After
some anxious pit stops the Dr
Manmohan Singh–Bush nuclear cooperation agreement signed on
18th July, which enjoins India’s to separate its
nuclear facilities in to civil and military, appears to be
back on track. India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran
accompanied by India’s nuclear experts carried India’s
separation plan to Washington’s foggy bottom and presented
it to Robert Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State. It
is reported the discussions went off well. This document
nominates which atomic reactors and facilities will be made
open for IAEA inspection and safeguards, and may or may not
depict the military reactors and laboratories associated with
weapons’ programme that support India’s nuclear arsenal.
It is presumed the cost factor and time frame of separation
will not come into play at this stage, though these will be
crucial. Unfortunately most Members of Parliament have shown
little interest in the technicalities of this matter, because
of security considerations and India’s antiquated Official
Secrets Act, 1923. Nuclear issues have also been kept out of
the purview of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence. The
good news is the plan will become public knowledge when
presented to the US Congressional committees to enable change
in US laws to provide India nuclear technology for peaceful
uses, primarily for energy. In India, the military who are
charged to operate India’s second strike are not in the
technical nuclear loop yet, but they too will have to get
involved when the separation is executed. At present the
subject is taboo in uniformed circles, since only a few
selected IAF Mirages and now possibly the SU 30MKIs are
nominated as the primary bomb delivery vehicles, and India’s
nuclear missile forces are still to deploy and exercise
operationally for nuclear war. At present training is for
nuclear defence, which the Navy has been pursuing since the
60s and all large Indian Navy ships are built to ‘citadel’
specifications to ride out a nuclear explosion at sea.
A
large Navy and DRDO contingent is also engaged in India’s
nuclear submarine construction programme which goes under the
misnomer ‘Advanced Technology Vehicle’ (ATV) at New Delhi
(Aakanshka, meaning Hope), Vishakapatnam (SBF for
construction), Kalpakam (IGAR reactor and training) and
Hyderabad (for BHEL Turbines, pumps, compressors and
metallurgy). This challenging and most expensive (media
reports it has expended more funds than the LCA programme) has
been in existence for over two decades and the personnel
possess nuclear knowledge and have hands on experience of
operating reactors and dealing with nuclear material, some
with training in Russia. A nuclear submarine employs enriched
uranium as fuel, and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee
speaking from Moscow in November while on a visit this year
did yeoman service by acknowledging this hush hush project
steered from PMO like our nuclear programme. He confirmed
Russia’s assurance to help complete the ATV. The Indian
uranium enrichment facility at Ratehalli near Mysore called
“Iyengar Village” has also become public in the course of
discussions for separation and media has speculated that India
may have used enriched uranium for one or two of its Shakti
explosions. It is to be seen if this enrichment facilty and
the ATV facilities at Kalpakam will come under safeguards. It
is no wonder Iran is smarting as it too wants to enrich
uranium and it feels gagged and discriminated as
irresponsible. Iran does not have the cover up of a nuclear
submarine programme, which route was pursued by Brazil for
some time, but it retracted under pressure in the 80s. South
Africa too under Waldo Stumpf who visited India in 1983
seeking cooperation went nuclear, produced a uranium bomb and
many claim tested it in a neighbouring country then closed the
programme, but surely possess the ability and the facility.
This is well documented and this time around Saran’s pitch
has been to assure the US which is keen to supply civil
nuclear technology that the help will in no way contribute to
India’s weapon programme, and begs to reason that India’s
strategic interests are vital. This is the right way to go as
USA has doubts about China’s ambitions in Asia.
A
lot of home work has been done in USA on India’s separation
and is in the public domain. Nuclear experts Ashley Tellis,
Stephen Cohen, Satu Lamaye and Frankel have tabled their
testimonies to the Senators dealing with the subject. Ashley
Tellis formerly of Rand Corporation and Ambassador
Blackwill’s Security Adviser in Delhi was given a free run
to visit India’s nuclear facilities and inter act with
scientists and the military. He succeeded in the mission to
steer India’s nuclear ambition towards a recessed arsenal.
Stephen Cohen has spent time in India and is conversant with
India’s defence capabilities. Recently India’s nuclear
expert Raja Menon a former submariner himself trained in
Russia spent three months at the Sandia National Laboratories
in USA, scripting India’s road map. Sandia is a Lockheed
Martin Company funded by the US Department of Energy, National
Nuclear Administration and Defence. Its primary
mission is to ensure the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure,
reliable, and employs the most advanced and failsafe
technologies to fulfill USA’s responsibilities as stewards
of the nuclear stockpile.
USA’s
House International Relations Committee dealing with the
subject held hearings on November 16. While, opinion in the
HIRC seems to have sprung in favor of the July 18 nuclear
deal, some impediments the Indian side will have to watch were
expressed. The US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, Robert James, was emphatic in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 2, that: "India's separation of its civil and
military nuclear infrastructure must be conducted in a
credible and transparent manner, and be defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. In other words, the separation
and the resultant safeguards must contribute to our(USA’s)
nonproliferation goals". He added: "To ensure that
the United States and other potential suppliers(NSG) can
confidently supply to India and meet our obligations under the
NPT, safeguards must be applied in perpetuity. Further, the
separation must ensure -- and the safeguards must confirm --
that cooperation 'does not in any way assist' in the
development or production of nuclear weapons. In this context,
nuclear materials in the civil sector should not be
transferred out of the civil sector." And finally:
"In this context, several countries have argued that it
is integral to maintaining the integrity of the global regime
that India not be granted de jure or de facto status as a
nuclear weapon State under the NPT. For this reason, many have
indicated that a "voluntary offer" arrangement of
the type in place in the five internationally-recognized
nuclear weapon States would not be acceptable for India”.
What
should worry India is injection of the "In
perpetuity" demand. This is not something required of the
five de jure Nuclear Weapons States under NPT, who can make
changes. Not much is specified in the July 18 agreement. Hence
a lot will depend on how the actual legislation is drafted
when Congress debates the issue, and the discussions India has
had in DC. The Indian public now needs to engaged about the
unclassified aspects of this very momentous step taken by the
Prime Minister to safe guard India’s future energy and
security needs. The deal needs to be supported to the hilt in
India’s long term interests as its economy and stature rises
in the comity of nations.
(Cmde
Ranjit B Rai (Retd) is a Defence Analyst who had studied
NATO–WARSAW nuclear issues at the Royal Naval Staff College,
Greenwich where the training nuclear reactor Jason was
situated for training naval officers and sailors.)
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