The LTTE Navy
Admiral Arun Prakash made a visit to Chennai recently and it was
perhaps prompted by the need to be vigilant and understand the Sri
Lankan crisis which is brewing. The LTTE attacked the Sri Lankan
Navy and their CDF was injured in much the same manner as Rajiv
Gandhi was killed. The Chief stated that the Navy and the Coast
Guard were stepping up their patrols as some 300 refugees had
already fled the North of Sri Lanka and a repeat of 1987 was to be
avoided.
B Raman (an ex-RAW No 2 man) has done a very incisive job of
analyzing the LTTE’s Navy. Pirabahkaran had cleverly invested in
LTTE merchant ships by proxy and that’s how he got arms and the
Indian Navy blew up a ship off Chennai and the one legged ‘Cdr.’
Kittu was killed. Whether the ship was in Indian waters was
controversial.
Then the LTTE formed the Sea Tigers and that kept the Sri Lankan
Navy at bay and we are surprised it operates as a proper Navy and
India says that we do not recognise it. How is it manned and
accepted by the largest neighbour, or is it just Tamil Nadu
politics?
We post an interesting piece. The point of interest is that during
the 1987–90 period the LTTE Navy was kept down and Sea Tigers never
harmed an Indian Navy ship or any Navy camp at KKS or Trincomallee
and those acts need to be replicated before it is too late. No
renegade Navy can operate in the vicinity of a powerful Indian Navy
in the area –– or it is politics again? Mr Karunanidhi has no Viako
to worry about. As they say ‘Do you get me Steve?’
Action
Against LTTE's Maritime Terrorism
International Terrorism Monitor: Paper No.58
By B.Raman
1. India and the
other members of the international community should be even more
concerned than in the past over the medium and long-term
implications of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
acquiring a capability for conventional and unconventional
(terrorism-related) maritime action.
2. This capability consists of a fleet of commercial ships run by
LTTE cadres based abroad and the so-called LTTE Navy. The commercial
fleet is normally used ostensibly for carrying legitimate commercial
cargo for different countries. This provides it with a seemingly
legitimate commercial cover and a source of revenue. When needed,
they are also clandestinely used for gun and narcotics running. In
the past, the LTTE had also placed its commercial ships at the
disposal of terrorist organisations of other countries. There is at
least one confirmed instance in 1995 when an LTTE ship had
clandestinely transported a consignment of arms and ammunition,
dispatched by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of
Pakistan
to the southern Philippines for use by the Abu Sayyaf. The HUM paid
the LTTE for its services by donating to it some anti-aircraft
weapons and ammunition. This was in addition to the cash paid for
it.
3. The so-called Navy is used for conventional and
unconventional naval operations against the Sri Lankan security
forces –– including acts of suicide terrorism. Its naval fleet has
not so far come to notice for operating in the high seas and for any
assistance rendered by it to the terrorist organisations of other
countries.
3. In the past, apart from
Sri Lanka, India
was the only country which was closely monitoring the movements of
the LTTE's commercial ships and acting against them, where necessary
and possible. The most spectacular example was the attack by the
Indian Coast Guard in 1993 on an LTTE ship transporting arms and
ammunition given by Pakistan for the LTTE. Kittu, an LTTE leader,
was travelling by that ship. To avoid the capture of the ship and
its cargo of weapons of Pakistani origin by the Indian Coast Guard,
the LTTE crew set fire to the ship, which sank. Kittu and some
members of the crew chose to go down with the ship. Some other
members of the crew jumped into the sea and were captured by the
Coast Guard.
4. Till 1996, the Governments in
New Delhi, which
were not dependent on the Tamil regional parties of Tamil Nadu for
their survival in power, acted vigorously in monitoring the
movements of the LTTE's commercial ships, attacking them when they
were suspected of carrying arms and ammunition or at least alerting
the Sri Lankan Navy about their movements.
5. The various coalition governments, which came to power in
New Delhi after 1996, were dependent on the Tamil regional parties for their
survival in power. This has resulted in a slackening of the
monitoring of the movements of the LTTE's commercial ships by the
Indian intelligence community and security agencies. There has
hardly been any significant action against LTTE's commercial fleet
in recent years. The LTTE has taken advantage of this for gun and
narcotics running and for keeping its coffers replenished.
