New
Delhi, 25 November 2002
Some
facts of life and the vital international interests of USA, the
largest economic and military power in the World, cannot be wished
away by India's leadership and foreign minister Yashwant Sinha
and IFS diplomats, just by berating USA to hit at Musharraf
while releasing maps of terrorist training camps, and pleading
with Bush to get him ousted like he proposes to do with
Sadaam. India wants Bush to call Musharraf's bluff on
cross border terrorism.
India
has to realise "Real Politik" even scripted in the
Arthshastra (Art of Safe Guarding Wealth) is about, "you
scratch my back and I will massage yours" and today Indian
Ayurvedic massages are making waves in USA as media reports.
Stephen
Cohen in his book “Emerging India” explains that Indian Foreign
Service (IFS) officers are more brilliant than Pakistan's
individually, but the Pakistani Foreign Service officers have
done better in their assignments in big capitals, as they have
lied better for their country. It is a universal truth that in Diplomatic
Service one has to sometimes lie for one’s country because the
truth has many shades too.
Former
Pakistani Ambassdor Qazi who was ousted out of India, is now in
Washington and must be an asset to Foggy Bottom, as he got to know
India well and spoke brazenly while he was here. Gen Colin Powell,
USA's Foreign Secretary has done yeoman service for Bush and
his country by activating all his contacts of yore in Pakistan, when
USA needed it desperately. US Armed Forces have a great many
uniformed friends in Pakistan, and whatever one may say, Pakistan
and Musharraf have cooperated with USA to the hilt,
and allowed the US Armed Forces to operate from their soil to fight
the war against terror in Afghanistan, and not uttered
even a word against Bush's plans to fight the war against
Iraq. Many Pakistanis like Indians work in Iraq. Musharraf has
cleverly asked for economic sops and military and personal
support, in a "Quid Pro Quo."
We
can report with conviction that the American administration is
mortally scared of what widespread Muslim terrorism can do
to its economy and its free way of life which they treasure, so the
payout of a few billions to Pakistan is peanuts for USA, to
ensure continued Pakistani support. They rightly believe that a down
turn in US economy at this juncture, which is just about
looking up, will affect the world badly and so they are doing the
world a favour. A change in Pakistani leadership may be India's
wish, but it may spell trouble for USA, so India's concerns about
terrorism in Kashmir may be articulated with decibels by Ambassador
Blackwill in New Delhi but are on the back burner at Foggy
Bottom.
They feel
it is unsolvable at the present and as long as a nuclear war is
averted USA has done its duty. Pakistan will acquiesce and India's
no first use demated Nuclear arsenal is insurance. Kashmir per
se, does not affect USA at present. In fact in their study it
comes out that it affects only the Indian Army the most, as
Kashmiris have one of the highest reported per capita incomes in
India. The J and K Bank is one of the flushest. To move further
Japan controlled ADB is now doling out $350 million to Pakistan in
loans to keep Musharraf propped up.
UK
has been the tried and tested partner of USA for years and today
in this fight against terror and war against Iraq, it stands out and
up with USA. Even CDS Admiral Boyce on Thursady last had said the
British Armed Forces are getting ready for action in Iraq and cannot
be too involved in London's Fire Fighters' strike.
PM
Tony Blair and his team have had to tread very carefully in
their relationship with Pakistan and India, even if they lose the
Indian $1.3 billion 66 Hawk-100 AJT deal, if the media is to be
believed about the gyrations in MOD. (Please see IDC analysis on
this on the site). The IAF painstakingly worked the contract under
the present VCOAS Air Marshal Inamdar and asked for the moon from
BAe, and now suddenly they and RM George Fernandes are in love with
other models and the Honeywell F-154 Engine in the L-159 , but that
is another story now that Shobha De in TOI on Sunday 24 Nov has
become an aviation expert. Even she has digressed from sex, and
offered her comments on why the MIG-21s are falling out of the sky.
It makes good copy on that page, just above our Attorney Journal
Sorabjee, sorry General.
The
IAF has already accepted a fifteen year delay for AJT induction
because India could not afford it despite cheap twin engine Alfa
Jets offered on a platter, on the ready so another delay of similar
period (as admitted by RM Fernandes if the deal is retendered) will
not matter is the common saying now. Today with $65 billion in
reserves that Bimal Jalan wants to deplete to avoid inflation, the
Hawk is suddenly too expensive. The climate has changed, and that is
probably India's "real politik" some one will explain. It
may well be.
