New
Delhi, 14
May 2004
Our
prediction that the NDA Government would hobble back was proved
wrong and the Congress is the single largest party. The silent but
vibrant electorate of India voted the BJP and its partners out for
forgetting the rural population. We could learn some lessons from
China where the Communist Government gave villages electricity and
small pumps to pull water for a productive living. China did it with
small plants and diesel generators with countrywide transmission.
India made big plants for cities and bigger ones to make money for
politicians e.g. ENRON lying idle.
The
need of the hour is to analyse the challenges before the next
Defence Minister. George Fernandes did some good for himself and the
services but he failed to produce JOINTNESS the call of the day. He
was autocratic and even banned a book on Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat and
scared the senior officers. We hope the next Defence Minister has a
long-term outlook, as Defence does not need daily running help.
The
three Indian Armed Forces are individually stronger today and yet
when one looks dispassionately for major changes in the realms of
interoperability, command and control, logistics, training,
administration, partnership with industry and transparency in
procurement in the last five years, the answer may be wanting. We
therefore attempt to prepare the next Defence Minister and his team
for the challenges that possibly lie ahead and to evince debate and
introspection.
Our
intention is not to create ruffled feathers. There had been many
good intentions and utterances by those in high offices to effect
changes, especially after India went nuclear and lessons were learnt
from the Kargil war in 1999, and when the Tehelkha and coffin
scandals erupted. The Phukan report is still to be tabled on
Tehelkha, to make a final assessment, and some officials await it,
as their fate is dependant on it.
Some
of the issues that should engage the new Defence Minister’s
attention:
Jointness
The
stentorian cry is that we live in an age of change, and jointness of
the Armed Forces is the credo for every thinking serviceman. The war
scenario of the future will be vastly different from that of the
past, requiring a revolution in military thinking and introduction
of new technology. Service doctrines and operations would need to be
Programme based, to ensure that the bucks are spent for the most
value to the country’s defence –– irrespective of whether the
money is spent on the Army, Navy or Air Force.
Strategic
Command & Control
On nuclear issues a Strategic Command
and policy is in place to provide deterrence and for prosecuting
nuclear war if shove come to push. Admittedly paper exercises have
been conducted, but its sinews are yet to be revealed to the
military, which will be expected to exercise the arsenal, and the
Parliamentary Committee on Defence was not allowed to look in to it.
Transparency
in Procurement
The
Kargil war did see many procurement powers for maintenance of stocks
being devolved to the services, but the speed of implementation and
transparency of other large and small new procurements has not
changed for a variety of reasons. Defence Agents are permitted, but
the procedure is cumbersome and none have been announced, and yet
one sees consultants galore in the field as the gap between military
systems and civilian equivalents has narrowed.
Coordination
between Armed Forces and Paramilitary Forces
The
Home ministry is also a big consumer of weapon systems and has
handsome budgets and easier procedures as Homeland and internal
defence is almost a co-runner with national defence in this age of
terrorism, calling for greater coordination between the Home and
Defence ministries.
Coordination
Among Intelligence Agencies
The
steps for gearing up intelligence resulted in formation of a Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the RAW was broken up to provide a
better snooping agency –– National Technical Facilities
Organisation (NTFO) –– akin to the National Security Agency ((NSA)
of USA. These agencies will take time to deliver, unless the sharing
of information issues are streamlined and analysis methods improved.
Independence of intelligence agencies without a Czar, save the PMO
and its National Security Adviser may have to be looked into and the
position of the powerful National Security Adviser codified. At
present the National Security secretariat services the PMO well and
the CCS carries out most decision making on PMO’s call.
Integration
of Service HQ with the MOD
George
Fernandes, the brilliant pyjama wearing former labour leader will go
down in history as one of India’s longest serving Defence
Ministers, who had a clear run of MOD, as his subordinate Ministers
seldom contributed. He also had the full confidence of the Prime
Minister who could not travel much to military institutions or
functions. Only time will depict his balance sheet of his
contributions as the Defence Minister who tried to modernize and
streamline the Defence Forces. Notably a few months before the
elections he swiftly sanctioned the import of four big ticket items
worth $4 billion and made provision for a $5 billion non lapsable
modernization fund making it easier for his successor to ensure
modernization. He made history by over three dozen visits to Siachen,
where he made life easier for the troops, but the challenge of the
elements will continue to take their toll, and the solution to
Siachen will continue to challenge the leadership and the Army
–– now that fake killings are in the air!
