New
Delhi, 01 October 2002
Recently
after the attack on the temple in Gandhinagar, India’s Defence
Minister George Fernandes made a bold statement that bolder steps
would be taken to deal with terrorism, in view of Pakistan having
stepped up its cross border support to terrorist activity. At the
same time President Bush enunciated the policy of “anticipated
defence“ to deal with Iraq and Generals Richard Myers, Peter Pace
and C-in- C of Rapid Force at Tampa, Florida and Air Chief Gen John
Jumper have completed a war game, Prominent Hammer 11, to assure
America that a swift, strong and IT led strike can be made against
Iraq. The Armed Forces are readied but have not been put on alert.
Senior Generals and Admirals took part with clear Aims to enable
change of regime in Iraq, but the President cannot go to war without
the Congress giving its approval as per the Law Governing War Powers
and Public Law enacted in USA.
In
India as we had explained earlier, war is governed by Art 74 of the
Constitution. We also suggested that immediate changes are required
in this Article, as now we are a nuclear state and we discuss here
‘How Nuclear Ready Are We?’ Bharat Karnad in his book titled
‘NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INDIAN SECURITY’ has given all the details
of India’s nuclear status and just as we analysed over a year ago,
that without further testing India’s nuclear arsenal is not battle
ready, so does Bharat explain the same thing and like us he relies
greatly on the many statements and findings of Drs Sreenivasan,
Iyengar and George Perkovich in the main. He was part of the NSAB
and the Draft Nuclear Doctrine Committee so he had access to
official data.
In
India there has been mobilization since December 2001 and 400,000
Indian and 300,000 Pakistani troops are ranged against each other
along the borders and it is the “uncertainty of intentions” of
these two nuclear powers that worries the world. In August 2002,
Pakistani troops infiltrated 1 km into the areas of Malecchi and
Loonda Sector of Gurez in Kargil, across the Line of Control before
being detected, called Kargil 2 by the media. The mountainous border
cannot be kept under complete surveillance and many posts in the
region have changed hands from time to time.
As
in the 1999 Kargil war, India had to employ Mirage 2000 aircraft
again to thwart the incursion. Pakistan’s confidence to titillate
and take on India stems from its rough but ready nuclear fission
uranium Rocket Forces, commanded by a Lt Gen. Hence India’s
military nuclear readiness level deserves an analysis as we have had
Ashley Tellis and Jasjit Singh tell us that India’s nuclear forces
are recessed and not under any one command.Both India and Pakistan
have been termed as Backward Nations with Advanced Technologies
under the acronym BNAT, because they possess weapons of mass
destruction. In the case of Iraq also a BNAT, President Bush is
worried.
The
nuclear tests conducted by India and followed by Pakistan in May
1998 took the world by surprise but now it is well documented that
India pursued its nuclear bomb programme stealthily under most Prime
Ministers’ direct support. The funding to BARC at Mumbai and DRDO
continues unabated. Pakistan pursued nuclear programmes aggressively
under Military control with subterfuge and tacit help from China.
Now it claims it has missile and aerial delivery systems in place to
nuke India but since 1998 no testing of weapons has taken place in
both countries. In the West rigorous testing was essential to prove
the efficacy of the weapons. Dr Iyengar has explained this and
Bharat Karnad puts a lot of the responsibility on Dr Chidambaram and
NSA Brajesh Mishra. About the latter, who is the key to India’s
nuclear weapons he says, ”Mishra has done little writing of his
own. But from what meager evidence is available, he is essentially a
person with “a risk averse mindset, oriented towards short-term
objectives and unwilling to think ahead or rigorously enough
……” These are telling words which in the past we have alluded
to.
Mr
Brajesh Mishra and PM Vajpayee have repeatedly stated that India has
declared a unilateral moratorium on testing and that the weapons
possessed by India are not intended for aggressive purposes. India
has also declared a “no first use” principle. These two policy
statements have lulled the Armed Forces in India who have desisted
from asking for the nuclear wherewithal, should the need ever arise
to retaliate against Pakistan’s first strike. Deterrence also
works on the principle that the aggressor be made to heed the
enemy’s nuclear capabilities. Many months ago President Dr APJ
Abdul Kalam was lecturing at the College of Combat Mhow in his
capacity as an Academic. He answered a uniformed senior audience and
assured them that the required nuclear arsenal would be provided to
the Military at the appropriate time if Pakistan ever attacked. For
DRDO the nuclear bomb became a reality when it passed a full field
drop test in May 1994 at Balasore. Kalam therefore probably implied
that dummy bombs and war heads had been tested and were in readiness
with BARC for assembly, to be delivered by the Indian Air Force and
by missiles, the only two modes feasible at present. Former Air
Chief SK Mehra had disclosed that Mirages had carried out dummy
sorties of toss bombing years ago, and the IAF swears by the Mirage
2000H which remains the sole air breathing nuclear weapon delivery
system. Ten more Mirages with modifications are on order on Dassualt
and ten SU-30 MKI’s have been recently inducted. The challenges of
EMP may have been addressed, but as the Indian Navy learnt in the
case of the INS Talwar EMI/EMC issues are very important.