Hence
we offer a view for consideration that all India can do in
these difficult circumstances, while we wait for Gujrat elections
and Mrs Gandhi lectures at Oxford on 29th Nov to the Forum for
Islamic Studies, is to tell USA if we can, what "via
media" is acceptable in the long term to solve Kashmir (aka Ram
Jethmalani's views that India and Pakistan will both have to climb
down and engage in talks), without losing face as it were, even by
just attending a SAARC meet, and make President Bush's task pleasant
and easy, and be rewarded. In any case if peace is maintained
and Pakistan does not agree to what was offered at Simla in 1972,
then most studies show that in 10 years or so, they will lose POK by
default. The world saw that even Syria voted with Bush in
UN and that did not shock Real Politik watchers. Now Bush has 7 more
allies in NATO. The world at large also realises USA and its allies
direly want President Musharraf to remain in power till an
alternate emerges, and need the soil of Pakistan to fight terrorism
and quell Al Queda before it strengthens again, and
strikes as Osama bin Laden claims it is doing at Bali and
other places all over again. There is support for Al Queda among
the fundamentalists. Indians are riding high abroad compared to
the Pakistanis but Musharraf cannot be wished away and he takes
great care he is not bumped off. Now our own PM Vajpayee is
getting an expensive BMW for safety, as media reports. It was
James Bond's choice too.
Geography
of Pakistan astride the oil route, gives it the biggest advantage,
and now Musharraf has a democratically elected Prime Minister of his
choice. David Saw, Editor of the Asian Military Review one of the
few professional Journalists (as others could not get insurance
to travel) to attend the Pakistani Defence Exhibition IDEAS in
September at Karachi, has released graphic details and pictures of
the military equipment of Pakistan including the North Korean
missiles displayed at the show, and claims the officers of all rungs
he freely spoke to in Pakistan, looked to Musharraf as their hope
for the future.
And
we tell you again the nine CORPS COMMANDERS OF PAKISTAN’s ARMY RUN
PAKISTAN. Our IFS never talk to them, and our military is not
allowed to. Now we have the North Korea connection with Pakistan, to
beat the drum.
We
were very fast off the mark to highlight the details of Nuclear
Bomb Technology Transfer from Pakistan to North Korea in exchange
for No Dong Missile transfers, after the story broke in the media. Since
then many including former RAW No 2 Mr B Raman and now very
much part of the NSAB, have exposed the nexus in some detail,
claiming India knew about all this all along. Hence the
big ticket question being asked in Strategic circles is –– did
the Indian Intelligence share its confirmed reports with USA,
because there is a senior CIA man in India in the US Embassy, as
there is an Intelligence man in every important Indian mission
abroad? It was announced by the Government, that since 9/11 there
has been sharing of Intelligence between India and USA and surely
this big ticket issue with evidence against Pakistan could not have
been neglected?
We
also reported the Disaster Management Seminar organised in
September by the E-in-C where the Defence Minster George Fernandes
informed the audience about the possibility of Nuclear terror attack
with fissile material falling into wrong hands of terrorists. This
in Pakistan and a North Korean ‘bomb’ is now a reality, and if
the Indian Intelligence had good intelligence about it then we are
full of congratulations to our operatives, but intelligence must be
used also to advantage.
The
article below in New York Times of 24 November makes it clear that
the US Intelligence did not have full intelligence, till only few
months ago when North Korea admitted it and then retracted. The
article also says that Colin Powell said he never went into the
past with Musharraf who assured there would be no further transfers.
Some hints are there why Dr A Q Khan was removed from the
Nuclear establishment of Pakistan to become an Adviser. That's "real
politik" and as the NYT article by David Sanfger suggests.
It is very revealing for analysts. If any viewers
have comments please do send them in.
THE
NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 24, 2002
IN NORTH KOREA AND PAKISTAN, DEEP ROOTS OF NUCLEAR BARTER
By DAVID E. SANGER
SEOUL, South Korea, Nov. 21 - Last July, American intelligence
agencies tracked a Pakistani cargo aircraft as it landed at a North
Korean airfield and took on a secret payload: ballistic missile
parts, the chief export of North Korea's military.
The shipment was brazen enough, in full view of American spy
satellites. But intelligence officials who described the incident
say even the mode of transport seemed a subtle slap at Washington:
the Pakistani plane was an American-built C-130.
It
was part of the military force that President Pervez Musharraf had
told President Bush last year would be devoted to hunting down the
terrorists of Al Qaeda, one reason the administration was hailing
its new cooperation with a country that only a year before it had
labeled a rogue state.
