President
Bush has for mutual benefits, supported India’s entry into the
exclusive five nation nuclear club, and the entry required
decision-makers from both countries to balance India’s
foreseeable civilian nuclear power generation benefits, and in
return India was being asked to forsake its long-term unproven
nuclear power strategies that hold the promise of
self-sufficiency. The IAEA monitored segregation of nuclear
facilities is to be restricted to civilian use. Most hurdles
seem to have been overcome except India’s pursuit of its Fast
Breeder based reactor technology, which has implications in
the military domain, especially as PM Manmohan Singh has
committed that India will support and join FMCT and level off
India’s fissile material holdings. Reams have been written
about this impasse but the final word is to be out soon.
Whereas a number of benefits can surely be anticipated to
accrue to India, USA and other countries, from this historic
deal a careful analysis of the competing strategies has been
steered by USA’s Nicolas Burns and India’s Shyam Saran with
their teams, in an attempt to achieve a winning outcome before
President Bush arrives tomorrow. Can it be realized? We feel
the answer is yes and a compromise on the fast breeder issue,
giving
India
breathing time till 2010 may solve the impasse.
The US has
strong infrastructure expertise spanning seven decades, in
segregating facilities and personnel and detecting segregation
violations in R&D, engineering and production facilities,
whilst engaged in a diverse range of aerospace, biological and
nuclear applications.
India
has neither the experience, nor the culture of secrecy, to
maintain such segregated, albeit cost duplicative facilities,
thereby rendering this segregation unaffordable and
unacceptable from an Indian perspective. India’s scientists
are chary of giving up pursuit of their home grown fast
breeder reactor technology and Larsen and Tubro are
constructing the facilities near Chennai and the military
supports their stance. Most sources claim India has only 800
kgs of fissile weapon grade plutonium for 80 nuclear warheads.
Mathematical calculus in dealing with this complicated subject
of second strike by survivable war heads that will be needed
after paralysis of some heads in a first strike, leads the
military to ask for 200 triad based bombs. Hence in due course
more fissile Pu 235 (plutonium) will be needed, and it is
anticipated the FBR will provide that, and possibly U 233
(uranium) another unique byproduct for bombs. India will also
need enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear submarine fleet and
when the FBR employs Thorium as fuel in
India’s
FBR, it ultimately promises to satisfy
India’s
power needs. India under Dr Manmohan Singh and his team has
taken that gamble. Segregation of this facility at Kalpakam at
this juncture will put an economic squeeze on India in its
legitimate and responsible indigenous R&D effort to eventually
become energy self-sufficient. That is India’s stance and
sounds logical.
On the US side it is not in the interests of the USA to
“setup” India and fail the pact, because then India may be
motivated to take surreptitious “short cuts” to maintain its
politically driven military security needs, thereby motivating
India to risk violating IAEA commitments. India’s cost per KW
in the free enterprise driven commercial sector will become
higher, thereby making nuclear less competitive and less
attractive, and India will be less able to afford the wares
offered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), safety related
or not. Bush’s team realises that and Condelezza Rice has
scripted in her policy that USA would help India become a
world power and letting it down at this juncture would not be
wise.
The other advantages when the pact is finally sealed with NSG
cooperation will come through the segregation of facilities in
India.
The subsequent IAEA and NSG negotiations will have provided
unfriendly foreign powers a much deeper insight into the
organization and technical depth and breadth of the Indian
Nuclear establishment, both civilian and military, and its
strategically exploitable vulnerabilities and locations, at
negligible acquisition costs, which foreign
powers like France have already welcomed. This will assist in
India’s deterrence policy towards China which is not spoken of
during the negotiations but has underpinnings.
Finally it is helpful to recall that the “conventional”
civilian power reactors typically utilise a “once through”
fuel cycle using Pu (plutonium) or enriched Uranium (Eu).
After about five years of operation, the resulting “spent”
fuel rods contain high-level waste (HLW), typically with a
half-life of about 10,000 years. This lethal waste in spent
fuel rods is cooled, typically in outdoor water ponds, next to
the reactor, for about eighteen months before they can be
encased for
transportation, albeit hazardous, to a waste repository.
Currently available encasement materials cannot be guaranteed
to be leak-proof beyond 250 years and may also require active
cooling in the repository. Incidentally, these spent fuel rods
are sought by terrorists, to fabricate dirty devices. Once the
India–USA nuclear deal is inked
India will be
able to look into its waste challenges more openly with USA’s
assistance as USA is even helping Russia out. The deal needs
to be supported and the prognosis of success is high. |