Over
$2 billion dollars have also been spent to operationalise the
Prithvi and Agni missiles. The Prithvis are operational in the
conventional role with 333 and 444 Missile groups of the Indian Army
in Punjab, and the liquid fuelled missiles once readied are capable
of being fired within six months with war heads of high-explosives
(HE), pre-fragmented unitary HE, incendiary, cluster munitions (bomblets),
and fuel-air explosives (FAE) weighing around half a tonne.
A
nuclear war-head of this size is now within the technical capability
of BARC and DRDO. In the Kargil war of 1999 the Pakistani threat to
use nuclear weapons did not surface, but in June 2002 when India
threatened Pakistan with war if it did not stop cross border
terrorism, President Musharraf declared Pakistan would use Nuclear
weapons to defend itself. Flying time between the two nations is in
minutes. This raised the ante the world over. Since mobilisation
there has been a spending wave by the Armed Forces from their
revenue and capital budgets. India’s nuclear arsenal also must
have been strengthened, but no details are forthcoming.
On
22 May 1998 Brajesh Misra had stated, “Let it not be forgotten
that PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir), including the so-called
Northern areas, is an integral part of India. After all, the
unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament in February 1994 to
this effect is absolutely clear.” In absence of any contrary
Military Directive regarding Kashmir to the Armed Forces, they are
duty bound to ensure the territorial integrity of India.
Hence
the Chiefs have to have war plans ready and practiced for any
eventuality including a nuclear strike however remote it might be.
Logic would dictate that in the event of a nuclear strike by
Pakistan, Indian Armed Forces may be ordered to retaliate on counter
value and counter force targets with alacrity. It is therefore
presumed the nuclear strategy and tactics have been tried out by the
Armed Forces. However it is also known this task was to be completed
by the Strategic Force Commander under the Chief of Defence Staff
over one year ago, but the political leadership has not been able to
appoint either one of them.
Inter
Service rivalry is still rife to stake control of their own nuclear
forces. The easiest way out for the Government to resolve this
dilemma has been taken, by not assigning any forces per se to the
proposed Strategic Force Commander. The question then is can Indian
Armed Forces execute a second strike without operational practice,
nuclear doctrine and a tried out command and control structure.
There is so much to nuclear strike and safety procedures of stowage
and aborts. This begs the question. Is the Indian Government
confident of its second strike? Surely the Armed Forces have to
answer that.
The
DRDO have indicated the 800 Km AGNI-I single stage solid fuel
missiles with 1000 kg warheads have been tested and the missile is
both rail and road mobile on Tatra trucks. A control room to feed
data accompanies the missile. The covers can be slid off and the
missile can be elevated and fired in 15 minutes. This is heartening,
and seems technologically feasible but any weapon system to become
operational needs a lot of practice in the field with trials. None
have been sighted or reported.
On
the other hand Pakistan just as firmly believes that Indian
controlled Kashmir is an integral part of Pakistan. Three of the
four Indo-Pakistani wars have been fought over this same territory.
The increasingly aggressive Indian posture, coupled with the current
tension along the LoC, raises a very real possibility of war
returning to the region. The nuclear factor is of concern.
Current
Nuclear Arsenal
There
are no official figures for weapon stockpiles even at this stage of
development of India’s arsenal and facilities are not subject to
scrutiny. The only figures that can be offered are estimates made
from considerations of India’s probable ability to produce
critical raw materials and considerations of likely production
plans.
The
types of weapons India could field as discerned from the tests are:
-
A
pure fission plutonium bomb with a yield of 12 kt
-
A
fusion boosted fission bomb with a yield of 15–20 kt, made
with weapon-grade plutonium. This is questioned by most experts
as unusable for the time being
-
A
fusion boosted fission bomb design, made with reactor-grade
plutonium
-
·Low
yield pure fission plutonium bomb with yields from 0.1 kt to 1
kt
In
October 2000 David Albright made the most widely accepted estimates
of India’s plutonium production. At the end of 1999 India had
available between 240 and 395 kg of weapons grade plutonium for
weapons production, with a median value of 310 kg. He suggests that
this is sufficient for 45–95 weapons (median estimate 65). The
production of weapons grade plutonium has actually been greater, but
about 130 kg of plutonium has been consumed –– principally in
fuelling two plutonium reactors, but also in weapons tests. His
estimate for India’s holdings of less-than-weapons-grade plutonium
(reactor or fuel grade plutonium) are 4200 kg of unsafe guarded
plutonium (800 kg of this already separated) and 4100 kg of IAEA
safeguarded plutonium (25 kg of this separated).
