New Delhi, 14
October 2004
China,
a large country with enormous resources and population has been
enjoying a prodigious economic growth in the last two decades, after
the initiation of market reforms by the late Deng Xiao Peng. It is
coming into the centre stage of international power equations due to
its accelerating economic development and increasing military might.
These developments had left the rest of the world somewhat uneasy,
wondering what path China would take when it eventually becomes one
of the global powers, politically, economically, militarily and
diplomatically. Aware of the disquiet, especially among its
neighbors in South and South East Asia, Chinese leaders like Wen Jia
Bao the Chinese prime minister, have been at pains to describe their
progress as ‘peaceful rise’. To demonstrate its peaceful
intentions China signed a treaty of amity and cooperation with ASEAN
last year and also a code of conduct to reduce the risk of conflict
in South China Sea –– a major irritant and cause of worry for
the South East Asian nations. While establishing the Shanghai
Co-operation Organisation as a security umbrella with the Central
Asian states it has been trying to act the responsible big power by
hosting the six nation talks on North Korea going nuclear –– a
development viewed with considerable concern by the international
community, especially the US, Japan and other western countries.
China has joined the international control regime like MTCR and
shown its readiness to join Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) a
multilateral group, which controls the export of nuclear materials
and technology. It had joined the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
much earlier and had signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
It
does not however rule out for itself a confrontation even with the
US on the question of Taiwan whose increasing ambitions for
independence adds to the bellicosity of China. Most thinking Chinese
do see the US as militarily and technologically stronger state and
of course an important trade partner for China. War against
International terrorism, especially after Sep 11, 2001 has brought
the two countries somewhat nearer and Chinese leaders see the US
anti-terrorism campaign as a chance to improve relations with the US
and to perhaps moderate anti-China attitudes on the part of the US.
China’s
pronouncements about its peaceful intention are however not fully
borne out by the fairly fast paced modernization of its armed forces
and weaponry. The need for further modernisation and improvement of
China's arsenal was voiced by Jiang Zemin the former President and
Chairman of the military commission who emphasized the need for such
modernization at the last National Peoples’ Congress in March 04,
“to meet the challenges of new military changes in the world”.
People’s Daily quoted him as saying that "building up
military equipment is an urgent task of military combat preparations
and is an important strategic task for the country's peace and
stability". He referred to the re-emergence of unilateralism,
continuing local conflicts and rampant international terrorist
activity as possible justifications for his call. At the same
session of the National People’s Congress, Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao said that China will strengthen its military and build-up its
arsenal of high-tech weaponry, focus on developing new and high
technology weaponry and equipment, and foster a new type of highly
competent military personnel.
China
increased its stated military budget by 9.6 percent in 2003,
following a 17.6 percent rise in defense spending in 2002 and a 17.7
percent increase in 2001. This year it has announced a real increase
of 11.6 percent in its budget in March 2004, bringing its estimated
defence budget to more than $25 billion. The US defence department
is however of the view that when off budget funding for weapons
research and foreign weapon purchases are included, the total
defense-related expenditures for China goes up to between 50 and 70
billion dollars. This would make China’s military budget the third
largest in the world, overtaking Japan and coming after the United
States and Russia. The impetus for China's military modernisation by
buying foreign military equipment is also fuelled by China's booming
economy.
China
has bought Su-27 and Su-30 fighters; AA-12 air-to-air missiles;
SA-10, SA-15 and SA-20 surface-to-air missiles; Novator Alpha
anti-ship cruise missiles; KILO submarines, Sovremeny destroyers and
associated weapons from Russia. Last year alone, China spent $1
billion on 24 advanced Russian fighter aircraft. Much as China would
like to diversify its purchases, especially from Europe, it is
constrained in this regard by an European arms embargo imposed after
massacre of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square in June
1989. In mid April this year the European Union decided under
intense political pressure, not to lift the embargo. It has, of
course tapped Israel for some of the latest military hardware.
China’s
intense space ambitions are clear from its launch of a manned
spacecraft in October 2003. On the defence research side, China is
believed to be trying to develop a laser, which can
"dazzle" and blind overhead satellites, something which
the United States failed to do some years ago. China has also
reportedly developed "parasitic micro satellites" that can
attach to other nation's satellites and either put them out of
commission or tap into the data they are collecting or transmitting.
China's
ambition for technological modernization of its armed forces and
weaponry was fuelled by the spectacular victory of the US in the
1991 Persian Gulf War, particularly due to the efficacy of air power
against massive ground forces, then the Kosovo war and now the Iraq
war. However, there has been some recent rethink, in the context of
Taiwan operations about the value of long-range precision strikes,
independent of ground forces. The advance of the US Ground forces in
the recent Iraqi war was the main reason for this rethink.
Security and Strategic Concerns
It
is believed that China’s ballistic missile count is around 120 and
are of four types: the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, and DF-21A. Each
missile carries a single nuclear warhead. China is busy modernizing
its somewhat old missile technology represented by these missiles.