But
several times since that new alliance was cemented, American
intelligence agencies watched silently as Pakistan's air fleet
conducted a deadly barter with North Korea. In transactions
intelligence agencies are still unravelling, the North provided
General Musharraf with missile parts he needs to build a nuclear
arsenal capable of reaching every strategic site in India.
In
a perfect marriage of interests, Pakistan provided the North with
many of the designs for gas centrifuges and much of the machinery it
needs to make highly enriched uranium for the country's latest
nuclear weapons project, one intended to put at risk South Korea,
Japan and 100,000 American troops in Northeast Asia.
The Central Intelligence Agency told members of Congress this week
that North Korea's uranium enrichment program, which it discovered
only this summer, will produce enough material to produce weapons in
two to three years. Previously it has estimated that North Korea
probably extracted enough plutonium from a nuclear reactor to build
one or two weapons, until that program was halted in 1994 in a
confrontation with the United States.
Yet the C.I.A. report - at least the unclassified version - made no
mention of how one of the world's poorest and most isolated nations
put together its new, complex uranium project.
In
interviews over the past three weeks, officials and experts in
Washington, Pakistan and here in the capital of South Korea
described a relationship between North Korea and Pakistan that now
appears much deeper and more dangerous than the United States and
its Asian allies first suspected.
The
accounts raise disturbing questions about the nature of the uneasy
American alliance with General Musharraf's government. The officials
and experts described how, even after Mr. Musharraf sided with the
United States in ousting the Taliban and hunting down Qaeda leaders,
Pakistan's secretive A. Q. Khan Nuclear Research Laboratories
continued its murky relationship with the North Korean military. It
was a partnership linking an insecure Islamic nation and a failing
Communist one, each in need of the other's expertise.
Pakistan
was desperate to counter India's superior military force, but
encountered years of American-imposed sanctions, so it turned to
North Korea. For its part, North Korea, increasingly cut off from
Russia and China, tried to replicate Pakistan's success in
developing nuclear weapons based on uranium, one of the few
commodities that North Korea has in plentiful supply.
Yet
while the United States has put tremendous diplomatic pressure on
North Korea in the past two months to abandon the project, and has
cut off oil supplies to the country, it has never publicly discussed
the role of Pakistan or other nations in supplying that effort.
American and South Korean officials, when speaking anonymously, say
the reason is obvious: the Bush administration has determined that
Pakistan's cooperation in the search for Al Qaeda is so critical -
especially with new evidence suggesting that Osama bin Laden is
still alive, perhaps on Pakistani soil.
So
far, the White House has ignored federal statutes that require
President Bush to impose stiff economic penalties on any country
involved in nuclear proliferation or, alternatively, to issue a
public waiver of those penalties in the interest of national
security. Mr. Bush last year removed penalties that were imposed on
Pakistan after it set off a series of nuclear tests in 1998.
White House officials would not comment on the record for this
article, saying that discussing Pakistan's role could compromise
classified intelligence. Instead, they noted that General Musharraf,
after first denying Pakistani involvement in North Korea's nuclear
effort, has assured Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that no such
trade will occur in the future.
He
said, ‘Four hundred percent assurance that there is no such
interchange taking place now,' Secretary Powell said in a briefing
late last month. Pressed about Pakistan's contributions to the
nuclear program that North Korea admitted to last month, Secretary
Powell smiled tightly and said, "We didn't talk about the
past."
A
State Department spokesman, Philip Reeker, said, "We are aware
of the allegations" about Pakistan, though he would not comment
on the substance. "This administration will abide by the
law," he said.
Intelligence
officials say they have seen no evidence of exchanges since
Washington protested the July missile shipment. Even in that
incident, they cannot determine if the C-130 that picked up missile
parts in North Korea brought nuclear-related goods to North Korea.
But
American and Asian officials are far from certain that Pakistan has
cut off the relationship, or even whether General Musharraf is in
control of the transactions.
Yet in the words of one American official who has reviewed the
intelligence, North Korea's drive in the past year to begin
full-scale enrichment of uranium uses technology that "has
`Made in Pakistan' stamped all over it." They doubt that North
Korea will end its effort even if Pakistan cuts off its supplies.
"In
Kim Jong Il's view, what's the difference between North Korea and
Iraq?" asked one senior American official with long experience
dealing with North Korea. "Saddam doesn't have one, and look
what's happening to him."
