New
Delhi, 02 May 2002
We
at IDC have offered a plethora of analyses on India’s nuclear and
missile capabilities. Earlier we reviewed Ashley Tellis’s
voluminous book on the subject. He was lucky to meet all and sundry
involved with India’s Nuclear Establishment but then he was from
RAND Corporation. Their main customer is the Government of USA so he
had an Agenda and IDC stands by the statement, as we have argued it
out at seminars. USA has changed goal posts from sanctions to rein
in India’s Nuclear ambitions to now acquiescing to the fait
accompli. Vajpayee will go down in history for the SHAKTI blasts.
(Admiral L Ramdas’s and Arundhiti Roy’s vehemence
notwithstanding.) Tellis is now enjoying the fruits of his hard work
and is an American of Indian origin in India advising the American
Ambassador in New Delhi.
We
all do have agendas, and Ashley tried to convey India’s recessed
forces and separated bombs at various locations as the most sensible
and economical in tune with ‘A NO FIRST USE DOCTRINE’, that
India’s National Security Adviser Brajesh Misra released. It had
the stamp of K Subhramanyam’s deep knowledge, who is India’s
know all on Defence, so India swallowed it lock stock and barrel.
But then K Subrahmanyam is a journalist now and writes anecdotes of
the past and philosophy these days. He is not in tune with ground
practicalities, which is what the Armed Forces have to deal with.
Now
we have a CDS equal to the Chiefs and the Nuclear Force under him
yet to be formed. The doctrine is of no value unless it is
implemented. We have no CDS, no Nuclear Command or Strategic Force
and the Army and the IAF were at loggerheads on the issue. India’s
NSA who scripted all this and the NSAB which meets often has a duty
to sort it out and may have done so. If it is sorted out then IDC
congratulates the powers that be. The PM, as enshrined in the
Constitution, must be fully aware of the Triggers and Procedures and
the Ops Plans and hopefully the WAR BOOK has been amended.
Deterrence
is the raison d’etre of Nuclear Power and this needs publicity,
but then India is silent and may be we will learn the new way by a
Nuclear Forces Act or some such intervention. Pakistan has a Rocket
Strategic Command and even if it is bluff the world has taken note
and Kargil was a good example. Brajesh Misra is less heard of or
seen these days.
The
IDC looked at Raj Chengappa‘s book on India’s Nuclear Story,
which was juicy on details (like Journalists are wont to be) and
good reading, and had the INDIA TODAY stamp. We also looked at
Sanjay Badri Maharaj’s book ‘The Armageddon Factor’ and that
was professional but he could not give all that we thought a
thinking person wants to know.
Now
one of our readers N S
Mirpuri who does research as a hobby has done a great job of
compiling what we may term as a ‘Busy Man’s Guide to India and
Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities’ and we offer it to our readers.
He has quoted K Subrahmanyam and IDC adds that the SU 30 MKI are
also capable of Nuclear delivery as are the F-16s of Pakistan.
THE
INDIA–PAKISTAN NUCLEAR STORY
By
N
S Mirpuri
That
India can build nuclear weapons has been an established fact since
8:05 18 May 1974 (IST), when India exploded a 6-10 kt plutonium bomb
107 meters underground in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. This test,
known as "Smiling Buddha", the PNE (for "Peaceful
Nuclear Explosive") or (now) Pokhran-I, was located at 27.095
deg N, 71.752 E, which is usually identified as being "Pokhran"
(or "Pokaharan"), the name of a town that is 24.8 km
southeast from the test site.
India
maintained at the time, and long afterward that the test was for
peaceful purposes, and that it possessed no nuclear arsenal. As one
of the principal scientists on the project (who was also a former
junior Defense Minister, and a former director of BARC - the
"Indian Los Alamos"), Raja Ramanna conceded on 10 October
1997 the former was never true. The Press Trust of India quoted him
as saying "The Pokhran test was a bomb, I can tell you
now." He was also quoted as saying later: "An explosion is
an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot
at the ground." He said the "peaceful" label had come
"from the political side", adding: "I just want to
make clear that the test was not all that peaceful."
But
surprisingly, the latter contention - that India had no nuclear
arsenal - remained true for more than a decade after Pokhran-I.
