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KASHMIR CRIES OUT FOR A SOLUTION by a Foreign Researcher |
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Cross-border terrorism inspired and abetted by outsiders, daily blasts and killings in Jammu and Kashmir, shelling by both sides across the LOC, infiltrations et al -- India and Pakistan are carrying out an undeclared war out there. Thousands of innocent lives, both civilian and security forces have been lost. Is there an end to this unnecessary bloodshed? Can we find an acceptable solution? A foreign researcher offers food for thought and a possible end to this crisis. What
do you think? We welcome your opinions and views on this
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-- Editor EXECUTIVE SUMMARY India’s northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir is reportedly one of the most beautiful places on earth. Most of us will not be seeing it anytime soon because it is also one of the most dangerous. Jammu and Kashmir is, today, a land torn by terrorism and political strife. The seeds of Kashmir’s current situation were sown when Pakistan and India were partitioned on August 15, 1947. In October of that year, in the face of a Pakistani backed invasion, Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India. When the invaders were pushed back, one third of the state remained occupied by Pakistan. The terms of the accession and Nehru’s promise to hold a plebiscite to ratify the accession when order was restored became the base ingredients of the current dissent. Today in Kashmir, more than a dozen terrorist organizations and an Indian "peacekeeping" force are engaged in an escalating spiral wherein one atrocity begets another. The government is corrupt and unresponsive to the real welfare of its citizens. For all the bloodshed, there is no consensus on what is being fought for. Some are striving for independence, some for accession to Pakistan, and some for the further division of the state into communal areas. The losers are, of course, the people of Kashmir. In this Opinion paper, I will examine the history and development of the current state of affairs, what the State Autonomy Commission Report suggests, and the positions of the various parties to the problem. I will then examine some possible solutions. Among the questions I ask are, "Who wants the conflict resolved?" and "Can peace be negotiated within the present context?" Finally, I suggest a possible context for negotiation. My conclusion is not optimistic. Some solution is essential because the longer the terrorism and the resulting anti terrorist repression continues and the longer the threats and counter threats over the Line of Control continue, the closer India and Pakistan move to a major conflict. Given the present governments and present attitudes, I think the prospect of real resolution is slim. At the present time, resolution seems possible in only one of two ways; through some leap of faith the two governments dramatically alter their present positions, put in place a workable cease fire and then honestly try to figure out how they can co-exist or a major conflict occurs with huge casualties and the condemnation of the civilized world forces a solution. INTRODUCTION I began writing this Opinion the day after Independence Day in India, this year commemorating the 53rd anniversary of India’s existence. In New Delhi, appropriate celebrations were held, featuring the traditional speech by the Prime Minister at the Red Fort. The rest of the country was in a celebratory, if cautious, mood. In the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, however, there was little celebration. There was, in the minds of most of its inhabitants, little to celebrate. Most inhabitants, in fact, stayed in their homes fearing for their safety. Jammu and Kashmir has, for 11 years, been squeezed between militant groups opposed to Indian rule and Indian security forces repressing the militants and, all too often, anyone else who happens to be in the vicinity. The day being celebrated was, in fact, the beginning of the problems that continue to vex Jammu and Kashmir to this day. When Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, contemplated the turnover of British rule to an independent India in April of 1947, he firmly believed that India’s unity was the greatest single legacy Britain could leave behind. Dividing India was, he assured Gandhi, the last solution he wished to adapt. In perhaps a visionary sense, he believed that to respond to the Muslim appeal to divide the country was to sow the seeds of tragedy. For Jammu and Kashmir, this has proven to be a sadly accurate vision. Mountbatten’s inability to persuade Mohammed Ali Jinnah that the partition of India was a dangerous course to follow led, in mid-April, to the decision to partition Pakistan from India. India’s questionable promise of a plebiscite to ratify Jammu and Kashmir’s accession and India’s failure to integrate Kashmir into the Union ultimately doomed Jammu and Kashmir to the seemingly irreconcilable mess in which it finds itself today. BACKGROUND Prior to August 15, 1947 what is now India consisted of two parts; one was the provinces of India, administered by the central government in New Delhi, and the other was a collection of 565 Princely States presided over by a collection of Maharajas, Nawabs, Rajas and other hereditary rulers. These Princely States represented one third of India’s land area and one quarter of the population. With independence, the states were "free" to choose to join the new republic or, presumably, the newly created Muslim country of Pakistan. Independence was not listed as an option. Five hundred and sixty two of the states chose to accede to the Republic of India. Of the three Princes who chose to remain on their thrones, one was the Nawab of Junagadh where, it is said, it was better to be born a dog than a man. The Nawab tried to affiliate this tiny state, situated in the heart of India, with Pakistan. It took almost two weeks for Indian army troops to arrive and dissuade the Nawab who, instead, fled to Pakistan with a planeload of wives, pets and loot. Another holdout was the Nizam of Hyderabad who wanted to be independent. The Nizam was a penurious little man who was, at that time, reputedly the wealthiest person in the world. He had a large army equipped with artillery and aircraft and seemed to have everything required to be independent except a seaport and the support of his people. After a lengthy attempt to convince Great Britain and India to recognize his independence, he too acceded to India. Kashmir, under Maharaja Hari Singh, was the third hold out. EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACCESSION OF KASHMIR TO INDIA One hundred years prior to India’s independence, Hari Singh’s ancestors had purchased Kashmir from the East India Company for six million Rupees and an annual tribute of six shawls spun from the pashmina wool that grew on the necks of goats in Kashmir’s mountains. Hari Singh, Maharaja of Kashmir, was a Brahmin caste Hindu whose four million subjects were mostly Muslim. Hari Singh was an authoritarian ruler, social reformer and antagonizer of the British who, aside from filling his jails with political rivals, also had a sizable army to defend his frontiers and lend emphasis to his claims of independence. With the creation of a contiguous Muslim country, it was unthinkable to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, that