A
Meeting of Minds in 1993
Pakistan's
military ties to North Korea go back to the 1970's. But they took a
decisive turn in 1993, just as the United States was forcing the
North to open up its huge nuclear reactor facilities at Yongbyon.
Yongbyon was clearly a factory for producing bomb-grade plutonium
from spent nuclear fuel.
When
North Korea refused to allow in inspectors headed by Hans Blix, the
man now leading the inspections in Iraq, President Bill Clinton went
to the United Nations to press penalties and the Pentagon drew up
contingency plans for a strike against the plant in case North Korea
removed the fuel rods to begin making bomb-grade plutonium.
In the midst of that face-off, Benazir Bhutto, then the prime
minister of Pakistan, arrived in Pyongyang, the North Korean
capital. It was the end of December, freezing cold, and yet the
North Korean government arranged for tens of thousands of the city's
well-trained citizens to greet her on the streets. At a state
dinner, Ms. Bhutto complained about the
American
penalties imposed on her country and North Korea.
"Pakistan is committed to nuclear nonproliferation," she
said, according to a transcript issued at the time. However, she
added, states still have "their right to acquire and develop
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, geared to their economic
and social developments."
Ms.
Bhutto's delegation left with plans for North Korea's Nodong
missile, according to former and current Pakistani officials.
The
Pakistani military had long coveted the plans, and by April 1998, it
successfully tested a version of the Nodong, renamed the Ghauri. Its
flight range of about 1,000 miles put much of India within reach of
Pakistan's nuclear warheads.
A former senior Pakistani official recalled in an interview that the
Bhutto government planned to pay North Korea "from the
invisible account" for covert programs. But events intervened.
Months
after Ms. Bhutto's visit, the Clinton administration and North Korea
reached a deal that froze all nuclear activity at Yongbyon, where
international inspectors still live year-round.
In return, the United States and its allies promised North Korea a
steady flow of fuel oil and the eventual delivery of two
proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors to produce electric power.
That was important in a country so lacking in power that, from
satellite images taken at night, it appears like a black hole
compared to the blazing lights of South Korea.
But within three years, Kim Jong Il grew disenchanted with the
accord and feared that the nuclear power plants would never be
delivered. He never allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency
to begin the wide-ranging inspections required before the critical
parts of the plants could be delivered.
By
1997 or 1998, American intelligence has now concluded, he was
searching for an alternative way to build a bomb, without detection.
He found part of the answer in Pakistan, which along with Iran,
Libya, Yemen, Syria and Egypt was now a regular customer for North
Korean missile parts, American military officials said.
A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, who had years ago
stolen the engineering plans for gas centrifuges from the
Netherlands, visited North Korea several times. The visits were
always cloaked in secrecy.
But
several things are now clear. Pakistan was running out of hard
currency to pay the North Koreans, who were in worse shape. North
Korea feared that without a nuclear weapon it would eventually be
absorbed by the economic might of the South, or squeezed by the
military might of the United States. In 1997 or 1998, Kim Jong Il
and his generals decided to begin a development project for a bomb
based on highly enriched uranium, a slow and difficult process, but
relatively easy to hide.
Talking,
but Not Changing
They
did so even while sporadically pursuing a better relationship with
Washington. In the last days of the Clinton administration, the
North negotiated with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright for a
deal to restrict North Korean missile exports in return for a
removal of economic penalties, a de-listing from the State
Department's account of countries that sponsor terrorism and talks
about diplomatic recognition. The deal was
never reached.
President
Clinton even considered an end-of-term trip to North Korea, but was
talked out of it by aides who feared that the North was not ready to
make real concessions. The nuclear revelations of the past few weeks
suggest those aides saved Mr. Clinton from embarrassment.
"Lamentably,
North Korea never really changed," said one senior Western
official here with long experience in the topic. "They came to
the conclusion that the nuclear card was their one ace in the hole,
and they couldn't give it up."
American
intelligence agencies, meanwhile, suspected that North Korea was
restarting a secret program. In 1998, satellites were focused on a
huge underground site where the C.I.A. believed Kim Jong Il was
trying to build a second plutonium-reprocessing center. But they
were looking in the wrong place: after American officials negotiated
access to the suspect site, they found only a series of man-made
caves with no nuclear-related equipment, and no apparent purpose.
"World's largest underground parking lot," one American
intelligence official joked at the time.
