A meeting with Anton Balsingham revealed that for
the last 20 years LTTE Chief Prabhakaran had never accepted under
what conditions he would agree to live in peace within Sri Lanka. On
the other hand he had carried out and directed suicide killings
including that of former PM Rajiv Gandhi. Any nation should condemn
this immediately with open statements and take action if the nation
is capable.
India is capable or why are we spending $20b a
year on security and assured help to the region to maintain
stability. Because of Tamil sentiments of some 40 mill the
Government of India has played a ‘hands off policy of wait and
watch’ in Sri Lanka. It is not correct to allow terrorism to thrive
and a renegade Navy to operate next door and at times within the
Indian EEZ and even territorial waters. Few know that India's sea
border agreement allows Indians to fish near Kachitivu, a Sri Lankan
island, as traditional fishing rights are allowed by both countries
and Indians also have traditional visiting rights on the Island
during festivals. It’s like allowing a neighbour to fish and roam in
ones compound freely and come into the house on traditional
festivals without an invitation. Kachitivu is in LTTE waters and
India cannot enforce the agreement as there is fighting in the area.
LTTE has even arrested Indian fishermen.
Once again B Raman has done a brilliant write up
on the suicide attack on Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary and listed
all the attacks LTTE had committed, but not written whether he
supports or rejects the actions or suggested a solution –– as Indian
Intelligence men are wont to do.
We put this up for our viewers to write in if
they have any views. Should not India put some restraints on the
LTTE's terrorist actions and Indian Navy patrol the area or wait and
watch or help LTTE and its leader gain ELAM i.e. an Independent
state as we helped Bangladesh with support from USA, Russia and
Europe this time and also China. In today's scenario except for
China and Pakistan's objections and a little ire from other smaller
countries, India may be able to swing the last option with little
criticism. Failing that, India must move in with the Norwegian
Team's negotiations and find a solution.
Theoretically Sri Lanka has every right to defend
itself and safeguard its territory and can ask for India's help if
it wishes to decimate the LTTE and we sympathise with the Sri
Lankans who want peace and stability.
ATTEMPT TO KILL SRI LANKA 'S DEFENCE SECRETARY
By B. Raman
Lt. Col. Gotabhaya Rajapakse (Retd.), the younger
brother of the Sri Lankan President Mr. Mahinda Rajapakse, who
serves as his Defence Secretary, escaped unhurt on December 1, 2006,
when a suspected suicide bomber blew himself up in the vicinity of
the convoy in which the Defence Secretary was going to attend a
meeting convened by the President. Two members of his security group
were killed and a passer-by was also killed when his security guards
opened fire after the explosion, apparently in an attempt to help
his car, which remained unaffected by the explosion, get away from
the scene.
2. According to the DPA, a German Press agency,
the Police said that the male suicide bomber had fitted the
explosives in a three-wheeler taxi and was riding parallel to the
convoy of the Defence Secretary. Army outriders had attempted to
prevent the bomber's vehicle moving when the explosion was
triggered. The suicide bomber's headless body was thrown on to the
rear of the vehicle. At least 10 civilian vehicles were also caught
in the blast with at least one of them completely burnt out in the
fire that erupted after the blast. The Defence Secretary's
bulletproof BMW had come to a halt about three metres away from
where the suicide bomber triggered the explosion. The vehicle was
hit by shrapnel but none penetrated the auto. The explosion occurred
at Dharmapala road, about one kilometer away from the President's
office cum residence. The President's other official residence and
the Presidential Secretariat are located about three kilometers away
from the scene of the blast. Seven members of the Defence
Secretary's backup security team were injured in the blast.
3. The Associated Press of the US gave the
following additional details: Military spokesman Brig. Prasad
Samarasinghe said the bomber triggered the explosives as the
five-car convoy of vehicles was passing. The military said two
soldiers died; nine soldiers and five civilians were hospitalized.
The suicide bomber apparently approached on a motorized rickshaw
from the opposite direction and targeted the convoy, said Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Jayantha Wickremeratne.
4. The AFP, the French news agency, reported the
following additional details :Police said the suicide bomber rammed
a three-wheel rickshaw taxi into the convoy of some eight vehicles
at the tightly-guarded Dharmapala Mawatha road leading to Temple
Trees. The Defence Secretary was inside a bullet-proof vehicle, one
of four identical grey limousines in the convoy, police said.
