New Delhi, 30
May 2003
Defence
analyst Raja Menon delivered the prestigious Lt General Samir Sinha
Memorial Lecture entitled “Reflections on India’s Nuclear
Command and Control” at the United Services Institute of India
recently in Delhi. It turned out to be a treasure trove on India’s
secret nuclear status. For the first time, the rationale of
India’s five nuclear blasts in 1998 termed Shakti, and India’s
present nuclear posture, were spelt out in public. Raja Menon citing
examples of Western nuclear ‘weaponisation models’, lamented
that the Armed Forces were never allowed “into the nuclear
loop”, or taken into confidence by the scientists for the 1998
tests, despite Army engineers being employed to carry out the tests.
“The entire process of achieving a minimum deterrent has been
completed,” PM Vajpayee had declared following the tests, but the
Armed Forces grudge is that they were still not in the
“operational loop,” and their voices remained muted. India is
considered a reluctant and reticent nuclear power with its nebulous
“no first use” doctrine, though George Fernandes
India’s Defence Minister has confirmed India is nuclear ready, to
preempt any one who proposes to use WMDs, against India. This
invariably raises doubts in knowledgeable circles about the currency
and control of India’s nuclear strike capabilities.
K
Santhanam a former Intelligence officer in RAW, India’s CIA,
studied nuclear physics and served long as Adviser to India’s
Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), which has
co-steered India’s nuclear programme from the mid 80s with Bhabha
Atomic Research Center (BARC). He is now head of IDSA –– the
Government’s ‘think tank ‘and was present for India’s1998
nuclear tests with Dr APJ Kalam (now President), the Department of
Atomic Energy head, Dr. R Chidambaram (now Scientific Adviser to the
Government) and the BARC Director, Anil Kakodkar (presently Chairman
AEC). Santanam happened to be in the audience for the lecture and
defended the scientists’ role to be the guardians of India’s
nuclear arsenal. During the question and answer session Santanam
stoutly outlined India’s nuclear military “modus operandi” and
touched on the current nuclear operational status. The bombs, he
said, were ready to be handed over by the scientists for deployment
when ordered. To put all doubts at rest he also confirmed that
trials for delivery had been successfully proved.
In
the light of India and Pakistan being viewed as nuclear flash
points, President Musharraf recently challenged India to agree to a
nuclear free South Asia, and enter into a no war pact, if the
problem of Kashmir was resolved. PM Vajpayee immediately rejected
the proposal outright, indicating that India’s nuclear arsenal is
not Pakistan-centric, while Pakistan’s is India-centric. There is
no doubt that there had been global concern since Pakistan keeps
brandishing its first strike capability and India claims military
deterrence is in place with its second strike capability. Following
its successes in Iraq, USA has now focused to bring about CBMs
between the two warring neighbors and hence the subject deserves
introspection.
India’s
scientific community deserves the major credit for India’s
achievements in atomic and space arenas. The policies for both were
articulated and put into place by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s
first PM and atomic scientist Dr. Homi Bhabha in the 60s. The
nuclear policy was to keep open the option of making atom bombs.
When the US task force 74 led by USS Enterprise, entered the Bay of
Bengal in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi verbally sanctioned what resulted in the
May 1974 Pokhran peaceful nuclear explosion PNE of 12 kilotons. The
Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, the Service Chiefs and the Defence
Secretary KB Lall were informed only 48 hours prior to the test.
China took India’s nuclear foray in its stride, but it was a jolt
to Pakistan,, which was still smarting from the 1971 defeat, and
Pakistan beefed up its nuclear program under military leadership. In
India, the scientific community took on the responsibilities of
military deployment, and this remains so today.
The
next 15 years till 1990 saw the close confidantes of successive
Prime Ministers take all executive decisions on India’s nuclear
program and the scientists received adequate funding. The
100-megawatt Dhurva research reactor at BARC lies at the heart of
India’s fissile material program. Commissioned in 1985 it began
producing 25 kgs. of plutonium every year, adequate for six bombs.
India also imported 100 kg of beryllium from West Germany to coat
the plutonium core, thereby increasing the yield and succeeded in
producing tritium, essentially needed for boosted fission weapons.
By 1986 Indian scientists had managed to produce lithium ––
6-deuteride, a material essential for thermo-nuclear weapons. The
scientists were given the freedom to pursue programs in secret, with
denials in public so no thought was given to doctrine, nor could the
military be involved.