predominately Muslim Kashmir would do anything other than eventually accede to Pakistan. In late August of 1947, however, Jinnah received information that Hari Singh had no intention of joining his state to Pakistan. This was intolerable. A plan was devised to arm the fierce Pathan tribesman of northwest Pakistan and send them to attack Srinigar to force the Maharaja to join Pakistan. The plan might have succeeded. On the night of the 22nd of October thousands of Pathan tribesmen crossed the Jellum river into Kashmir at the tiny city of Muzaffarabad and headed for Srinigar, some 135 miles of mostly paved road away. The plan, as it turned out, began to disintegrate almost immediately when the tribesmen began looting the Hindu bazaars of Muzaffarabad rather than driving rapidly toward Srinigar. Delays occasioned by frequent looting missions continued to slow down the advance. The delay allowed news of the "invasion" to reach Delhi before the tribesmen reached Srinigar. Great Britain could hardly deploy its troops in a newly independent India. If there was to be military intervention, it had to be by Indian troops. Mountbatten was also of the opinion that India should not intervene until Jammu and Kashmir was formally part of India so it was essential that Hari Singh be pressured into signing the accession paper as soon as possible. This was accomplished on the 26th of October. Hari Singh’s letter seeking accession stated that he had considered acceding to India or Pakistan or standing independent with cordial relations with both. Singh was well aware of Nehru’s condition of popular support for accession. He was also well aware of the invading Pathan tribesman on his doorstep. He had decided on accession to India, he said, because, "The only alternative is to leave my country and my people to freebooters." As "good faith" to Nehru that he would achieve popular support, he promised to invite Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, whom he had previously imprisoned, to head the government. In Lord Mountbatten’s letter accepting accession, he stated, "Consistent with their policy that when the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. It is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the raider, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by reference to the people." The accession was, by this statement, considered temporary until affirmed by a vote of the people of Kashmir. THE GENESIS OF CURRENT MILITANCY AND TERRORISM On the 27th of October 329 Sikhs and eight tons of equipment arrived at the Srinigar airport and halted the Pathan’s drive toward Srinigar. They were the first of what would eventually be 100,000 Indian troops. Ali Jinnah was furious when the attack was repelled and the raiders driven back. He ordered Pakistani units disguised as irregulars to reinforce the tribesmen. The battle raged for many months before finally reaching the United Nations. India and Pakistan achieved a cease-fire agreement on 01 January 1949 following a little over a year of fighting. The Cease-Fire Line, later to become the Line of Control, left roughly one third of Kashmir in Pakistani hands. The raiders were expelled from two thirds of the country and a semblance of law and order restored. By Nehru’s promise, one he had no real right or authority to give, these were the conditions for holding a plebiscite to determine what the people of Kashmir wished to do; ratify the accession to India or accede to Pakistan. This did not happen in 1949 and, 51 years later, it still has not happened. In 1950, elections were held in "Indian" Kashmir to elect an assembly that would be charged with framing a constitution and legally defining the state’s relationship with India. The National Conference party (NC) won the election and very quickly put forth an interim constitution. Many people in Kashmir still demanded a plebiscite. Delhi countered that the election constituted "reference to the people". On the Indian side, Jammu and Kashmir was granted special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. It is significant to note that Article 370, granting this special status, is contained in the Constitution in a section titled, "Temporary and Transitional Provisions". In his Inaugural Address on 05 November 1950, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah said, "The Constitution of India has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exception of items grouped under defense, foreign affairs and communications in the Instrument of Accession, we have complete freedom to frame our constitution in the manner we like." Special note should be made of this language because, years later, it will be alleged by various groups that Kashmir acceded only these three areas of control and should be autonomous in all other regards. "The Indian Constitution", said the Sheikh, "has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This should meet the argument that Muslims in Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus. The Indian Constitution has amply and fully repudiated the concept of a religious state." Pakistan’s claim to being a Muslim state the Sheikh described as, "a screen to dupe the common man so that he may not see that Pakistan is a feudal state." Sheikh Abdullah was, however, not unaware that Hindus were capable of communalism. "Certain tendencies have been asserting themselves in India which may, in the future, convert it into a religious state wherein the interests of Muslims may be jeopardized. The continued accession of Kashmir to India should, however, help in defeating this tendency." In July of 1952, Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah signed an agreement enunciating ten points defining the relationship between Kashmir and India. To quote an article by Lt. Col. TKS Ludra, "According to this agreement, while residual powers rested with the Central Government while dealing with the other states, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, they rested with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. A clear violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. What was worse, while a citizen of Jammu and Kashmir would also be a citizen of India the reverse was not allowed. This also allowed the state of Jammu and Kashmir to incorporate the pre-independence law that denied outsiders the right to buy land in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This created a situation that the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, regarding evacuee property, in Jammu and Kashmir, would not be valid for Jammu and Kashmir. Thus those citizens of Jammu and Kashmir who migrated to Pakistan could return at any time and reclaim their property, this facility was not allowed to refugees from Pakistan who entered Jammu and Kashmir." Lt. Col. Ludra continued, "In fact these evacuees are, today, citizens of no state. They are denied citizenship of Jammu and Kashmir and, as such, of India. They are not allowed to acquire any property in that state, nor have they been given any compensation for the property they left behind in Pakistan. In other words, Sheikh Abdullah had ensured that Muslims would remain in majority in the state." "In spite of the agreement between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah there were still very clear areas of disagreement. In addition, the Agreement of 1952 became the basis for further and ever increasing demands from Jammu and Kashmir. All this time the Praja Parishad of Jammu