INDIA
DEFENCE CONSULTANTS
WHAT'S HOT?
––
ANALYSIS OF
RECENT HAPPENINGS |
The Manipur Agitation An IDC Analysis |
Hindi-Chini
Bhai Bhai? There
was a backlash in Manipur when a woman terrorist was apprehended by the
Army at night. The Army i.e. Assam Rifles tried but could not get a woman
police person to escort her. The woman was to show them the places where
her comrades were hiding. The facts are unclear but the Army claims that
in the morning on the pretext of easing herself and asking for privacy she
was running away and Thangajam Manorma was shot dead. The army says they
can prove it from the wounds of the bullets. The counter claim is that
they raped and killed her. Under
the Armed Forces Special Powers Act which is enacted in an area nominated
disturbed, no action can be taken against the forces acting for the
Government and all acts are beyond legal questioning. The country and
media are divided on this. Manipuris are agitating for its removal from
the statue. A commission of Inquiry has been ordered by the state and at
first the Army refused to allow the jawans to testify, but relented later
for them to be examined in camera. In
Manipur there appears to be collusion with China in this very serious case
and it seems plausible as the following media clippings show. There
is no doubt but that the Army has to be made more accountable.
The
Chinese Hand Newsinsight,
August 28, 2004 At
last we know who has road mapped the Manipur agitation. The
last piece in the Manipur puzzle has been found, the Chinese hand in the
recent uprising in the state. While it was widely assumed that Thangjam
Manorama’s rape and murder allegedly by Assam Rifles men set off the
state wide agitation for withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act, the provocation runs deeper, as separately discovered by the
Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Military
Intelligence Directorate. Their individual reports have been sent to the
prime minister’s office, and discussed by the cabinet committee on
political affairs, and further details are awaited before the matter can
be taken up by the cabinet committee on security. From
the first, the security and intelligence agencies were convinced there was
more to the Manipur agitation than the tragic Manorama rape incident,
which obviously lit the fire. The Chinese hand was suspected, but not
explored, perhaps because since after P.V. Narasimha Rao visited China in
September 1993, the Chinese backing to various North-Eastern insurgent
groups, but especially the NSCN, ceased, which subsequently enabled the
government to open a dialogue with the NSCN factions. Through the late
Nineties and thereafter, China built one axis of opposing India,
proliferating to Pakistan and selling missiles and technology via third
parties like North Korea, while continuing with its encirclement policy on
the other axis using countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh. Arming the
insurgents was thought small beer, in comparison. Even
when China commenced pressuring Nepal to invite the PLA to stamp down
Maoist insurgency, reported by this magazine in early July, preparing
thereby to open a third axis against India, the agencies were not alerted
to its possible subversive activities in the North East. It had somehow
become an article of faith on the Indian side that China would stay away
from sponsoring insurgency there, though what that touching faith was
based on nobody knows. Subsequently, we reported that China was
implementing a Communist-Party resolution in a swathe of North-East
territories, with the aim to lay claim on them after 2010, and the first
step in that direction was encouraging border trade with the North-Eastern
states, followed by increasing Chinese tourism in these states, and
simultaneously funding the Chinese Indian community to buy prime
properties in the region (Commentary, “New game,” 16 August 2004) In
a bigger picture of Chinese subversion in the North East, all this would
fit, but the Manipur agitation still remained curiously unfitted, and
therefore unexplained. When the agitation grew uncontrollable was when
perhaps the agencies decided to investigate the deeper causes, and came
upon the first of the evidence linking China to it. Raids on Manipur
university professors and at least seven students unearthed details of
telephone calls made to Hong Kong and visits to meet Chinese MID or
military-intelligence department agents. During
questioning, one of the professors broke down and confessed to visiting
Hong Kong nine times in the past six months. A proposal was recovered in
the raid for Chinese mediation of the Manipur issue. A further trail led
to five Manipuri insurgent leaders who had regular meetings with MID
agents based in Myanmar, who were presumably road mapping the agitation.