6. Before the cease-fire agreement between the Sri Lankan
Government and the LTTE was concluded in February 2002, the two main
sources of arms and ammunition for it were those captured from the
Sri Lankan security forces during clashes and those procured in
other countries and smuggled in its commercial ships. Since the
cease-fire came into force, the first source has almost totally
dried up. This has not affected its arms holdings because of its
success in continued gun and narcotics running by taking advantage
of the slackening of the monitoring and interception operations by
India. The
LTTE's reported success in clandestinely procuring one or more light
aircraft in Europe and transporting it to the areas under its
control in the Northern Province might not have been possible but
for this slackening. The only weapons, which the LTTE has not been
able to get from outside after February 2002, are those used for
anti-aircraft operations from the ground. The ease with which the
Sri Lankan Air Force has recently carried out punitive air strikes
on the LTTE's ground positions and boats in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces, without the LTTE being able to do anything about it,
clearly indicate a continuing inadequacy of an anti-aircraft
capability with the LTTE.
7. The post-tsunami (December 2004) speculative reports about
serious damages supposedly caused to the LTTE's Navy by the tsunami
have been proved wrong by the success with which the LTTE has
organised some spectacular naval strikes –– including acts of
sea-borne suicide terrorism –– since Mr. Mahinda Rajapakse took over
as the President in November, 2005.
8. Since its conventional ground forces continue to remain
weakened due to the desertion of "Col."
Karuna, its commander in the Eastern Province, and his men in March
2004, the LTTE has been relying largely on its so-called Navy and
its capability for suicide terrorism for its reprisal strikes
against the Sri Lankan security forces –– particularly the Navy.
After a spectacular naval action by the LTTE on May 11, 2006, the
"Times" of London described it as "one of the bloodiest naval
engagements of modern times" and reported as follows: "The two-hour
engagement late on Thursday afternoon killed 17 Sri Lankan sailors,
including two officers, and an estimated 50 Tamil rebels. According
to the authorities, whose version was largely corroborated by
European monitors who witnessed the attack, 15 Tamil vessels
ambushed a squadron of six ships, an unarmed troop carrier (it
carried 700 troops) and five escorts. In the ensuing battle, four
rebel boats were sunk and an Israeli-made patrol boat was destroyed
by a rebel suicide boat. The exact strength of the rebel navy
remains a secret, but there are thought to be as many as 6,000 “Sea
Tigers” — including heavily armed gunboats, troop carriers and
speedboats laden with explosives for suicide attacks. Thursday’s
two-hour battle revealed that the rebels pose a potent threat to the
Sri Lankan Navy, which has 17,000 sailors and 50 vessels, mainly
coastal patrol boats. Jason Alderwick, a former Royal Navy warfare
officer at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said
the use of naval contingents by the Tamil rebels was a unique
feature of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and one that the authorities
struggled to contain. “The use of swarm boat tactics is very
ferocious,” he said, “often leading to close-range gunnery
situations. It has proved successful and is very hard to counter.
First you have to identify the target and engage it. This is
difficult if you have a swarm of five or 10 boats moving at high
speed against you. You might take out two, but you could still have
five more to deal with. The Sri Lankan Navy were increasingly
vulnerable, particularly since the Tamil fighters often expect, and
want, to die,” the "Times" quoted him as saying.
9. The LTTE's confidence in its strengthened naval capability
and its determination to assert its right to control the waters off
the coast of the Northern and Eastern Provinces were reflected in
statements issued after the engagement by 'Col.’ Soosai, the head of
the so-called LTTE Navy , and S.P. Thamilselvan, the political
adviser of Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE. Soosai said on
May 13,
2006: "We have openly established our control, and have
unequivocally asserted our rights to maritime waters adjoining our
homeland, in the same way we recovered and control large areas of
northeast. We are not prepared to relinquish sovereign rights to the
seas which we have won with the sacrifice of our people. Today, the
long stretch of northern seas extending from Nagarkovil to
Kokkuththoduvai is under the control of Liberation Tigers. After we
evicted the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) from the Mullaitivu garrison, our
control of northern seas has expanded and strengthened. We move with
complete freedom in these waters to transport our cadres and to
distribute material needs to our movement. We will not hesitate to
wage war with anyone who attempts to prevent us from exercising our
freedom. We have the power and right to develop the necessary
infrastructure and military strength to provide security to our
people within our homeland. Some say that International laws do not
permit parties "without a legal state" to own a naval force in seas
belonging to a sovereign state. We have one thing to say to them.