were demanding the complete merger of the state with India. This was something that was not acceptable to Sheikh Abdullah. That was the time that the Cold War was at its peak and the western powers (read the United States) were keen that Jammu and Kashmir came into their camp. … With allurements being offered by the western powers, Sheikh Abdullah started toying with the idea of independence. He started using the same communal card which he had condemned earlier, by using the Friday Namaz Assembly, at the Hazratbal Masjid (Mosque), to rouse Muslim congregations against India and Hindus. It was this (and the violence that followed) that drove Nehru to arrest him and place Bahkshi Ghulam Mohammed in the hot seat of Wazir-e-Azam (Chief Minister). The administration of BG Mohammed was marked by rampant corruption. His administration also produced documents that formed the basis of the 1954 Constitution Order, issued by the President of India, which completely changed the 1952 Accord. By this order, the Parliament of India was empowered to make laws for Jammu and Kashmir. Fundamental rights guaranteed in the Indian Constitution were extended to Kashmir which, up until that time, had no such provision. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was completed and became effective on January 26, 1957. Kashmir became the only Indian State to have its own constitution and its own flag. With the implementation of its constitution nearly a decade after accession, conflict was far from over. Conflicts between India and Pakistan, Kashmir and India and between various groups within the state were only beginning. On 02 July 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Shimla Accord under which the two countries resolved to respect the Line of Control and to resolve differences over Kashmir through peaceful means. The actual settlement of differences was deferred to some future date. It is the Shimla Accord that is the reference point of continuing discussions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In 1975 an accord was arrived at between the Sheik and Indira Gandhi that assured the continuation of Article 370 but did not include restoring the titles of sadr-e-riyasat (Governor) and wazir-e-azam (Chief minister) which had been abolished earlier. The Indira accord also rejected Sheik Abdullah’s demand that the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court and the Indian Election Commission be restricted in Jammu and Kashmir. Of more far reaching nature, the accord eliminated the power of the state government to make changes to its constitution relating to the appointment, powers and privileges of the government. Manipulation of the electoral process in Kashmir by the political forces has been extant since the state’s inception. In 1986, however, discontent within the state began to find significant popular support. It was in 1986 that the Muslim United Front came into existence as a group of pro-independence activists, pro-Pakistanis and other Islamic organizations. In state elections in 1987 it appeared that the MUF would do quite well. Blatant election rigging by the NC and the arrest of many MUF leaders swelled the ranks of the MUF and spawned the formation of numerous militant groups who sought arms and training in Pakistan. The major militant organizations seemed divided between those who supported independence and those who advocated accession to Pakistan. Militancy and violence increased, leading to a boycott of the 1989 national parliamentary election by a majority of voters. Popular protest against state and federal government eventually led to a massive crackdown on militants and, in January 1990, the imposition of Presidents Rule on the state. INSURGENCY, TERRORISM AND THE MUSHROOM CLOUD Government repression of militants was brutal. In retaliation, militant groups increased their attacks on Indians. Sabotage, murder, kidnapping and bombing became a way of life. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of some 23 political and militant organizations fighting for independence, was formed to act as a political front for the independence movement. In the mid 1990’s, Indian security forces began the development of local auxiliaries to fight insurgency. These state sponsored paramilitary groups added to the brutality of repression in Kashmir which, predictably, resulted in more terrorist acts. Pakistani support of terrorists has increased steadily for a number of years. May of 1996 saw the first parliamentary elections held in Kashmir since 1989. Despite widespread allegations of coercion and other irregularities, the National Conference party formed the first government since 1990 with Farooq Abdullah becoming chief minister for a second time. 1996 also saw the establishment of the State Autonomy Commission in response to election promises made by the National Conference. Following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May of 1998, hostilities and shelling increased along the LoC. In February of 1999 there appeared a ray of hope that hostilities might be lessened when Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee made his much publicized bus trip to Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration in which India and Pakistan promised to renew talks on Kashmir and to discuss, in advance, any future arms tests. The workability of the prior notification clause was tested in April of 1999 when India tested its long range Agni missile and when Pakistan replied by testing its long range Gauri and mid-range Shaheen missiles. In May, before the glow of Mr. Vajpayee’s trip to Lahore could subside and before the ink on the Lahore Declaration was dry, the proxy war in Kashmir boiled over once more. Over the winter, Pakistan had moved troops and equipment into position along the LoC and military conflict once again broke out, this time in the Kargil region of Kashmir. The battle of Kargil lasted months and escalated to division level conflict. Before it was concluded by Pakistan’s withdrawal, many hundreds of casualties had been sustained by both India and Pakistan. The battle was politicized by both sides, Vajpayee being anointed the "Hero of Kargil" and the "Chief Protector of the nation". The losers, as is usually the case, were the Kashmiri citizens. Many civilians died and much property was destroyed. Militants promoting independence argued more vocally that Kashmir had nothing to gain from alliance with either India or Pakistan. Pro-Pakistan militants argued that the war was just further proof that Hindu India offered nothing to Muslim Kashmir and that they should become part of Pakistan. A more ominous product of the conflict was increased commentary on both sides about the potential use of nuclear weapons. Today, the situation is little changed. Major militant organizations reported to be operating in Kashmir at this time include the Hizb-ul-Mujahidin, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lash-i-Toiba. The Hizbul is predominately Kashmiri and has been operating since late 1989. Its current strength is estimated to be approximately 1000 persons and is led by Syed Salahuddin. Lashkar is a very fanatical group and is made up of mostly non-Kashmiris. It began operating in Kashmir in 1993 with an estimated strength of about 400 and is led by Prof. Hafeez Mohammed Saeed. Jaish is a new organization in Kashmir and is headed by Maulana Masood Azhar (one of those released as a result of the Indian Air hijacking). It is reported that many