Meanwhile
the ISRO rocket scientists were moving ahead with India’s space
program, and Defence Minster Venkataraman, later President inducted
selected scientists into the DRDO and funded an Integrated Missile
Development Program to develop missiles simultaneously. Dr APJ Kalam
moved from his civilian ISRO post to DRDO and joined hands with BARC
for the nuclear program, though many feel DRDO had taken the major
credit that should have gone to BARC scientists. The separation
between the civilian and military was maintained. President Bush Snr
tried to pressurize India to freeze its nuclear programs and
proposed a three (US, China and Russia) plus two (India, Pakistan)
meeting just when India’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $ 1
billion in 1991. It is to the credit of PM Narasimha Rao that he
engaged US in dialogue for over two years and pressed BARC
scientists to hasten the bomb program. By 1994 the scientists were
ready to deploy and test the fusion and fission devices, but it was
only in May 1998 that the BJP government under PM Vajpayee displayed
the will to test for military use.
Five
years later all indigenous knowledge and expertise on nuclear
technology begins and ends with the specialists at the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE). They also stake claim to have the wisdom on
India’s deterrence policy, termed as ‘ramshackle’ by many in
the West, by their experiences of Mutually Assured Deterrence and
graduated response theory. The DRDO had provided the chemical
explosion technology and the bomb casing and deployment trials, and
is the closest to the operations. The other details of D-T Neutron
Beam Generators, explosive lenses, lithium 6 Deuteride, PU 239,
U-235 and gas spark plugs have never been shared. Raja Menon in his
lecture was critical of Indian scientists for not bringing the
military into the loop for the test outputs and questioned the basis
used to arrive at the yields of the five nuclear tests in 1998,
which were 45, 15, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5 kilotons. No military personnel
were positioned in the control center, 5 km away from the blasts
where data was transmitted by fiber optic cables, to witness and
gain military experience. Menon argued that yields dictated doctrine
and fixed the arsenals and costs for which the military had not been
consulted.
K
Santanam defended the Government policy and explained lucidly that
the specially cemented shafts at Pokhran happened to be 17 years old
and there was no way they could have been increased beyond the 150
– 200 metres without India’s intentions to test being
compromised. For this reason the maximum calculated yield of 45 kilo
tonnes, though feasible could not be exceeded without de populating
several villages as also fearing a nuclear fall out towards
Pakistan. The three smaller fission tests were totally devoted to
producing thermo nuclear warheads and these were scientific in
nature and likelihood of getting another chance to repeat the tests,
were remote. The military, he concluded had no role to play in the
tests but confirmed that the arsenal remains ready and the
scientists were in a position to hand over the nukes to the
nominated agency when required, in keeping with the no first use
policy.
In
Retrospect
India's
nuclear policy has always had ambiguity at its core, which in
retrospect has served it well. India vociferously championed a
policy of global nuclear disarmament since the 70s, and its leaders
did not want to be caught building bombs in their own
backyard. Indian atomic scientists at the BARC and later DRDO
were funded and mandated to engage in India's
‘nuclearisation’ program very secretly, and were implicitly
trusted to design the yields, shapes and sizes and delivery
systems without consulting any military minds. The military,
especially the Army, were never encouraged to study nuclear tactics in
any of their institutions with respect to Indian conditions. When
the late General K Sundarji, as the Army Chief, tabled a paper on
India's nuclear needs in 1997, the Government persuaded him to
keep his views to himself and put his paper in cold storage.
It
is also documented that the DRDO scientists had pursued an
active chemical weapons stocking program, without involving or
informing the military, but such weapons of mass destruction were
destroyed when India acceded to the Ban On Use Of Chemical Weapons
Treaty. Indian Air Force test pilots were deputed from time to time
to fly Mirage 2000s and Jaguars for the scientific, nuclear and
DRDO community to carry out bomb drop tests in secrecy under
the guise of making improvements to the already existing bombing
systems. The then Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal S K
Mehra, claims that he was the only one who was once taken into
confidence by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and confirms the other Chiefs were
kept in the dark. Dummy bomb drop tests were also successfully
carried out at the Chandipur Proof Test Range near Balasore on the
East Coast, where India's DRDO also tests the Prithvi, PJ 10
Brahmos and Agni series of missiles. The pressures exerted by
USA from time to time on successive Indian governments to derail
India's nuclear program are also now documented, and hence it
has to be accepted that Indian leaders did the right thing, given
the constraints of a democratic form of government when even a weak
opposition, has been known to put spanners in any national endeavor.
India's
Defence Minister George Fernandes had recently in May, stated in
Parliament, that the 800 km Agni I and the 2000 km Agni II
ballisitic missiles would be deployed in 2003 itself, and confirmed
both were capable of carrying nuclear war heads. They also have
proven Inertial and GPS based accurate delivery systems. The IAF
Mirage 2000 is known to have been qualified as a nuclear delivery
platform, and the Jaguar, it is understood, had been abandoned for
nuclear weapons delivery, due to technical problems. Thus it may be
that the Mirage 2000 remains the sole air breathing nuclear weapon
delivery system and the missile force would be in place soon. India
seems to have done right, and it is up to the recently appointed
Strategic Force Commander and the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee
to study all aspects to bring the military into the nuclear loop to
ensure stability.
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