A
key motivation for India's nuclear program is its concern about
nuclear-armed China, which faces India along much of its northern
border. Disputes about this border exist: China currently occupies
the Aksai Chin plateau adjacent to Ladakh, Kashmir in Northwest
India; India occupies the North-East Frontier Agency claimed by
China. In October 1962 China invaded India, an attack that India was
powerless to respond to (China eventually withdrew voluntarily later
that year). Although China and India have had better relations in
recent years, the rise of China's economic and military strength,
coupled with the simultaneous decline of Russia which had acted as a
counterweight to China, has caused India to view China as a
long-term strategic threat. India has also fought repeatedly with
Pakistan since 1947, and holds Kashmir - Muslim inhabited territory
claimed by Pakistan. Pakistan's own nuclear program now serves as
justification for perpetuating India's own program, although
Pakistan did not acquire weapon capability until a decade after
India's nuclear test. India also has aspirations to being a major
power on the Asian continent, and a major player in world affairs,
and views nuclear weapons as a necessary component of acquiring this
status.
Although
India first tested a nuclear explosive in 1974 it did not become a
nuclear weapons state - in the sense of having the ability to
deliver nuclear weapons until 1986-88 when, according to Dr. Sanjay
Badri-Maharaj author of The Armageddon Factor, a rudimentary
delivery system was in place [Indian Express, 18 June 2000]. This
presumably refers to a developmental delivery system based on the
Mirage 2000 that began development in 1986, after an attempt to
integrate a DRDO developed nuclear bomb with the Jaguar
fighter-bomber failed. This system provided India with a usable but
limited nuclear weapons capability, but the weapon system did not
actually enter service until it passed a full field drop test in May
1994 at Balasore, though most observers thought that this milestone
had been passed years before.
The
US CIA testified before congress in 1993 that it did not believe
that India maintains assembled or deployed nuclear weapons, although
it believed India was producing weapon components. The CIA's HUMINT
(human intelligence, as opposed to electronic intelligence)
regarding India's nuclear program is famously poor however (witness
the U.S. intelligence communities surprise about the 1998 tests) so
it cannot be accorded great weight; nonetheless it could be true
that in 1993 India still had not taken the step of maintaining
weapons in a ready-to-use state. There is a vague report though [Chengappa
2000; pg. 418] of "a few" weapons existing as early as the
early 1980s. Chengappa relates that hardened concrete bunkers were
built in the early 1980s at Mumbai to house India's weapons
plutonium stocks, and a few weapons. Gen Sundarji was shown these
weapons in the mid-80s, an unusual step since the military chiefs of
staff had not been briefed on India's nuclear capability even as
late as 1990. These weapons may not have been kept fully assembled,
but there is little doubt that India could have made them ready in a
matter of hours (or days at the most).
India has several aircraft that are nominally considered
"nuclear capable", the Mirage 2000, Mig-27, and the
Jaguar. Due to the cost of integrating and qualifying an aircraft
for nuclear delivery, and maintaining a cadre of specially trained
pilots, it is unlikely that India would choose to deploy nuclear
weapons on more than one or two aircraft types. Only the Mirage 2000
is known to have been qualified as a nuclear delivery platform, and
the Jaguar is known to have been abandoned for nuclear weapons
delivery due to technical problems. Thus it may be that the Mirage
2000 remains the sole air breathing nuclear weapon delivery system.
India
has developed short and medium-range nuclear-capable missiles. These
are the Prithvi (range 250 km, payload 500 kg), and the Agni-II
(range 2500 km, payload 1000 kg).
The
first operational capability of a missile deliverable nuclear
warhead was probably soon after the official deployment of the
Prithvi SS-250 missiles in September 1997, which occurred after the
successful completion of integration and testing of the warhead and
missile during 1996-97. Reportedly four nuclear armed Prithvis were
deployed during the Kargil War in June 1999. Also during this war
was the first deployment of the medium range Agni-II, apparently
consisting of a single preproduction model. The Agni-II was not
qualified for full production and deployment until after the second
Agni-II test occurred on 17 January 2001 at 10:01 a.m. IST (Indian
Standard Time) when it was tested in its final deployment
configuration.