existing groups are being merged into the Jaish-e-Mohammed. There are a dozen other smaller militant groups, with strengths of 25 to 150 persons also operating in Kashmir. These groups are well armed. Their hardware includes AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles, light machine guns, revolvers and landmines. They also are said to have night vision devices and advanced communication equipment. The Pakistanis deny supplying or training the militant organizations in Kashmir, a claim that, in light of the equipment these groups possess, seems to lack any credibility whatsoever. The Indian Government forces in Kashmir include the Indian Army (which includes the Rashtriya Rifles counter insurgency unit), Federal Security Forces, the Central Reserve Police Force, and the Border Security Force. At the conclusion of the Kargil conflict, there were probably between 400,000 and 600,000 Indian troops of one branch or another deployed in the valley and along the LoC. A decade or more of insurrection and a large scale battle in Kashmir have left the area in shambles. Somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000 Kashmiris have died. Ten thousand women have been widowed. An estimated 15,000 children have been orphaned. India’s security forces are regarded by many as butchers rather than protectors and stand accused of robbery, rape, torture and murder. The media report new atrocities by both protectors and the protected on an almost daily basis. Terrorist acts are blamed on Pakistan sponsored militants or the ISI. Security force acts are described as the repression of terrorism. Whoever is responsible, people are being killed in large numbers. Who, really, are the terrorists or militants? Why do they exist? What is it they are fighting for or against that is so important that they are willing to die for it? People need a reason to become terrorists and insurgents. If some of the terrorists are not Kashmiri, then the local population for some reason accepts them. Some of the terrorists and militants are ideologues, but not most. Some are religiously motivated. Some are economically motivated. Some are seeking to avenge some particular wrong. Some seek an independent Kashmir. Some seek to accede to Pakistan. Whatever their individual motivations, most are very unhappy with Kashmir’s current relationship with India and many are the result of years of brutal repression. What seems to exist is a convergence of heavy handed repression, long festering religious animosity, lack of a feeling of inclusiveness in the Indian Union, an unfulfilled promise of a plebiscite, lack of economic development, governmental corruption and the unwillingness of both India and Pakistan to consider a solution driven by the desire of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. THE STATE AUTONOMY COMMISSION REPORT In June of this year, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah called a special session of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly to discuss the very controversial Autonomy Committee report. The report, produced by the State Autonomy Committee, which was constituted in 1996, recommended a package very similar to the one suggested by Farooq’s father in 1953. Its’ demands were similar to those which landed Sheik Abdullah in jail for two decades. After five days of debate, the resolution supporting the report was passed. The report demanded, among other things, that autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir be restored to pre-1953 conditions (only three areas of influence by the Central Government). The State Autonomy Commission Report attacks the 1954 Constituent Order on a number of technical grounds claiming that the Constituent Assembly was in session and, therefore the Government of Jammu and Kashmir had no standing in constitutional matters at the time. In any case, the Committee notes that by 1986 42 Amendments had been issued to the Order which severely restricted the power of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. All India Services had, by that time been brought into the states as had the Election Commission. The State Autonomy Commission strongly advocated that they revert back to the status of the 1952 Accord (referred to as Pre-1953 status) Farooq Abdullah’s NC party is part of the BJP led NDA government but the two could not be further apart on the subject of autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir. The United Front government, predecessor to the NDA, strongly supported the autonomy issue but the BJP, and its philosophical parent, the RSS, is very much opposed to it. So opposed that the RSS and the VHP have vocally advocated the abrogation of Article 370 which gives J&K its’ special status. Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee called Farooq Abdullah on the first day of the assembly session to express his concern at hearing reports that the report might actually be put to a vote. Later in the session, Farooq flew to Delhi to confer with Vajpayee. Farooq has been under a great deal of pressure in recent months with charges of misgovernance and corruption during his three and a half year rule beginning to stick with alarming frequency. Farooq has been able to generate only 60,000 jobs and many of these are tainted by charges of corruption and nepotism. Unemployment is high and disillusioned youth are increasingly going across the boarder where, reportedly, the Pakistani ISI pays Rs 5000/ month, a bounty on Indian soldiers killed and a payment to the families of militants killed in action. Many in the BJP and Congress Party charged that the special session of the assembly was merely a tactic to deflect criticism. There are others who see the session as Farooq’s way of getting back at the Delhi government for suggesting it discuss issues in J&K with the secessionist Hurriyat forces. Farooq declared that, "Autonomy is our legitimate right. I don’t see why the skies fall when we raise this demand. There is no question of any bargaining." It is important to look closely at what the State Autonomy Commission proposed to achieve: 1. They proposed that the word "Temporary" should be deleted from the title of Part XXI of the Constitution of India and also from the heading of Article 370 where they proposed it be replaced with the word "special". Fifty years seems like a long time for something to regarded as temporary. 2. The Commission proposed that the fundamental rights granted to all Indian citizens by the Constitution of India should not apply to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir. They proposed instead that a section on fundamental rights be added to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution. As the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution exists today, it has no specific guarantee of rights. It is interesting to speculate whether the lack of inclusion of such a section was intentional. If it was intentional, why? Possibly to allow repression of regional or religious minorities in the case of independence? Possibly as a bargaining tool for future negotiations? 3. The Commission proposed that the Supreme Court of India not have jurisdiction in Jammu and Kashmir. Again, why? To allow the repression of non-Muslim minorities? As a bargaining chip? 4. The Commission proposed that the Indian Election Commission not have authority to conduct elections in the state. It proposed that a state election commission assume that responsibility. Given the history of rigged and questionable elections, this would seem an extremely blatant move to consolidate power by Farooq Abdullah. 