Rumors
of a secret enriched-uranium project persisted, however. The C.I.A.
and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee evaluated the
evidence but reached no firm conclusion.
But
there were hints. One Western diplomat who visited North Korea in
May 1998, just as world attention focused on Pakistan, which had
responded to India's underground nuclear tests by setting off six of
its own, recalled witnessing an odd celebration. "I was in the
Foreign Ministry," the official recalled last week. "About
10 minutes into our meeting, the North Korean diplomat we were
seeing broke into a big smile and pointed with pride to these tests.
They were all elated.
"Here
was a model of a poor state getting away with developing a nuclear
weapon."
When the Clinton administration raised the rumors of a
Pakistan-North Korea link with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who
succeeded Ms. Bhutto, he denied them. It was only after General
Musharraf overthrew Mr. Sharif's government, and after Mr. Bush took
office, that South Korean intelligence agencies picked up strong
evidence that North Korea was buying components for an
enriched-uranium program.
The
agencies passed the evidence along to Washington, according to South
Korean and American officials. It looked suspiciously similar to the
gas centrifuge technology used in Pakistan. "My guess is that
Pakistan was the only available partner," said Lee Hong Koo, a
former South Korean prime minister and unification minister.
A.
H. Nayya, a physics professor at Quaid-e-Azam University in
Islamabad, who has no role in the country's nuclear program, agreed:
"The clearest possibility is that the Pakistanis gave them the
blueprint. `Here it is. You make it on your own.' " Under
American pressure, Dr. Khan was removed from the operational side of
the Pakistani nuclear program. He was made an "adviser to the
president" on nuclear technology.
Here in Seoul, nuclear experts working for the government of
President Kim Dae Jung say they were subtly discouraged from
publicly writing or speculating about the North's secret programs
because the Korean government feared that it would derail President
Kim's legacy: the "sunshine policy" of engagement with
North Korea and encouraging investment there.
By
this summer, however, the C.I.A. concluded that the North had moved
from research to production. The intelligence agency took the
evidence to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security
adviser, who asked for a review by all American intelligence
agencies.
Such
a request is usually a prescription for conflicting interpretations.
Instead, the agencies came back with a unanimous opinion: the North
Korean program was well under way, and had to be stopped.
Telling the North, 'You're Busted'
After
sending senior officials to Japan and South Korea in August to
present the new evidence, Mr. Bush decided to confront the North
Koreans. On Oct. 4, James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, was in North Korea and told his
counterparts that the United States had detailed information about
the enriched-uranium program.
"We
wanted to make it clear to them that they were busted," a
senior administration official said.
The
North Koreans initially denied the accusation, but the next day,
after what they told the American visitors was an all-night
discussion, they admitted that they were pursuing the secret weapons
program, several officials said. "We need nuclear
weapons," Kang Sok Joo, the North Korean senior foreign policy
official, said, arguing that the program was a result of the Bush
administration's hostility.
Mr.
Kelly responded that the program began at least four years ago, when
Mr. Bush was governor of Texas. The Americans left after one North
Korean official declared that dialogue on the subject was worthless
and said, "We will meet sword with sword."
Since then, the North Koreans have been more circumspect. They have
talked publicly about having the right to a nuclear weapon, even
though they have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and an
agreement with South Korea to keep the Korean Peninsula free of
nuclear weapons.
The
Bush administration has been uncharacteristically restrained.
President Bush led the push for an oil cutoff, but also issued a
statement on Nov. 15 saying that the United States had no intention
of invading North Korea. His aides hoped that the statement would
give Kim Jong Il the kind of security guarantee he had long demanded
- and a face-saving way to end the nuclear program.
Mr.
Bush's aides say the way to deal with North Korea, in contrast to
their approach to Iraq, is to exploit its economic vulnerabilities
and offer carrots, essentially the strategy the Clinton
administration used. Many here in Seoul believe it may work this
time. "The North Koreans are a lot more dependent on us, and on
the West, than they were in the 1994 nuclear crisis," said Han
Sung Joo, who served as South Korea's foreign minister then.
But
the reality, officials acknowledged, is that Mr. Bush has little
choice but to pursue a diplomatic solution with North Korea.
Kim Jong Il has 11,000 artillery tubes dug in around the
demilitarized zone, all aimed at Seoul. In the opening hours of a
war, tens of thousands of people could die, military officials here
say.
"Here's
the strategy," one American official said. "Tell the North
Koreans, quite publicly, that they can't get away with it. And say
the same thing to Pakistan, but privately, quietly."
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