New Delhi, 27
April 2003
If
a more responsible person were the Defence Minister of India, he
would derive many lessons from the swift victory of the
Anglo–American expeditionary force in Iraq. A mere six divisions
following in the wake of a precise and relentless aerial blitz swept
away the largest standing army in the middle east, not once but
twice in a dozen years with the ease of a hot knife slicing through
butter. He would wonder if the outcome would have been any different
if George Bush’s baleful finger stopped three places higher on the
list of nations? But our Defence Minister, being a bit of a
peripatetic fellow, seems to have little time to sit down and
ponder, or have serious concerns. Maybe he thinks on his feet, but
we have not much evidence of any worthwhile cerebral activity in the
half a decade of his stewardship of the MoD. We have not seen a
single white paper or even a policy paper outlining any perception
of potential and probable threats and challenges the nation might
face in the years ahead. The only other threat he saw some years ago
was China and that is exactly where he is right now. And who can
blame him for discarding any suspicions about the Chinese after
savoring Peking Duck? Even without it the man is capable of the
sharpest about turns. Remember his impassioned defense of Morarji
Desai in Parliament in 1979 and his defection to Charan Singh’s
side the next day?
It
is not without some irony that in the past half a century in the
nuclear age, the sole superpower is now the sole superpower not
because of its nuclear arsenal, which is still vast and enough for
this and other worlds, but because of the vastly enhanced potency of
its conventional power. Nuclear weapons can be great equalizers to
neutralize military and economic asymmetries, as was the case during
the Cold War and as is now with India and Pakistan. But deterrence
works if the threshold of pain is known to be low and leadership
unstable enough to be willing for mutually assured destruction
(MAD). Thus for MAD to work the leaders have to be, or more
importantly appear to be, if not somewhat mad, most certainly
willful and driven. Who would be more credible with nuclear weapons,
Vajpayee or Togadia? Or Kim Jong Pil? See how less peremptorily
George Bush II approaches Kim II. Would Kennedy have blockaded Cuba
if Joseph Stalin instead of Nikita Khrushchev were the leader of the
USSR in 1962? Clearly credibility has much to do with willingness
than ability.
A
former Director General of Military Operations, now embedded in our
television channels, on seeing the Anglo–American army in action
could barely conceal his excitement on seeing the superb equipment
on display. One can’t blame him. Any experienced infantryman and
more so a highly regarded and shrewd military thinker would have
taken note of that. Every US/UK soldier had the latest small arms,
bullet proof vests, night vision, personal wireless communication,
global positioning system that enabled him/her to fight equally well
day and night, call for air or artillery support giving the most
accurate co-ordinates, keep in touch with fighting buddies and
ground commanders with less personal vulnerability. The troops were
fully mobile with Main Battle Tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers
keeping pace with Humvee’s and Land Rovers, armed with a weapon
for every kind of opposition. Equally important were the command
centers, fuel tankers, ammunition carriers running alongside field
ambulances, and field kitchens serving up hot meals for soldiers
tiring of MRE’s (meals, ready to eat). Even the British
Viceroy’s annual duck shoot at Bharatpur couldn’t be better
provisioned and the opposition more disadvantaged!
That
every infantryman was as much an autonomous fighting unit of immense
lethality as well as a part of a superbly structured fighting
organization negated the numerical inferiority. If the US/UK were to
go by Indian norms then they would have had to deploy almost a
million troops to fight Iraq’s 300,000. Instead they went in with
half that. Firepower, mobility and instant and constant
communications go a great extent to make up for numbers. Given that
they come with top class tactical and strategic leadership, such
armies are usually invincible on the field. Of course airpower makes
a great difference as it did in Iraq twice. But let us also not
forget about how a British task force in 1981 voyaged 7000 miles to
take the Argentines to task and recover the Falkland Islands? The
Argentines had more men, more aircraft and more ships but were still
outclassed, despite being dug in. Better equipment and superior
leadership and training made all the difference. The preparation for
any contingency was apparent. In contrast the Indian Air Force
confessed that it did not have the tactics in place to dislodge the
Pakistanis from the Kargil heights. For that matter it seemed that
neither did the Indian Army. We lost 559 men to clear a string of
half a dozen peaks. By contrast the US/UK forces lost less than a
quarter of that in Iraq and more of them to friendly fire than to
Iraqi resistance.
