INDIA
DEFENCE CONSULTANTS
WHAT'S HOT?
––
ANALYSIS OF
RECENT HAPPENINGS |
India China Detente Warning An IDC Analysis |
In
the past we had persisted with our assessment that the steadfast path of
China since the 70s had been to see the India–China border settled along
the Line of Actual Control –– as articulated in its Peace and
Tranquility deal. China will tire India down and also try to see that the
Pakistan–India border is settled along the LOC. This way it will never
have to discuss the small part of Indian land bequeathed to it by Pakistan
–– ensuring that India has no direct access to the Central Asian Oil
and Gas. China
is likely to import more than 100 million tons of crude and 40 million
tons of refined oil this year, according to a report by the Ministry of
Commerce based upon first half numbers. The 20 percent rise in crude
imports and the 40 percent increase in refined oil will account for
roughly seven percent of Chinese imports for the year. China currently
imports more than 33 percent of its oil, and has been steadily cutting its
exports of crude and refined oil with decreases this year of more than 25
percent for each category. China's
GDP is already double that of India and it will need energy from Central
Asia. Add to this that for both China and India, Pakistan is the key for
transit of oil from Central Asia and Iran. China has Gwadar getting ready
and India will have to think of oil and gas pipe lines from Central Asia
via Afghanistan and from Iran all via Pakistan. Oil prices are soaring and
sea transit of oil would be more costly. IDC presumes India's intelligence
has done enough studies to caution Indian leadership of this and Dr Kelkar
had started working on this long ago as Petroleum Secretary and India has
invested in oil tracts in Russia, Viet Nam and Sudan. Yet that will not be
enough. Now
K Subrahmanyam, India's leading strategic affairs expert, has cautioned
India against reverting to the "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai"
mood. While drawing appropriate lessons from the failure of
"intelligence assessment" in the US and Britain, this is what he
says about India. Also another leading strategic writer Chellaney has some
advice and both articles are tabled as food for thought. India is in a
bind to play with China for economic interests but must drive a hard and
coherent bargain. In
India our politicians and senior bureaucrats assert their own ad hoc views
in preference to collegiate assessments. Since this has become part of our
political and bureaucratic culture there are no attempts to build
expertise on intelligence assessment. The result may be seen in assertions
by some politicians and retired bureaucrats who sing praises of Panchsheel,
totally ignoring the fact that China had armed Pakistan with nuclear
weapons and missiles. Unfortunately
too many bureaucrats and politicians in India, just as in the United
States (in the latter the corporates are equally guilty), have become
complacent about China –– a trend that is as dangerous as compromising
with the source of terrorism. How
is it that China which has hardly disguised its long term objective of
showing both the US and India their place –– the former out of Asia,
and the latter boxed inside South Asia by an aggressive Pakistan aided by
a liberal supply of Chinese WMDs –– has so successfully been able to
pull the wool over the eyes of so many seemingly intelligent people in
both the countries? Enough material there for substantive Ph D work by a
bright American or Indian student! Mind
Your IQ –– Adequate Intelligence Is Not Enough, It Must Be Rigorously
Assessed By K. Subrahmanyam The
Indian Express, August 5, 2004 Recently
three reports were issued dealing with shortcomings in the intelligence
process — the US Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Iraq, the
Butler Committee Report in the UK and the 9/11 Commission Report in the
US. Though the reports dealt with different subjects they all focussed on
one common conclusion — that intelligence assessment should be
independent and autonomous and free of influence of the executive branch.