Separately, RAW, the IB, and military intelligence came to common
conclusions about the Chinese hand in the Manipur agitation, but not to
compromise operations, officials are not disclosing names or details. Reports
of the Chinese hand have been available with government for at least ten
days, and possibly two weeks, but it has been stymied for a response.
While the issue has been discussed in the CCPA, the government is chary of
taking it up to the CCS, a more select body than the CCPA, with an
unwritten mandate to act on issues brought before it, and not just
deliberate and forget. Officials say the government has sought more
details, and the agencies are complying, but there is also a feeling that
the government is unwilling to face the truth. Every
government has its particular level of security consciousness, but this
government’s low level has left agencies dissatisfied, disoriented, and
cold. “Prime minister Manmohan Singh,” said a top intelligence
official, “does not regularly interact with the agencies, and there is
little to suggest that he acts on our findings or recommendations.
Unfortunately, we cannot varnish the truth to someone’s liking. This is
not about politics or oneupmanship. We state things as they are, and the
risk is yours if you don’t act.” In
fairness to the UPA, it is only a hundred days old, put against the risk
of questioning the basis of our hard-got friendship with China. China is
not a pipsqueak but the most proactive big power after the United States,
leagues ahead of united Europe or Russia, and an emerging power like India
has to proceed with abundant action against it, if such be policy. But the
agencies complain that there is no policy on China, not outside the agenda
of resolving the border issue, and while we play ball, they move the
goalposts to their advantage. On
the causes of the recent threatened flooding of Himachal Pradesh, for
example, the government has a good idea, that indiscriminate rock blasting
for railways and roads in the ecologically fragile Tibetan plateau
produced landslides and the dangerous artificial Pareechu lake on the
Sutlej. With the flood threat receded, it is extremely unlikely that India
will interrogate the Chinese on the causes, even though there may a design
in it to flood northern India in future and paralyse the political
economy. Long-term Chinese plans for largescale Chinese settlements in the
North East, preparatory to some sort of secession, have not received due
attention or caused particular concern, although the agencies have
dutifully monitored the Chinese Indian community since especially the 1962
war. In
this sorry background, the agencies expect little or no action on their
current intelligence about the Chinese hand in Manipur. While it is
legitimate for the government to seek more evidence of this, the past
tells the agencies to keep expectations low. In the midst of
A.B.Vajpayee’s much-published trip to China last June, the PLA grabbed
two IB officers on a routine inspection tour of Arunachal Pradesh
alongwith support staff of SSB jawans. Until this magazine and the
newspapers exposed it, the government hoped to get the intelligence
officers off quietly, and paper over the incident. “One reason to leak
the Chinese hand in Manipur is so the government cannot cover up,”
confessed an agency official frankly. “The various threats from China
make a picture, and it is downright irresponsible to go about as though
the picture does not exist.” The
reaction to the Chinese subversion in Manipur cannot be knee jerk, and at
least this expose should put the Chinese on the defensive. The Indian
response has to be calculated and calibrated, and there must be some show
of public concern to the evidence of the foreign hand in Manipur. Not
showing even the most minimal concern now, not acting at all, would
encourage China to worser subversion and maximum damage. The Chinese hand
in the Manipur agitation is of a different order of its previous support
to the Nagas, because the first involves some intellectual conversion to
China’s present ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. As
agency officials say, the arrested Manipur professors and their other
intellectual sympathisers were impressed by the Chinese model of
development. This should cause pain to a political-economist like Manmohan
Singh about the North East and particularly Manipur’s neglect. Too much has gone wrong in the North East for any inimical foreign power not to take advantage, but simultaneously, we have to dramatically reassess our relations with China. In the centre of our relationship build-up or build-down with China cannot be the border issue, because it horribly limits our responses, and intimates our weakness, but our vision of our own future, because that will give reality and muscularity to our responses. Threatened by India’s future rivalry, China threatens us now, and we should respond in kind.
|