India
reportedly is investigating development of an ICBM-class missile
called Suriya (or Surya) with a range of over 6000 km.
There
are no official figures for weapon stockpiles at any stage of
development of India's arsenal. The only figures that can be offered
are either explicit estimates made from considerations of India's
probable ability to produce critical raw materials and
considerations of likely production plans; or are unofficial
statements of uncertain provenance and authenticity. To show the
problems with figures of the latter sort we have only to look at the
statement by K. Subrahmanyam, a leading strategic theorist, that by
1990 India had stockpiled at least two dozen unassembled weapons,
versus the May 1998 estimate by G. Balachandran, an Indian nuclear
researcher, that India had fewer than 10 weapons ready to be
assembled and mounted on warplanes or missiles.
The
types of weapons India is believed to have available for its arsenal
include:
-
A
pure fission plutonium bomb with a yield of 12 kt;
-
A
fusion boosted fission bomb with a yield of 15-20 kt, made with
weapon-grade ploutonium;
-
A
fusion boosted fission bomb design, made with reactor-grade
plutonium;
-
Low
yield pure fission plutonium bomb designs with yields from 0.1
kt to 1 kt;
-
A
thermonuclear bomb design with a yield of 200-300 kt.
All
of these types should be available based on the tests conducted
during Operation Shakti (Pokhran-II). It may be possible to
extrapolate significantly from these device classes however without
further testing. There is reasonable doubt about whether the
thermonuclear device actually performed as designed. Even if this
so, it does not rule out the possiblity that sufficent test data was
collected to field a successful design with reasonable confidence of
good performance. Interest has been expressed in the development of
a neutron bomb (a very low yield tactical thermonuclear device), but
this would probably require additional testing to perfect.
The
most widely accepted estimates of India's plutonium production have
been made by David Albright. His most recent estimate (October 2000)
was that by the end of 1999 India had available between 240 and 395
kg of weapon grade plutonium for weapons production, with a median
value of 310 kg. He suggests that this is sufficient for 45 - 95
weapons (median estimate 65). The production of weapon grade
plutonium has actually been greater, but about 130 kg of plutonium
has been consumed - principally in fueling two plutonium reactors,
but also in weapons tests. His estimate for India's holdings of
less-than-weapons-grade plutonium (reactor or fuel grade plutonium)
are 4200 kg of unsafeguarded plutonium (800 kg of this already
separated) and 4100 kg of IAEA safeguarded plutonium (25 kg of this
separated). This unsafeguarded quantity could be used to manufacture
roughly 1000 nuclear weapons, if India so chose (which would give it
the third largest arsenal in the world, behind only the U.S. and
Russia)
Indian
Delivery Systems and Characteristics
Delivery Systems
|
Entry into
Service
|
Range
(km)
|
Payload
(kg)
|
Accuracy
(m)
|
Launcher
Number
|
Warhead Number
and Type
|
Land-Based Missiles
|
Agni-I
|
1999?
|
1500
|
1000
|
|
10?
|
1 x > 15 kt?; 200 kt?
|
Agni-II
|
2000
|
2500-3000
|
1000
|
|
3-4?
|
1 x > 15 kt?; 200 kt?
|
Agni-III
|
2005?
|
3500-5000
|
1000
|
|
3-4?
|
1 x > 15 kt?; 200 kt?
|
SS-150 Prithvi
|
1997
|
150
|
1000
|
15
|
20?
|
1 x 12 kt
|
SS-250 Prithvi-2
|
2001?
|
250
|
500-750
|
25
|
0
|
1 x 12 kt
|
Dhanush
|
2003?
|
350
|
500
|
35
|
0
|
1 x 12 kt
|
Aircraft
|
Mirage2000
|
1988
|
|
|
|
|
1 x 12 kt bomb
|
Existing
Weapon Infrastructure
The center piece of India's nuclear weapons program is the Bhabha
Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay near Mumbai (Bombay) which
is the center for nuclear weapons associated work. BARC was founded
as the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET) on 3 January 1954
by Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha. Bhabha was the also the founder India's
entire nuclear industry and infrastructure, and India's first
Secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) when it was
created on 3 August 1954. In its early years BARC was already a very
large, but primarily civilian-oriented nuclear research laboratory.