5. The Commission proposed that the only applicability of the Indian Constitution in Kashmir be those three areas defined in the Instrument of Accession in 1952; defense, external affairs, and communications. This also seems to be a rather blatant attempt to consolidate power with the Kashmiri (Muslim) majority at the expense of other regions and groups. 6. The Commission proposed that the declaration of state of emergency would be subject to the concurrence of the state government which would, in turn, be contingent on approval of the State Assembly. They further proposed that, should the Assembly not approve the state of emergency within two months, it was revoked. This concept has huge implications. First, of course, is that the government of the state might go in any direction or allow any level of corruption without the ability of the central government to intercede. The second is that if Pakistan should attempt to occupy the state, a pro-Pakistan government might keep Indian troops from interceding. 7. The Commission proposed that a sitting judge in Jammu and Kashmir could be removed only by the action of the two houses of the Jammu and Kashmir legislature and not by the Indian Parliament. This would completely eliminate any checks and balances in the judiciary and pose the possibility of a captive and corrupt judiciary. 8. The Commission proposed the removal of All India Services from Jammu and Kashmir with state bodies assuming those duties. The services would include the Indian Administrative Services, the Indian Police Service and important oversight agencies such as the Indian Audit and Accounts and Central Board of Taxation. While these agencies may not be world class in their efficiency or possibly their transparency, it is hard to imaging what would replace them. Any semblance of accountability for income and expenditure would, in all probability, disappear. 9. The Commission proposed that the Central Government no longer administer Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes and that that power revert to the state government. Given the tone of other proposals, one must wonder just how much attention and resource these areas and groups would receive. 10. The Commission proposed that the ability of the state government to change the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution in matters of appointment, powers and privileges that was eliminated in 1975 in the Indira Accord be restored. 11. The Commission proposed that the original provisions of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, including the name and the appointment of the head of state, which was amended in 1965, should be restored. The Chief Minister would again be called Wazir-e-Azam and the Governor called Sadar-e-Riyasat. The question arises again, "is Farooq Abdullah really advocating an independent Jammu and Kashmir or is he attempting to maneuver India into the position of being guarantor to a feudal fiefdom owned by the Abdullah family?" How many of the recommendations of the State Autonomy Commission are serious and how many are just potential bargaining chips? The J&K assembly passed the resolution and forwarded the report and resolution to New Delhi. On 04 July, the cabinet of PM Vajpayee summarily rejected the resolution without discussion saying, "The government is of the firm conviction that national integration and devolution of powers to the states must go together." The action of the NDA Cabinet has put both Mr. Vajpayee’s government and Farooq in a bind. Farooq is in political trouble in J&K. His authority there being eroded by allegations of corruption, increased custodial killings and other human rights violations. Major constituencies in Jammu and Ladakh are protesting violently against the actions of the government in appropriating nearly all resources to the interests of the Kashmiri Muslims at the expense of others. Many politicians are calling for Farooq to sever his ties with the NDA but he is regarded as the "NDA’s man" in J&K. While many have judged the passing of the State Autonomy Commission Report to be only a means of starting debate on the continuing status of Jammu and Kashmir and have condemned its outright rejection by the Central Government of India, the implications of these actions are much further reaching. The centre has limited its maneuvering room by slighting the CM who is regarded as their own representative and Farooq is left as the loser of a gambit to rally support by fulfilling a 1996 election promise. For many Kashmiris, what faith they may have had left in both state and central governments is further eroded. The larger question, however, is if Jammu and Kashmir can press for independence, what about other groups? What about Tamils? What about Nagaland, Assam or Bodoland? For that matter, how about Punjab and the Sikhs? The list of organizations demanding independence for their regions is lengthy indeed and includes: United Liberation Front of Asom· Assam Watch· Bengal Liberation Army (which demands the secession of West Bengal)· Bodoland Liberation Force (which demands an independent Bodoland created from Assam)· Dalitstan Organization (which demands independence for predominately Dalit Scheduled Tribes areas)· Gujrat Swaraj Sangh (which demands an independent Gujrat)· Council of Khalistan (which demands an independent Sikh Khalistan)· Maratha Rashtra Parishad ( which demands the restoration of Shivaji’s 18th Century Empire)· Revolutionary Party of Manipur (which demands an independent Manipur)· Hezb-e-Muglistan, Pan-Islamic Mughlestan and Jihad-e-Mughelstan (which wants to restore the Muglestan Khilafat which would involve the union of Pakistan and India as well as Bangladesh, Nepal and Afghanistan), Oriya Mahasabha (which demands an independent Orissa)· Indian National Front for Smaller States (demanding the creation of Bodoland from Assam, Gorkhaland from West Bengal, Purbanachal from eastern Uttar Pradesh, Panchal from western Uttar Pradesh, Bundelkhand from southern Uttar Pradesh, Telengana from Andhra Pradesh, Vidarbha from Maharashtra, Saurashtra from Gujarat, Malowa from Madhya Pradesh and Kodagu from Karnataka) All this in addition to the already committed formation of Uttaranchal (northern UP), Jharkhand (southern Bihar) and Chhattisgarh (eastern MP). The list goes on. Some of these groups are small annoyances and others are large, very vocal and potentially dangerous. The point is that if any form of independence is considered for Jammu and Kashmir, it will only stoke the fires of other radical groups who perceive some benefit for themselves and feel they have an equally valid claim. There is some thought that the autonomy issue raised by the Autonomy Commission is just a smoke screen for a more deceptive plan. Also recommended by the Commission were:
If one looks at a map and overlays the territory with the predominant demographics, it is not hard to see that these recommendations divide the state into communal areas. The Kashmir Valley being almost totally Muslim, Ladakh with many Buddhists, and Hindus and Sikhs in Jammu segregated into other areas except in Pir Panjal where the Hindus are combined with majority Muslims. This would pave the way for a potential plebiscite to send all of Jammu and Kashmir, with the possible exception of the Leh and Jammu provinces to Pakistan. IS THERE A RESOLUTION TO KASHMIR’S PROBLEMS? The run-up to Independence Day saw insecurity increase in Jammu and Kashmir. Atrocity followed atrocity. Security forces went to a state of maximum alert. Military and police forces reported seizing large quantities of explosives and firearms nearly every day. Since June, the army reports finding 500 kg (1105 lb) of RDX explosive (also know as C-3 and C-4). One kg of RDX (2.2 pounds) is considered capable of causing a large amount of destruction. If they found 500 kg of RDX how much was not found? House to house searches were carried out and checkpoints were established on almost all major roads. How many more atrocities will this cause? Everyday life in many parts of Kashmir has slowed to a crawl. The Hizbul Mujahideen (advocates of acceding to Pakistan) recently announced a cease fire in order to facilitate talks with Delhi over the future of Jammu and Kashmir. This was denounced by the secessionist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and the Hizbul was suspended from the United Jehad Council (an umbrella group of 14 guerilla groups fighting in Kashmir). When India refused to include Pakistan in peace talks, the Hizbul ended the cease fire and the APHC claimed vindication for their stand against the cease fire. The United States called for a renewal of the cease-fire and restoration of the peace process. The US action was driven to a degree by a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that, post Kargil, the chance of a non-nuclear military conflict between India and Pakistan was in the 50-50 range with the likelihood of a nuclear exchange going up and down. What should frighten people is that the possibility exists at all. Against the current backdrop of 11 years of militancy, 50,000 plus dead, 10,000 widows, 15,000 orphans and the possibility of nuclear exchange, just what might peace be? Between whom? Resolving what? What do the Kashmiri people want? It’s hard to say. Some want to remain with India, some would rather be with Pakistan and some want "azadi" (based on a concept of ethnic solidarity called "Kashmiriyat". Those favoring turning to either India or Pakistan should look at what either would provide? Pakistan is, for all intents and purposes, bankrupt both financially and politically and India has not demonstrated a particularly enlightened approach toward the area, viewing it more as a military buffer with Pakistan. And what would Azadi bring? Independence and prosperity or continuing and worsening economic problems, corruption and strife? Would it relieve dependence on India and Pakistan? Would anything really change for the better? Pakistan would love to see Kashmir fully integrated into its territory. Pakistan seems to believe that this will resolve Kashmir’s identity problem. On another level, if Kashmir were to cease to be a focal point for frustration and hatred, what else might erupt? India simply will not let Kashmir go. To let go of Kashmir would, in the Indian view, be a first step toward a national disintegration. A more real concern should be that if Kashmir were to go to Pakistan, it would remain in turmoil and provide a closer border to the population centers of India for terrorism, smuggling, and drugs. From the perspectives of both India and Pakistan, if Kashmir were to go to either side or to become independent, few of the problems would go away. The big question is "is there any ground for a solution to the Kashmir problem"? The general principles upon which a solution might be based are Kashmiriyat, National Self-determination, Muslim Separateness and Democratic Co-Existence. Kashmiriyat, a concept of ethnic solidarity, would assume some conflict between clearly distinct entities where the choice is clearly one or another. This is not really the case. There are similarities between Kashmir and other separatist movements in Punjab, Assam and even the Tamil separatists. These movements were engendered by unmet economic and political expectations and dissatisfaction with what was perceived as control by the Central Government. National Self-determination has, in the past, been used as a device to re-define political boundaries. This was invoked, for example, in the unification of Italy and Germany and in the creation of states such as Greece and Albania in the eighteenth century. National self-determination is in opposition to another historical principle, that of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. If one pursues the concept of national self-determination, the borders of many countries might be challenged. India, for example, might become a dozen or more countries as previously enumerated. Muslim Separateness is, of course, the principle favored by Pakistan but there is very little to recommend this concept. The existence of Bangladesh speaks loudly against the validity of the Muslim Separateness concept. There are, in fact, more Muslims in India than in Pakistan and most would appear to not be interested in breaking away to join Pakistan. If ethnic solidarity, national self-determination, and Muslim separateness are ruled out, Democratic Co-existence is the only basis left upon which a viable solution can be based. No political unit can be considered as stable unless it accommodates all social, religious and ethnic groups within its confines equitably. This is much more easily said than done. It is not occurring in Bihar, Assam, Sri Lanka and UP and probably some other places and the result is instability varying from local clashes to open warfare. Somehow, it is within this space that a solution to Kashmir must be found. The question that seems not to be asked by the involved parties to the conflict is, "What kind of solution will be best for the people of Kashmir?" Joining Pakistan would seem not to do anything for the wellbeing of the people of Kashmir. Pakistan is unstable politically and socially and in deep economic distress. If the lot of the Kashmiris in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is any barometer, little is to be gained by association with Pakistan. Further dividing Kashmir is probably not the right course of action either. This will only create smaller, less economically viable, more politically unstable units and will not do anything to lessen the existing conflict. Independence is also illusory. It sounds good and provides a rallying point but an independent Kashmir would have most of the same conflicts as it has today. If Jammu and Ladakh were split off as a non-Muslim state, it would be small, weak and dependent upon India just as Jammu and Kashmir is today except more so. The rest of the state would also remain dependent on either India or Pakistan. Staying with India, if an agreement guaranteeing real autonomy can be worked out, is suggested by many as the best solution from the point of view of the people of Kashmir. But, given the past 50 years of experience in state governance, what could the people really expect but more corruption, repression and drift to feudalism? What is going to really improve the lot of the people? There is no sustainable industry large enough to drive the economy. Their biggest potential industry may well be tourism and it is unlikely that militancy will abate to the point necessary to develop this. WHO WANTS THE CONFLICT RESOLVED? In my view, the lack of resolution of the conflict in Kashmir has little to do with Kashmir itself. Rather, Kashmir is a surrogate for the deep rooted enmity between India and Pakistan; between Hindus and Muslims; between classes and cultures. Until India and