In
1998 when George Fernandes summarily sacked CNS Admiral Vishnu
Bhagwat he had promised to swiftly integrate services headquarters
with the Defence Ministry. In 2004, on paper the Services have begun
calling themselves Integrated HQ of MOD –– but even now two
parallel files are maintained by the MOD and service HQs on the same
subject. These have to be merged for the services to know what goes
on. Only then progress will finally have been made –– this will
surely be the first challenge for the next Defence Minster.
Common
Defence Doctrine
In
the last few weeks the Armed Forces have issued statements on
individual service doctrines but the Government will have to give
military and national objectives a common doctrine. Hence the next
Defence minister may look at the following points culled from UK and
other countries edicts to their Armed Forces. In USA the Congress
had to put in place the Nichols Goldman, a law to make the Joint
Chiefs acquiesce and UK has an unwritten constitution to force for
Jointness. Unfortunately India’s founding fathers while drafting
the Constitution had little experience of war, and hence inked no
military directives in to it save Article 72 which is common to all
ministries in respect of Cabinet Control, and made the President the
Supreme Commander in Article 52 but bound him not to apply his mind
on any matter. The Constitution also gave no powers to the President
–– however, change is a constant and Indian defence planners
will have to look into the Constitution especially Art 311 which was
used by George Fernandes to sack Admiral Bhagwat. The elections have
shown India’s strength as a democracy.
Appointment
of a CDS
There
has been a disguised showdown between the three Service Chiefs,
bureaucracy and the political leaders, all of whom have not been
able to agree on the appointment of a CDS. In the past too, Indira
Gandhi’s had proposed to make Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw the CDS.
The reactions of then CNS Admiral S M Nanda on tour in Mumbai
Dockyard who agreed was, “you can give anyone any number of extra
stars, as long as you do not remove any of mine” However, the late
Air Chief Marshal Lal vehemently objected and tabled a note of
dissent.
The
fruits of the joint planning and operations Manekshaw imposed in the
1971 war as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, need to be
revisited by the Prime Minster as Mrs Gandhi had realised the need
for it. Her support to Maekshaw to act as a single advisor led to a
victory with least anxiety to her in cohesive decision making.
Manekshaw also supported the Navy’s plan to hit Karachi in an
opening blow with missiles and on that fateful morning on 4th
December four Hunters of the IAF also cooperated. The lack of a CDS
was badly felt when the Army asked for air power support in Kargil
in the early days of Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil in early
June 1999, which came only in late June when the PM finally took the
decision as events now recorded in retrospect show. The future
battle space will require swift decisions and three equal Chiefs may
not have the authority or cohesion in spite of their best
intentions.
Joint
Operations and Training
Success
in modern warfare depends on joint teamwork. Battles and wars are
won by maritime, ground and air forces operating effectively
together in support of shared military objectives. Joint operations
are not new and India’s Armed Forces have a proud record of
successful cooperation in many cases. In the geo political situation
India is placed in with nuclear neighbors it could face complex and
unexpected situations, which will require a swift and flexible
response, the importance of a joint approach is more critical than
ever.
Individual
units depend for their fighting capability on the training,
discipline and ethos generated by their parent service. But success
for the force as a whole requires effective orchestration of its
individual components. This also encompasses the Para Military
forces which strength has risen to 800,000.
To
achieve these goals a single joint commander is needed, supported by
a unified command structure. The joint commander must be able to
draw upon and direct the entire range of front-line forces committed
to the operation, together with supporting units and personnel (both
military and civilian).
Joint
teamwork does not just happen. It requires a shared understanding of
the roles each participant is required to play. It also needs mutual
confidence, built up from extensive practical experience of
operating together, that everyone will deliver his or her
contribution effectively. All have to ensure that a joint approach
forms a central part of the way defence activity is carried out.
This means closer integration in day-to-day training, in operations,
and in the way defence is organised, supported and managed at all
levels.
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