When India's first nuclear device was designed and fabricated at
there, the work was conducted surreptitiously (often at night) to
hide it from the rest of the laboratory. But in May 2000 a watershed
was reached in this tension between civilian and military work when
the civilian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which had been
exercising regulatory oversight was split off from BARC. As S.
Rajagopal oberved, an expert on nuclear affairs and a professor of
the Bangalore-based National Institute of Advanced Studies, this
decision effectively reclassified BARC as a nuclear weapons
laboratory - a laboratory with a primarily military function though
also conducting civilian oriented work in a model similar to the
U.S. weapons labs. But without much of the civilian oversight and
management that the U.S. labs have.
BARC
is the site of the two reactors used for weapons-grade plutonium
production: the 40 MW CIRUS (Canadian-Indian-U.S.) reactor, and the
100 MW reactor named R-5, but usually called "Dhruva".
Both of these are heavy water moderated and cooled natural uranium
reactors.
CIRUS
was supplied by Canada in 1954, but uses heavy water supplied by the
U.S. (hence its name). The reactor is not under IAEA safeguards
(which did not exist when the reactor was sold), although Canada
stipulated, and the U.S. supply contract for the heavy water
explicitly specified, that it only be used for peaceful purposes.
Nonetheless CIRUS has produced much of India's weapon plutonium
stockpile, as well as the plutonium for India's 1974 Pokhran-I
nuclear test. India argued in 1974 that the contract allows its use
in producing peaceful nuclear explosives, which is how it
characterized this explosion, though in recent years the project
director Raja Ramanna has conceded that this was a sham. CIRUS
reactor achieved criticality on 10 July 1960. It can produce
6.6-10.5 kg of plutonium a year (at a capacity factor of 50-80%).
In
1977 work began on the larger Dhruva plutonium production reactor,
which was developed indigenous but based on the Canadian supplied
technology. It was commissioned on 8 August 1985 but startup
problems caused by resonance vibrations from the cooling system
damaged fuel assemblies soon required shutdown. After modifications
were made (spring clips to damp fuel rod vibration) it began
operating at one-quarter power in December 1986 and reached full
operation in mid-January 1988. It operates at 100 MW and is capable
of producing 16-26 kg of plutonium annually (at a capacity factor of
50-80%).
An
additional possible source of plutonium are a number of
unsafeguarded CANDU power reactors,including Madras Atomic Power
Stations (MAPS, known as Madras I and II, or MAPS-I and MAPS-II);
the Narora Atomic Power Stations (NAPS, known as NAPS-I and
NAPS-II), and the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS). Like CIRUS
and Dhruva, the CANDU reactors are heavy-water moderated natural
uranium reactors that can be used effectively for weapon-grade
plutonium production. The possible production by MAPS is much larger
than CIR and Dhruva combined, although the fuel burnup in power
reactors of this type normally produces lower grade plutonium that
is less desirable for weapons. Each power station reactor could
produce up to 160 kg/yr (at a 60% capacity factor). It is uncertain
how practical it is to operate MAPS for weapons grade plutonium
production, although even the reactor-grade output has weapons
potential. If supergrade plutonium were produced at BARC by short
irradiation periods, it could be mixed with MAPS plutonium to extend
the plutonium supply. As of November 1998 India had a total of 10
small power reactors operating, with 4 under construction and due to
begin operation in 1999, but with 12 more planned or under
construction that would boost electrical output by another 5100 MW.
Nuclear
power supplied 2.65 percent of India's electricity in 1999 and this
is expected to reach 10 per cent by 2005. Expectations for nuclear
power growth have consistently fallen far short of goals for over 30
years, so this percentage is likely to continue to grow slowly.
India's nuclear power program proceeds almost entirely without fuel
or technological assistance from other countries. Partly as a result
its power reactors have been among the worst-performing in the world
(with regard to capacity factors), reflecting the technical
difficulties of the country's isolation, but are apparently now
improving significantly. Its industry is largely without IAEA
safeguards, though a few plants are under facility-specific
safeguards.
In
February 2001 India had 14 small nuclear power reactors in
commercial operation, two larger ones under construction and ten
more planned. The 14 operating ones comprise:
-
Two
150 MWe BWRs from USA, started up in 1969, now using
locally-enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
-
Two
small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards;
and
-
Ten
local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200
MWe.
