27 December 2008

The recent Mumbai attack of 26/11 has lead to a kind of euphoria all over the world and the reaction within India is also more vigorous than it ever was, the reason being that the victims of terrorism were the elite of the society.

Media has been giving a wide coverage for over last 22 days. It has been the lead news item for all the national and local dailies. Prime Minister along with Minister for External Affairs, Minister of Defence and the new Minister for Home Affairs in the Government of India have reacted in a manner that suggests, if Pakistan fails to dismantle the terrorist’s infrastructure within its boundaries then India shall be bound to take a ‘hard decision’. The term ‘hard decision’ has been widely interpreted as India is preparing itself for declaring a war on Pakistan. Decisive or indecisive, India will never enter into a war with Pakistan

These reactions are well expected taking the unprecedented kind of damage that 26/11 has inflicted and the profile of the victims. Nothing concrete is going to emerge out of all this rhetoric for reasons as follows:

First, the 13 December 2001 attack on Parliament and the consequent mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces along the border in December-January, the Kaluchak and Amarnath killings and continued cross-border infiltration despite the then president Musharraf’s assurance, gave rise to varied speculations in India and abroad about India going to war with Pakistan. History bears witness to what the successive Indian Governments did after that.

Second, the Indian leadership has hardly ever taken policy decisions, which could amount to aggression in the eyes of the international community, even at the cost of loss of territory to their neighbours. They have always shown their impotence so far as taking a decision to launch an attack is concerned. They did not allow the Forces to cross the Line of Control (LOC) during the Kargil war and kept the war limited within the Indian Territory even though the decision led to the death of precious Indian soldiers.

Third, India lacks defence preparedness to wage a war. There was absence of major acquisitions by different wings of Armed Forces, throughout the decade of the nineties. Consequently, the forces were technologically inferior to its adversary. After its experience of the technological inferiority faced during the Kargil war, India has struck deals for sophisticated armaments to ensure qualitative superiority which is yet to be achieved. Indian victory of whatever measure could be attributed to its huge army and greater quantity of arsenal.

Fourth, the inordinate delay in weapons procurement and modernization procedures is one of the most common features of Indian defence policy makers. The role of the Air Craft Carrier is very vital as it provides cover to other ships by dominating the air when the combat fleet advances to cut into the maritime sovereignty of the adversary. Admiral Groshkov for which India has signed a deal with the Russians is yet to be inducted into the Indian Navy. Sukhoi aircrafts of the latest version (SU-30MK-I) has started arriving from Russia but the full squadron is yet to be completed. These aircrafts are supposed to provide technological superiority to Indian Air Force vis-à-vis Pakistani Air Force.

Fifth, the assurance about reform and modernization of Indian Police Force is not new. It is revived with every such attack to provide solace to both the police and the people. Rather, the expansion of National Security Guard (NSG) will transform this elite force into an ilk of Indian Police.

Last but not the least, nuclear weapons on both sides of the border along with the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles has deterrent effects. The present challenge, therefore, is to immediately engage in a right and sensible dialogue and political negotiations in order to evolve a constructive solution to the present impasse and reduce the immense expenditure on account of constant high alert. India should not allow an “enormous opportunity” to US and others to ‘create a new balance of power’ in the world. India must frame its external policies cautiously to address the challenges of domestic security.

However, the Government of India has initiated two major anti-terror measures in the aftermath the attacks. One to set up a National Investigative Agency (NIA) and the other to amend the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2008. The Lok Sabha passed both these Bills without much debate either inside or outside the House. The reason is obvious. The impending elections of Lok Sabha in mid 2009 and the public outcry that forced even Bollywood on the roads of Mumbai with placards spitting venom.

The very objective of the Indian policy planners has been ambiguous and devoid of any clear course of action. There are no defined vital interests or non-vital interests of the country. This is quite evident from the inter-party differences regarding the security scenario of the country. They all want to safeguard the sovereignty of the country and ensure security of Indian Territory and people, but what constitutes threat to the security of the country is never explained. For some it is a ‘war on India’ while for others it is a ‘law and order problem’. The recent initiatives, therefore, smacks of rhetoric based on political motivations.

The December 13, 2001 attacks on Parliament and the consequent mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces along the border in December-January, gave rise to varied speculations in India and abroad about India going to war with Pakistan. Security experts from the region aired views about the distinct possibilities of war ranging from a full-scale conventional war to a limited war with Pakistan. However, forces were given a marching order in view of impending elections in Uttar Pradesh, which would have proved decisive for the fate of the political party desirous of ruling the Center.

The 26/11 attacks speak volumes not only about the vulnerability of the country as a whole but also the impotence and severe lack of political will and vision within the leadership, otherwise post-Bangalore, Ahmedabad, and Delhi blasts, the Indian leaders should have been more cautious and could have taken some tough and concrete measures. Once again the political leadership is treading a wrong path and trying to put the public unrest and anger at ease by these recent initiatives, which are eyewash. The general masses seem to be at a loss to understand what needs to be done to deal with act of terrorism.

The unfortunate death of Hemant Karkare, (the ATS Chief of Maharashtra) and some other top policemen has created a kind of euphoria and the political leaders have very deftly made them martyrs. However, their sacrifice would soon be felt, that it was in vain as it is nowhere a personal loss of political leaders. The countrymen are required to learn from this year’s homage to those thirteen martyrs of December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament, when only twelve Parliamentarians gathered to pay homage. It reveals the extent of their concern and commitments to the nation. The political leadership needs to tackle terrorism by placing the national interest above all other vested interests—personal, political and religious.

What the governments have done after every attack is to condemn the dastardly act, blame it on Pakistan and then safely go into hibernation. Put precisely, the Indian leadership has effectively developed the art of dealing with the post-terror euphoria rather than the art and might of containing the terror. It is indeed, shocking and shameful that our intelligence agencies had no clue that deadly arms and ammunition were finding their way into the economic capital of India. Inefficient and corrupt leadership has metamorphosed the administration as inefficient and corrupt.

The media competes among itself for TRP by showing and publishing the pictures of victims to further aggravate the situation, and politicians condemn the attacks and announce ex gratia payments. The maximum that comes to the people is a change of ministerial portfolio: a change of face to save the face of the existing government. After few days, the situation is back to square one. The need of the hour is, a mix of responsive and preventive approach to be adopted by the political leadership. 

This is high time that both the leadership and the people must be clear about certain facts: that there is no need of better laws, rather there is need of better law-enforcement; that there is no need of a better investigating agency, rather there is a need of strengthening and capacitating the existing agency and a strong political will; that there is no need to expand Security Agencies like NSG, rather there is a need of eternal and effective vigilance; that there is need of political modernization before police modernization.