Improved mobility, accuracy, lighter warheads, and use of solid fuel
are the main components of the modernization. It is also working on
a more robust command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)
system. The three-stage, solid fuel, mobile DF-31, would be the
mainstay of the modernization programme. Its range is estimated at
8,000 kilometers, and its circular error probability (CEP) or
accuracy is 300–600 meters for its single warhead. China has also
been deploying short-range missiles on its eastern coast to threaten
Taiwan. China has had the technical capability to develop multiple
reentry vehicle systems (MRVs) for 20 years, but has chosen not to
do so. The Pentagon and the US intelligence community have
repeatedly stated that they expect China’s nuclear arsenal to
increase significantly over the next decade or so. The US Defence
department estimates that the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of
hitting the United States “could increase to around 30 by 2005 and
may reach up to 60 by 2010”.
So,
which side the Chinese cat will jump with regard to its strategic
ambitions? Would we see an aggressive China enforcing its will in
areas of strategic interest to it a la the US today –– or would
we see a friendly china using its diplomatic skill and economic
clout to get what it wants?
What
are China’s strategic interests. In modern world, quest for power
and influence stems from economy and economy alone as aggression for
territorial gain has been passe for many years now in
international relations.
Firstly,
a fast developing economy has forced China to become a net importer
of oil for the first time in history in 1993, when its primary
energy production of 672 mtons of oil equivalent (MTOE) fell short
of its consumption of 677 mtons. Depleting reserves of oil (oil
reserves were 94 billion barrels in 1994) and increased domestic
consumption, thanks to a booming economy, have made matters worse.
China comes behind the US as the second largest consumer of oil in
the world and 60 percent of its imports come from the volatile
Middle East. China has been targeting onshore exploration of the
Tarim basin in north west of the country, (its occupation of the
Aksai Chin claimed by India is to be seen in this light as this
territory offers a passage to Xinjiang where the oil exploration
fields are located) and off shore in South China Sea. Its bellicose
behaviour in the past with some of its South East Asian neighbours
is due to the latter. The south China Sea holds a special place in
China’s strategic and economic thinking. The Spratlys are a
valuable strategic prize not only because of their potential oil and
gas deposits but because they lie along major shipping lanes and
fishing grounds. Falling grain harvest and shrinking agricultural
land would make China a major grain importer. Taking these factors
into consideration, China can be expected to improve its defence of
shipping lanes vital to it to ensure uninterrupted supply oil and
food grains shipments.
China
can be expected to therefore improve the ‘blue water’ capability
of its navy and pay more attention to enlarging its influence in the
Indian Ocean. It has been assiduously cultivating the ruling junta
of Myanmar to possibly use the country as a bridgehead to the Indian
Ocean. It does see the US as a major worry for its strategic
stability but realizes at the same time that currently it would be
no match to the American military prowess, particularly in military
technology. It has therefore been following what has been described
by some Sinologists like Ashley Tellis –– a “ calculative
strategy”. Historically, a weaker Chinese state has relied mainly
on non-coercive tactics to stave off foreign attacks. Beijing
recognizes that challenging the existing US leadership would be both
arduous and costly and, hence, not in China's long-term interest.
The only exception to this would be Taiwan, which apart from the
emotional aspect of sovereignty, would also be an outpost of the US
presence near China very much like Israel in the middleeast.
China
would therefore avoid any armed confrontation with the US except in
the event of Taiwan declaring independence with the support of the
US. This is unlikely as the US has accepted that Taiwan is a part of
China. For South East Asia it would use its economic clout more than
military one to gain its objectives in the South China Sea. But it
would not hesitate to use its military muscle, if its perceived
vital interests in that region are threatened.
China
and India
Despite
talking for more than two decades (the latest was in July this year
) India and China have still not been able to agree on a mutually
defined line of control in the border between the two countries.
Leave alone settling the border dispute, China has shown no
enthusiasm even to define the line of control. China actually has
what it wants and therefore is in no hurry to settle the issue. It
is India that is under strategic pressure since it pins down along
the Himalayas, a large number of its troops who could otherwise be
deployed against China's "all-weather ally", Pakistan. It
also gives the option to China for turning on the military pressure
along the Sino Indian border if India were to revive the Tibet issue
or enter into a military alliance with the United States.
China
therefore tries to underplay the border issue and concentrates on
improving relations in other areas. It does not want a land border
flare up in its periphery, which would stymie its efforts both in
economic development and its attempts to improve its hold in South
China Sea and interest in the Indian Ocean. It could ultimately
settle by giving up its claim on Arunachal Pradesh, if India were to
accept its occupation of Aksai Chin, a territory the size of
Switzerland. But China is not in a hurry. And India too for the
foreseeable future has no appetite for a war nor would it be able to
sell the possible solution to the public, if not to the parliament.
(*S.Gopal
is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India
and a member of the governing body of Institute of Contemporary
Studies, Bangalore ––
http://www.contemporarystudies.org)
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