Delivery
Systems
Agni-I
Under series Production
Specifications
Length :
18.4 meters
Diameter :
1.3 meters
Weight :
16,000 kg
Range :
700-1500 km
Stages :
Single/Two stage, solid fuel (HTPB, hydroxyl-terminated
polybutadine / oxidizer)
Guidance :
Strap-down inertial; in-flight positioning update with GPS.
Payload :
1000 kg; Re entry vehicle has carbon-carbon composite heat
shield; Thermonuclear warhead (200–300 kt)?, fission/boosted
fission warhead (greater than 15 kt)? “Agni” is Hindi for
“fire” and is also the name of the Hindu deity of fire and the
cost is estimated to be $ 2 million per piece.
Agni-II
Specifications
Length :
20 meters
Diameter :
1.3 meters
Weight :
16,000 kg
Range :
2500–3000 km
Stages :
Two stage, solid fuel (HTPB, hydroxyl-terminated
polybutadiene/oxidizer)
Guidance :
Strap-down inertial; in-flight positioning update with GPS.
Payload :
1000 kg; Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle with carbon-carbon
composite heat shield; Thermonuclear warhead (200-300 kt)?,
fission/boosted fission warhead (greater than 15 kt)? The Agni-II
costs approximately $10 million per missile and is manufactured by a
partnership of the DRDO/ DRDL and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) in
Hyderabad. It is expected that BDL will be manufacturing 10–12
missiles every year.
Prithvi
Specifications
Length :
9 meters
Diameter :
1.1 meters
Weight :
4000 kg
Propulsion :
Single stage, dual motor; liquid fuel - inhibited red fuming
nitric acid (IRFNA) oxidizer; 50% xylidene, 50% triethylamine fuel
Guidance :
Inertial
Versions :
SS-150 (Prithvi-1); Army version –– range 150 km, payload
1000 kg SS-250 (Prithvi-2); Air Force version –– range 250 km,
payload 500-750 kg
Dhanush
(“Prithvi-with modifications); Naval version –– range 350 km,
payload 500 kg fired from INS SUBHADRA twice.
Summary of Pakistan’s Missiles
Name
|
Alternate
Names
|
Range
(Km)
|
Payload
(Kg)
|
Test Firing
Date
|
Developer
|
Status
|
Hatf-1
|
|
80
|
500
|
April 1989
|
KRL
|
In service since 1996
|
Hatf-1A
|
|
100
|
500
|
February 2000
|
KRL
|
In service?
|
Hatf-2
|
|
260-300
|
500
|
April 1989
|
KRL
|
In service?
|
Hatf-3
|
|
800
|
|
3 July 1997?
|
KRL?
|
Never deployed
|
Hatf-4
|
Shaheen-1
|
750
|
1000
|
15 April 1999
|
NDC
|
Deployed September 2000
|
Hatf-5
|
Ghauri-1
|
1100-1500
|
700
|
6 April 1998
|
KRL/DPRK
|
|
Hatf-6?
|
Ghauri-2
|
2000
|
500-700?
|
14 April 1999
|
KRL/DPRK
|
|
Hatf-7
|
Shaheen-2
|
2400-2500
|
1000
|
Declared ready for test Sept. 2000
|
NDC
|
|
Ghauri-3? (Ghaznavi?)
|
3000
|
?
|
15 August 2000??
|
KRL/DPRK?
|
|
M-9
|
CSS-6/DF-15
|
600-650
|
500
|
|
China
|
Supplied?
|
M-11
|
CSS-7/DF-11
|
300
|
500-800
|
|
China
|
30-80 Supplied
|
Notes
1. NDC: National Defence
Complex
2. KRL: A.Q. Khan Research
Laboratories
3. DPRK: Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea)
4. Hatf-2 may be a Pakistani
manufactured M-11
5.
Shaheen-1 believed to be based on Chinese M-9 technology and
design Shaheen-2 believed to be based on Chinese M-18 or DF-21
technology and design Ghauri and Ghauri-2 are believed to be DPRK
(North Korea) No-dong missiles or No-dong based designs
Conclusion
It
can therefore be concluded that India does have a credible nuclear
arsenal but how effective it is for urgent deployment by the Armed
Forces is being kept secret, which is counter to the conventional
nuclear strategy of deterrence.
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