Pakistan can decide how to live with each other, little will change in Kashmir. Kashmir will remain a convenient focus of the enmity between two very immature political systems, neither leadership really willing to make any significant concession or accommodation in its relationship with the other, neither evidencing any real vision for the future. Prolonging the conflict in Kashmir may well be viewed by both sides as advantageous at this point in time. From the Pakistani point of view, the longer the battle over the Line of Control goes on, the greater the chance of focusing world attention on the dispute and, with that, the better the chance (at least in their view) that the LoC will be recognized as an international boundary. This will then legitimize Pakistan’s October 1947 grab of part of the original Kashmir. From there, continued militancy and continuing pressure for a plebiscite to determine if the rest of Kashmir wants to go with India or Pakistan is probably viewed as a good probability to give all of Kashmir to Pakistan. Establishing the LoC as a recognized border is not essential to this plan but is a solidifying step that takes one more item of discussion off the table. One cannot forget, either, that Pakistan is a militarily controlled country whether it is in "democratic" or "dictatorial" mode at any given moment. Armies exist to fight. Kashmir provides justification for spending a lot of money on the army, and therefore the leadership, as long as the perceived threat of battle exists. From India’s point of view, prolonging the conflict in Kashmir may be considered an effective way to bankrupt Pakistan and to tie up its military forces to minimize pressure on the Indian military in other areas. There may well be a thought that by bankrupting Pakistan it could again one day be subjugated by India. By pinning down the Pakistan army in Kashmir, India may view its remaining border with Pakistan as more secure. In any case, India is under no circumstance willing to give up Kashmir. Even limited autonomy is unpalatable. Prolonging the conflict is one way to avoid any type of plebiscite. Throw into the equation the fact that India has illusions of becoming a regional military power. This requires that the armed forces be upgraded and updated. Continuing conflict in Kashmir provides a politically saleable reason for spending vast sums of money on the military. There is an inherent danger in the "mutually agreed upon proxy war" theory. It is entirely possible that India can spend Pakistan into bankruptcy by forcing the Kashmir war. (It should be noted, however, that some observers feel that the volume of drug money coming to Pakistan through Afghanistan is sufficient to sustain its military.) Neither is there any doubt that India has a conventional war capability vastly superior to Pakistan’s. During the Kargil war, a number of relatively powerful politicians and groups argued that India should pursue Pakistan back across the LoC and possibly into Pakistan itself and resolve the Kashmir issue once and for all – throw them out of both Indian Kashmir and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. A cornered or desperate foe is a dangerous foe. Both countries possess atomic weapons and powerful voices on both sides made a point of noting that they were willing to use those weapons. India has put forth a "no first strike" policy which, as I have discussed in a previous Opinion paper, is ludicrous, particularly given the sad state of its intelligence gathering capabilities. Pakistan said directly that it would use its nuclear weapons if the security of the country were threatened. Neither country has a credible command and control structure. This is a formula for disaster. So where is the opportunity for solution? Settlement of the Kashmir conflict would seem to me to depend on:
The Prime Minister, in his Independence Day speech at the Red Fort stated unambiguously that, "Kashmir would remain an ‘unbreakable’ part of India and Pakistan cannot secure anything through its ‘undeclared war’ because the 21st century did not permit the redrawing of borders either in the name of religion or on the strength of the sword". He went on to say, "nobody should underestimate India’s willingness and ability to deal firmly with violence, terrorism, extremism and separatism." On the other side of the issue, Ghulam Hassam Khan, Lok Sabha MP from Kargil-Ladakh, commenting on conditions today in Kashmir said, "These days are worse than the days of war. Power, education, hospital conditions, everything is worse than the war period." When asked if more autonomy would remove the problems and give Kashmiris what they really need, Khan pointed out, "there has to be overall development, care for people, cooperation on all fronts. And there is no special formula to achieve this. Autonomy for the state is now linked with the honour of the people. Refusal to give it, he warns, will dishearten and alienate more and more Kashmiris." In Pakistan, General Musharraf pledged, "to continue his government’s support to militancy in Kashmir." Pakistan’s President Rafiq Tarar warned the international community, "of a nuclear conflict in the region unless it intervened to resolve the dispute over Kashmir." This is a Gordian knot. India says that Kashmir is and will remain a part of India and that they will counter violence with violence. Pakistan says it will continue to support terrorism in Kashmir even if that position leads to nuclear conflict. Both India and Pakistan might see value in prolonging the conflict. Many Kashmiris see little value in either Pakistan or India and want to be independent but independence just returns the situation to where it is now. CAN PEACE BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN THE PRESENT CONTEXT? Suppose the various parties in the Kashmir conflict were to sit down at a negotiating table. What, exactly, would they negotiate? Let’s begin with the question of who would sit down to negotiate. Pakistan and India would certainly seem logical parties to the discussion. What about the people of Kashmir? Who exactly would represent the people? The current government of the Indian part of the state is an elected body but a great deal of the dispute seems to involve the quality of its governance. What about those in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir? The militant groups who claim to represent the people? Which group or groups? There are more than a dozen active groups representing many different points of view. India recently suggested discussing Kashmir with one of the militant groups but without Pakistani involvement. Other groups stated that tripartite discussions were necessary involving the militant groups, Pakistan and India. The elected state government, of course, took exception to this. How about outside agencies such as the UN? No one seems interested in moving in this direction. Just to throw another twist into equation, the United States, in 1993, declared that the United States did not recognize the 1947 Instrument of Accession by which Kashmir became part of India and, as a corollary, defined Kashmir as a "Disputed Territory" rather than an integral part of India. This position has been reaffirmed as recently as 1998. So I ask again, who would be the parties to a negotiation? Moving on, let’s address the question of what constitutes the Kashmir that would be discussed. India claims the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir as delineated at the time of