Even
so it is quite evident that many of our experienced military
thinkers have not derived the appropriate lessons, especially if one
had to go by the analysis provided by Maj.Gen. (Retd.) KS Randhawa,
a former trainer of the Iraqi Army whose optimism expressed on CNN
gave former Iraqi Information Minister Ali Sahaf’s a good run for
his money. Sahaf’s optimism can be understood for after all he was
just a sycophant dressed in a uniform, but when a senior officer
albeit a retired one of a professional army cannot see any better,
one hopes that such optimism is not endemic. Our Army, particularly
the infantry is stranded technologically in the 1950’s and much
earlier than that organizationally. It’s fine for Pakistan, but
not by very much.
Many
centuries ago a prominent statesman, Cornelius Tacitus I think, said
that a country must not judge a neighbor by its motivations but by
its capability. In the modern age the world is much compressed and
the neighborhood greatly expanded. It would be a happy situation if
our adversaries were just Pakistan and China, in which case the
creeping invasion by Bangladesh would be our severest challenge.
When Iraq had to be bombed USAF B-52 and B-1 bombers took off from
Oxfordshire in England and Diego Garcia deep in the Indian Ocean.
Some sorties of B-2 stealth bombers took off from the USA. Britain
and Diego Garcia are six hours away and the USA eleven hours away.
Tomahawk missiles were launched from the Mediterranean and Red Seas,
apart from the Persian Gulf. The neighborhood is not the same
anymore.
Must
we worry about US intentions? Maybe not. But remember, less than
twenty years ago the USA and Saddam Hussein’s regime were together
in trying to bring Iran down. Many believe that Saddam Hussein was
even helped by the CIA to get rid of the military dictatorship of
Maj. Gen. Kassem. In 1983, Donald Rumsfeld, then an oil industry
executive, but nevertheless a top ranking Republican, met with
Saddam Hussein to seek his favour for Bechtel to construct a
pipeline to the Mediterranean from Mosul. The US even forgave Saddam
Hussein for sinking the destroyer USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in
1987. The testimony before the US Congress by the former US
Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, reveals that Washington did
indeed suggest to Saddam Hussein that the US “would not be unduly
concerned” if Iraq took steps against Kuwait for stealing its oil
by horizontal drilling. One would not be far off the mark to suggest
that for a good period till 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait, the USA
and Saddam Hussein were, if not thick as thieves, certainly in
cahoots with each other. But in the world of realpolitik
there are no permanent friends, just permanent interests.
What
are the USA’s permanent interests? Cheap oil is one for sure. But
there is more. Zalmay Khalilzad, now the US special envoy in the
Middle East, in his widely read book “From Containment to Global
Leadership” writes “the US should preclude the rise of another
global rival for the indefinite future.” India may not be a
potential global rival, but its not willing to be pussycat either!
Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the US State
Department, said in a recent interview: “The goal of US foreign
policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to
certain key ideas on how the world should operate. Opposition to
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, democracy, markets.
Integration is about locking them into these policies and then
building institutions that lock them even more.” It is in pursuit
of this locked-in world order that Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defence
Secretary, espouses the doctrine of the use of pre-emptive military
force and punishment of any threat by a variety of means including
attacks on military bases and missile silos.
The
last time India embarked on a military mobilization to threaten
Pakistan with war, the USA struck at us by issuing a travel advisory
that crippled the tourism business and slowed down the expansion of
the software industry. We couldn’t protest. After all one will
look rather ridiculous to expect tourists to visit and export orders
to be placed on a country on the verge of war, possibly even a
nuclear war. Suppose we disturbed the West’s equanimity again with
another threat of a possible nuclear war, would the USA stop with
issuing another travel advisory?
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