The Senate Report was devastatingly critical of the CIA assessment on Iraq
having weapons of mass destruction. Though issued as a bipartisan report,
the Democrats have implied that the CIA’s assessment was influenced by
pronouncements of political personalities and media hype. The Butler
Committee has been critical of the way the assessment of the British Joint
Intelligence Committee was used in the issue of the dossier on Iraqi WMDs
in Parliament and to the public by omitting all the caveats in the
assessment. The 9/11 Commission is of the view that the CIA director
cannot do justice to three jobs at the same time. He cannot run the
external intelligence agency, be in charge of intelligence assessment and
also be intelligence adviser to the president. It therefore proposes the
creation of the post of National Intelligence Director who will foresee
the coordination of different intelligence agencies and also national
intelligence centres which will be assessment bodies for different
subjects. The
intelligence process comprises of collection, compilation, analysis and
assessment. What reaches the national leadership is assessed intelligence
which should lead to policy-making. A wrong assessment on Iraq having WMDs
led to an uncalled for war on Iraq. As a senior senator pointed out, if
the Senate had not been given such an assessment they would not have voted
for war. Similarly, though the assessment of the British Joint
Intelligence Committee had a number of caveats the dossier presented to
Parliament created an impression of certainty not warranted by the
assessment. As
the 9/11 Commission points out, there was uncertainty among top officials
as to whether the Al-Qaeda activity was just a new and especially venomous
version of ordinary terrorist threats the US had lived with for decades or
whether it was indeed radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet
experienced. In the absence of clarity of assessment, terrorism was not an
overriding national security concern for the administration before 9/11. If
we are to draw an analogy in the Indian context we have to go back to 1962
and 1965. Contrary to popular view there was no failure in intelligence
reporting. The failure was in intelligence assessment. I am in a position
to assert this since I was asked to go into the question at that time.
There was a stream of reports from the Intelligence Bureau about Chinese
activity in Tibet. But individual reports which said so many Chinese
soldiers with such and such equipment were seen moving south, east or west
on such and such day at a specific time did not make any sense to the
recipient of the intelligence reports. If they were plotted on a map and
then assessed, a clear picture of Chinese build-up against certain points
on our border emerged. Since the Joint Intelligence Committee of that time
did not meet and did not carry out regular assessments, a myth was created
that there was an intelligence failure. The truth was there was an
assessment failure. Similarly,
in 1965 the Intelligence Bureau reported that Pakistan had raised a second
armoured division. The army refused to accept the existence of the second
Pakistani armoured division. Again the matter should have been subjected
to assessment. Though the JIC was functioning this time, the issue was not
subjected to rigorous assessment. The result was the surprise of our armed
brigade having to face the Pakistani armoured division at Asal Uttar near
Khem Karan. In
this country politicians and senior officials do not give adequate weight
to assessment. In the light of the experience of 1962 and 1965 the JIC was
upgraded and transferred from Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Cabinet
Secretariat. In 1985 it was further upgraded with the chairman being made
a secretary to the government. But the work of the JIC is considered so
routine that the office has been converted into the secretariat of the
National Security Council. The various shortcomings in assessment in the
US mentioned in the 9/11 report — turf rivalry among different agencies,
lack of adequate communication among them and withholding of information,
especially by agencies of the armed forces — exist in our system too. To
that extent the lessons derived by the 9/11 Commission in respect of the
US are applicable for India too. In
the US the neoconservatives imposed their views on the assessment process
in respect of Iraq. Since the CIA had built up the jihadis in Afghanistan
in the ’80s they, according to the 9/11 Commission, did not have
sufficient imagination to conclude that those jihadis who were conditioned
by the CIA to declare jihad against the Soviet Union were now waging jihad
against the US. These are instances when well-informed and expert
collegiate thinking is overridden by “group think” conditioned over a
period of time. In
India our politicians and senior bureaucrats assert their own adhocist
views in preference to collegiate assessments. Since this has become part
of our political and bureaucratic culture there are no attempts to build
expertise on intelligence assessment. The result may be seen in assertions
by some politicians and retired bureaucrats who sing praises of Panchsheel,
totally ignoring China arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles. Attempts
to make policy without a proper intelligence assessment of the external
environment can never be successful. Ultimately the purpose of
policy-making is to achieve one’s objective against both domestic and
external impediments to our progress. Usually only proper assessment will
reveal the impediments. Ideologues are averse to assessment as they lack
the flexibility and resilience needed to adjust to changing dynamics in
external situations. That may explain why the neo-conservatives failed in
the US and in India too there is a lot of resistance to realistic
assessments from our ideologues both from the left and the right. Drawing
The Line With China By
Brahma Chellaney NEW
DELHI -- India and China have held regular border-related negotiations
since 1981 in the longest such process between two nations since the end
of World War II. Yet, after 23 years of negotiations, the two Asian giants
have not achieved the bare minimum -- a mutually defined line of control
separating them -- even as they deceptively call their disputed front line
the "line of actual control." The
latest round of border negotiations in New Delhi on July 26 and 27
testified to the lack of real progress. Since
negotiations first began, China has emerged as a global economic and
political force and strengthened its leverage vis-a-vis India, both
directly and through transfers of weapons of mass destruction to Pakistan
and strategic penetration of Myanmar. As
the negotiations have proceeded, Beijing has shown a weakening inclination
to settle the border or even clarify the front line. This is because the
unresolved, partially indistinct Himalayan frontier fits well with Chinese
interests. First,
the status quo keeps India under strategic pressure. Second, it pins down,
along the Himalayas, hundreds of thousands of Indian troops who otherwise
would be available against China's "all-weather ally," Pakistan
-- a "third party whose interests China cannot disregard" (as a
Chinese official admitted at a "track 2" dialogue in Beijing).