5. The Defence Secretary has been accused by the
Sri Lankan Tamils of being the architect of the tough
counter-terrorism policy being followed since his brother became the
President in November, 2005.
6. The attempt to kill him has the definite
signature of the LTTE ( the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), which
specialises in acts of suicide terrorism. Since the beginning of
this year, the LTTE has carried out or attempted to carry out 12
acts of suicide terrorism, including the failed attack on the
Defence Secretary. Seven of these involved the Sea Tigers of the
LTTE Navy. The remaining five were on land--- four of them in
Colombo or its suburbs and the fifth at Digampatana in the Habarana
area of the Matale district. Two of these attacks were successful in
killing the intended target or targets. The remaining three were
only partially successful. In these three incidents, while the LTTE
successfully carried out the attacks, the targets escaped.
7. The successful attacks were the following:
June 26, 2006: A suicide bomber killed the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Sri Lankan Army,, Major General Parami
Kulathunge, the third highest appointment in the SLA, and three
others at Pannipitiya, a suburb of Colombo. Eight others were
injured.
October 16, 2006: At least 98 sailors of the Sri
Lankan Navy were killed and 100 injured as suspected LTTE suicide
bombers rammed an explosive-laden vehicle into a naval convoy at
Digampatana in the Habarana area of the Matale district.
8. The partially successful attacks were the
following:
April 25, 2006: Army Commander Lt. General Sarath
Fonseka was seriously injured and eight others were killed when a
female suicide bomber, disguised as a pregnant woman, blew herself
up in front of the military hospital inside the Colombo Army
headquarters. Twenty-seven persons were injured . The Army chief has
since recovered from his injuries and resumed his work.
August 14, 2006: At least seven persons,
including four soldiers of the Sri Lankan Army, were killed and 17
others injured in a suicide attack targeting the then Pakistani High
Commissioner, Col. (retd) Bashir Wali Mohammad in Colombo. He was
returning home after attending the Pakistan Independence day
function at the mission. He escaped unhurt though his vehicle
suffered minor damage. He is a former officer of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence and retired as the Director (chief) of
Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau. There was an element of doubt
whether the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber or through
remote control.
December 1, 2006: The attack on the Defence
Secretary.
9. A study of the suicide attacks carried out by
the LTTE on land this year indicate the following:
The LTTE's suicide bombers have been more
successful when attacking large groups than when attacking
individuals. Suicide attacks on individuals require greater
precision in the timing of the detonation. It would seem that the
attack on the Pakistani High Commissioner failed to kill the target
due to a split second delay in the detonation. The failure in the
case of the Defence Secretary was probably due to a split second
premature detonation.
The LTTE's intelligence collection capability in
Colombo and elsewhere continues to be very good. It is able to
collect fairly precise information about the movements of the
security convoys of its targets and the route they would be taking.
It would seem the Sri Lankan security agencies have not been
strictly following the normal precautions such as not following the
same route for movement every time, keeping the route to be taken
secret etc. The LTTE is able to get advance information of not only
the route, but also the time of movement.
Access control of the Government's security
agencies is weak. The ease with which the woman suicide bomber
penetrated the highly guarded Army headquarters in her attempt to
kill the Army chief indicated the poor state of access control.
Like the Maoists in India and Nepal and the ULFA
(United Liberation Front of Assam), the LTTE continues to depend on
conventional explosives and has not been using self-fabricated
explosives made out of commonly available materials and chemicals
like the jihadi terrorists have been increasingly doing.
10. The LTTE's use of the Internet for
operational purposes has till now been not as sophisticated as that
of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist organisations. It had been
using the Internet mainly for propaganda and PSYWAR purposes and for
motivating its overseas supporters. It now seems to be paying more
attention to exploiting the operational potential of the Internet.
One noticed in some of the chat groups suspected to be of LTTE
sympathisers/supporters visual observations of the scene after the
attack on the Defence Secretary being exchanged. Those reporting the
visual observations were apparently based in or near the area where
the attack was carried out and could watch what was going on.
(3-12-06)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently,
Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com
)