Every square-inch of land we control, and all infrastructure and
areas we administer, were not given to us. We obtained these by
force from our adversary. More than 1200 sea-tigers sacrificed their
lives during the last 15 years of struggle over maritime waters. We
have now evolved into a formidable naval force commanding control
over the northeastern seas. The price we have paid to earn our
sovereign rights to waters is immeasurable. Even during intense war,
we were able to establish sea-links with distant lands at our will.
No party was able to stop us then. How can anyone, especially within
a period of peace, try to scuttle this ability? How can we permit
this? Only recently the Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
shook hands with us and was ready to start sea-tiger boats on a
journey to the east. Now he is advancing new explanations to label
our sea movements as illegal. We are determined and will continue to
engage in activities in sea in northeastern waters that lie within
our control perimeter. Any obstacle will be overcome with
appropriate debilitating force."
10. In a letter to Major General Henricsson, the Head of the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, after the engagement of
May 11, 2006,
Thamilchelvan rejected the Monitoring Mission's statement issued
earlier the same day, stating that non-State actors cannot claim any
legitimate right to operate in the sea and air.
11. While the LTTE's ground action capability poses a threat
mainly to the national security of Sri Lanka, its emergence as a
credible naval and maritime force poses a threat even to regional
and international security. It should be of concern to the
international community as a whole and particularly to
India's
national security managers. Even though the so-called LTTE Navy has
till now acted only against the Sri Lankan Navy and has refrained
from interfering in the international (non-Sri Lankan) maritime
traffic in and through the waters adjoining Sri Lanka, its assertion
of its right to operate in the seas adjoining the Northern and
Eastern Provinces not only to protect the ground areas controlled by
it, but also to protect the livelihood of Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen
has the seeds of a potential confrontation with the Indian Navy and
Coast Guard and a potential threat to our maritime traffic and the
livelihood of our fishermen.
12.
India has unfortunately failed to articulate so far its concerns
over the so-called Navy of the LTTE. The only categorical statement
on the subject came from Admiral Arun Prakash, India’s Chief of the
Naval Staff (CONS), during his visit to Sri Lanka from September 11
to 16, 2004. Addressing a press conference at
Colombo on
September 16, 2004, he was reported to have stated as follows:
”There is some concern (in Colombo) that the port of Trincomalee
should not fall into the wrong hands. It seems to be that at the
moment the LTTE is closely bearing down on Trincomalee. The LTTE is
a proscribed terrorist organisation. There is no question of a naval
wing or anything like that. We don’t recognise entities of that
nature. Like any fanatical and suicidal organisation, they have the
potential to cause a certain amount of damage. India is solidly
behind Sri Lanka’s integrity and sovereignty. It is the country’s
stated policy that it would like to underwrite the integrity of the
island-nation.”
13. Subsequently, there has once again been muted silence,
presumably to accommodate the desire of the regional Tamil parties
of Tamil Nadu to tone down the rhetoric on this subject. The time
has come for
India to be more
proactive in this matter with a policy and action initiative at the
following two levels:
·
LEVEL
ONE: Mobilising action in the UN Security Council and other
appropriate fora for freezing, under the UN Security Council
Resolution No.1373 against terrorism, the bank accounts of all those
associated with the LTTE's commercial fleet, seizure of the ships as
assets of a terrorist organisation banned in many countries and
arrests and prosecution of the members of the crew for working for a
banned terrorist organisation.
·
LEVEL
TWO: To constitute an international coalition against maritime
terrorism in order to force the LTTE to dismantle its maritime
capability through diplomatic pressure if possible and through naval
action, if necessary.
Back
to Top
Disclaimer
Copyright