And third, it arms China with the option to turn on the military heat
along the now-quiet frontier if India were to play the Tibet card or enter
into a military alliance with the United States. More
importantly, China is sitting pretty on the upper heights, having gotten
what it wanted, either by furtive encroachment in the 1950s or by conquest
in 1962. It certainly sees no strategic imperative to accommodate India, a
potential peer competitor. By persisting with the border dialogue with
India and singing the virtues of give and take, Beijing seeks to influence
Indian policy and conduct through engagement while looking to take more,
such as the Buddhist Tawang region -- which China claims as a
cultural-continuity extension of its annexation of Tibet. Given
these realities, a succession of Indian governments put priority on fully
defining the line of control (LOC), even as they remained open to any
Chinese proposal for an overall border settlement. The
complementary process of confidence building since the 1980s was pivoted
on the elimination of ambiguities along the LOC to stabilize the military
situation on the ground and ensure peace and tranquillity permanently. But
with the Chinese dragging their feet on defining the line, the
confidence-building process has overtaken the line-clarification process.
The two countries, for example, farcically prohibit certain military
activities at specific distances from the still-blurry line. India
and China are the only known neighbors not to be separated even by a
mutually defined LOC, as their entire 4,000-km frontier is in dispute. By
contrast, the India-Pakistan frontier is an international border -- except
in Kashmir -- where a clearly delineated LOC exists. China,
by and large, has settled land-border disputes with its neighbors other
than India. For one, its dispute with India involves larger tracts of
territories than any other land-border problem. For another, China has a
track record of clinching land-border settlements with declining states
(except in the case of Vietnam) so that it can impose the majority of its
claims, as it did with a rudderless Russia before Vladimir Putin and with
three internally troubled Central Asian states. It
took China two decades of border talks with India before it agreed to
exchange maps of just one segment -- the least-controversial middle
sector. This step was to be followed up with a promised exchange of maps
of the western sector in 2002, and finally of the eastern sector. The
Chinese side reneged on its promise to exchange maps of the western and
eastern sectors. China
also injected deliberate confusion by suggesting that the two sides
abandon years of laborious efforts to define the LOC and instead focus on
finding an overall border settlement. This was clearly a dilatory tactic
intended to disguise its breach of promise: If Beijing is not willing to
even clarify the LOC, why would it be willing to resolve the border
problem through a package settlement? Clarification
of the LOC, after all, would not prejudice rival territorial claims. A
border settlement, on the other hand, would be a complex process that
would involve not only a resolution of territorial claims but also
agreement on a clear-cut front line through a lengthy three-part process
to define, delineate on maps and demarcate on the ground the border. Put
simply, a disinclination to define the LOC translates into a greater
aversion to clinch an overall border settlement. Yet,
in a surprise decision before being swept out of office in national
elections, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided during a China
visit to turn Indian policy on its head and shift the focus from LOC
clarification to the elusive search for a border settlement. His
concession to the hosts in agreeing to initiate a new framework of
discussions between "senior representatives" has not only
sidelined and stalled the process of clarifying the front line, but also
taken India back to square one -- to discussing "principles" of
a potential settlement, as the just-concluded discussions show. A
specialty of Chinese diplomacy has been to discuss and lay out
"principles," and then interpret them to suit Beijing's
convenience, as the past half-century bears out. It is incomprehensible
that India would weaken its own negotiating strategy by diverting focus
from the practical task of clarifying the LOC to a conceptual enunciation
of "principles" to guide future talks. The
first requisite to good-neighborly relations is a defined front line. It
is time India insisted on mutually clarifying the LOC with China.
Otherwise, China will continue to take India round and round the mulberry
tree. (Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.)
|