the pay and pension figure of Naik
(2000 entry) will be higher. Thus annual revision of OROP table will
lead to a higher pension figure for a Naik of 24 years of service
when Naik (2000 entry) retires. This effect will get ‘damped’, as
time progresses in the regime of any pay commission.
There are many other reasons for declining additional financial
implication for annual review of OROP tables, but the two major
reasons are listed above. Theoretically, if there are 300 Cells in
the OROP table (10 Ranks as Column Heads, 30 Qualifying Service as
Row Heads) and all 300 Cells are to be enhanced by three per cent
next year, the additional financial implication will still be capped
at three per cent. However, actually only few Cells may change
through annual review of OROP tables and additional financial
implication of each Cell may range from 0 to three per cent
approximately. Hence, overall additional financial implications will
be much lower than three per cent. It was actually mathematically
computed as 0.85 per cent using CGDA (Comptroller General, Defence
Accounts) data for JCOs/OR.
Experts say another way to comprehend the declining financial
implication of annual review is to draw an analogy from the
‘Damping Out’ of a Sinusoidal Wave. Unless there is an external
impulse, the sinusoidal wave gets damped out. Similarly, as Bunching
Effect and other anomalies exit the system of pay and pensions, with
no external impulse (ie change in terms and conditions of service),
the additional financial implications of annual review of OROP will
continuously reduce and in steady state will be almost zero.
So, all the arguments that the nation cannot afford the steadily
increasing defence pension bill in the long run, is specious to say
the least. If India wants to be strong, it needs a powerful military
which acts as a deterrent against all adversaries. And if the nation
needs a strong military, it is the obligation of the state to look
after its soldiers—both serving and retired-- reasonably well.
The Narendra Modi government will do well to remember that if it
wants to be seen to be a friend of the soldier, there is no
alternative but take a quick decision on OROP implementation. In a
lighter vein, if that does not happen, my weekly call to my parents
will invariably continue to begin with a question: What's happening
to OROP?