partition. Indian maps show the one third of the state occupied by Pakistan as "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir". Pakistan claims that all of Kashmir should belong to Pakistan because it is a Muslim state. The current division between the two pieces of Kashmir was established in 1949 as a cease fire line and delineated on maps in July of 1949 by the Karachi Agreement. Because of the lack of demarcation in certain areas, competing claims have existed over the Saichen glacier area. The CFL became the Line of Control in 1972 as part of the Shimla Agreement. Until the Pakistani incursion into the Kargil area, the LoC had been respected by both sides without major incident. It had, in fact, been a defacto border for some 50 years. India is steadfastly opposed to declaring the LoC an international border and relinquishing its claim to POK. What kind of solutions might be discussed? Firstly, it would not appear that any absolutes exist. Absolute victory for either India or Pakistan is not a realistic expectation. For India, unifying Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir either through negotiation or force is unrealistic. For Pakistan, it is unrealistic to expect that either support of militancy or international pressure will cause India to give up its claim to Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, it would appear that redrawing boundaries or creating new entities is also unrealistic. If done along communal lines, as has been discussed, what would be solved? In all probability, more problems would be created. Thirdly, independence also seems like an unrealistic option. An independent what? Jammu and Kashmir? An independent combined POK and J&K? The present LoC separates two very distinct ethnic groups. What would removing the 50 year old LoC do? How much political and economic unity would be achieved? What other problems would arise for India if the current Jammu and Kashmir were granted independence? What would change for the better in the independent entity? A POSSIBLE CONTEXT FOR NEGOTIATION So far I have said that, in the current context of discussions, it is very hard to define who should sit down to a negotiation, what the entity that is being discussed really is, and what any possible solutions might be. This is not a hopeful situation. Maybe we are looking at an incorrect picture. Maybe an infrastructure needs to be built to reach the level of discussion being contemplated. Maybe, if properly constructed, the infrastructure would negate the need for this negotiation all together. What are the real problems that can be addressed? First, let us assume that militancy, in its current form, will not be successful in causing India to relinquish control of J&K and that its only real effect is that many innocent people will die either through the action of militants or through the actions of those repressing the militancy. Let us also assume that militancy will not attract international attention that will be favorable to either Pakistan or India. Second, let us assume that outright force by either India or Pakistan will not result in the unification of the two parts of Kashmir. This gives us the first opportunity for meaningful negotiation. If there were a recognition that current actions had no possibility of leading to an agreeable solution and if there was a real desire for a resolution that would be acceptable to the Kashmiri people as well as the other groups, India, Pakistan, and the militant groups could negotiate a cessation of terrorism and the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the LoC. As part of this negotiation specific grievances might be addressed or at least placed on hold for some period of time. The DMZ concept, monitored if necessary by an outside agency, would mitigate the immediate threat of conventional as well as nuclear conflict without the risk to either side of relinquishing any current claims. These two actions would provide breathing space to address other problems as well as free up scarce resources that could be applied to solving baser problems. If this first level of activity can be implemented, a second phase of negotiation could begin. This would be for India to negotiate with all concerned parties in Jammu and Kashmir a fair and equitable system of political governance in the state. India is currently saying that it wishes to devolve more power to its states and at the same time increase the cohesiveness of the Union. Here is a chance to begin that process. Maybe fair elections would be a good place to start. Pakistan might consider the same course of action in its part of Kashmir. As the process moves along, economic development might be addressed in both parts of Kashmir. What if only a portion of the resource being expended on military operations could be diverted to developing a viable economy? If all the above could be achieved, it would be time for the main feature, for India and Pakistan to negotiate how they can coexist. If India and Pakistan could come to terms on coexistence and if the two parts of Kashmir could achieve reasonable governance and the beginnings of economic development without the constant threat of terrorist activities, maybe the need to negotiate the further division or combination of Kashmir would not be necessary. Maybe what has existed for 50 years already might continue as it is constituted. Maybe this sounds like a fairy tale. To be sure, it requires huge leaps of faith to think that two countries that have harbored irrational hatred of each other for the 50 years of their existence could actually put aside some of the irrationality and think along these lines. It requires an equally large leap of faith to imagine that the concept of honest government and bargaining in good faith might also enter the equation. The process, however, has to start somewhere. The current approach to peace in Kashmir is utterly doomed. The parties and the negotiating space cannot be defined in the present context. Even if some type of cease fire were negotiated, it would only be a transitory state because the root causes of the problems have not been resolved. CONCLUSION Some solution is essential. The longer the terrorism and resulting anti terrorist repression continues and the longer threats and counter threats over the LoC continue, the closer India and Pakistan get to major conflict. Both countries are spending huge percentages of their resources on military operations, resources that they can ill afford considering the shameful levels of poverty and illiteracy that exist in each country. The chances of this happening any time soon? Very slim. I think, unfortunately, that a more likely scenario is that a major conflict will occur and that when the dust settles, hopefully not radioactive dust, the horror of what has occurred and the outrage of the rest of the world will force a solution on the two governments, assuming there are governments left to talk to. It is not very difficult to construct even non-nuclear conflict scenarios with casualties running, at the very least, into the hundreds of thousands. This is simply not acceptable in the civilized world. The key to the future of both India and Pakistan is resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Status quo is not a solution. Either both governments mature quickly and resolve the issue or both countries will retreat to footnote status in the list of nations of any importance in the world.
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