The
separated plutonium for the 1974 test was produced at the separation
plant in Trombay, near to Bombay, capable of processing 50 tonnes of
heavy metal fuel/yr. Construction on the first facility there began
in the 1950s, and began operating in 1964. In 1974 it was shut down
for repair and expansion and reopened in 1983 or 1984. Trombay
handles the fuel from both the Cirus and Dhruva reactors. India also
can separate plutonium in the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE)
facility. This plutonium separation plant was built at Tarapur,
north of Bombay, and began operating in 1979. The plant has
encountered operating problems, but India reports having overcome
these by 1990. The nominal annual capacity is given as 100-150
tonnes of CANDU fuel. A much larger plant is now under construction
at Kalpakkam sufficient to handle all existing reactors.
Given
its immense thorium resources, India is actively interested in
developing the thorium/U-233 fuel cycle. India is known to have
produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in CIR,
Dhruva, and MAPS reactors. Substantial production of U-233 is not
practical though with natural uranium fueled reactors. The thorium
cycle requires more highly enriched fuel to have an acceptable
breeding ratio with the non-fissile thorium blanket. Reactor-grade
plutonium from MAPS could serve as start-up fuel for U-233 plants in
the future. If available U-233 is as effective a weapon material as
plutonium.
India
has been developing the capability to produce heavy water
domestically to provide the moderator load for future reactors. The
heavy water for almost all existing reactors was imported however.
The 110 tonnes of unsafeguarded moderator for Dhruva and Madras I
and II were ironically provided by China.
India
has acquired and developed centrifuge technology and built
centrifuge enrichment plants in Trombay and Mysore in the 1980s. The
larger Rare Metals Plant (RMP), as it is called, at Mysore has a
cascade capable of producing 30% enriched uranium in kilogram
quantities, beginning in 1992-93, although reliability has been a
problem. These enrichment plants appear to have no role in India's
power reactor development plans, so they may be intended to offset
the prestige of Pakistan's enrichment capability, or to provide
additional standby weapons production capability. India has reported
that it plans to build an enriched uranium reactor, and a
domestically fueled nuclear submarine.
India's
interest in light weight weapon design can be surmised from BARC's
acquisition in the 1980s of a vacuum hot pressing machine, suitable
for forming large high-quality beryllium forgings, as well as large
amounts of high purity beryllium metal. India is known to
manufacture tritium, and may have developed designs for
fusion-boosted weapons.
India
is not a signatory to NPT and has opposed the treaty as
discriminatory to non-weapons states. India has previously taken the
position that a world-wide ban on nuclear testing, and the
production of fissionable material for weapons is called for. Except
for China, which continues testing, there is now a de facto halt to
testing worldwide, as well as the production of weapons grade
plutonium and uranium by the US and Russia. India has shown no
interest so far in restricting its own activities despite these
changes in the world situation. India has also rejected offers at
bilateral negotiation with Pakistan, but in December 1988 the two
nations signed an agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's
nuclear installations and informing each other of their locations
(though not their purposes).
Planned
Nuclear Forces
Nothing is publicly known about official Indian nuclear force
planning, but assessments made by opinion leaders provide a context
for judging the prevailing attitude in Indian government circles
India's
first effort to formulate a nuclear policy and the determine the
means needed to implement it was an informal but authoritative study
group that was set up in November 1985 to answer queries by Rajiv
Gandhi regarding defense planning. It encompassed the three services
(Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Tahiliani, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen.
K. Sundarji, Deputy Cheif of Air Staff John Greene), leaders of BARC
(Ramanna), the DRDO (Abdul Kalam), and the AEC (Chidambaram), and
India's most prominent strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam. The
outcome of the group's deliberations was to recommend building a
minimum deterrent force with a strict no first use policy. The
arsenal envisioned was 70 to 100 warheads at a cost of about $5.6
billion.
In
1994 K. Subrahmanyam suggested that a force of 60 warheads carried
on 20 Agnis, 20 Prithvis and the rest on aircraft would cost about
Rs 10 billion over 10 years. In 1996 Sundarji suggested a cost of
some Rs 27.5 billion -- Rs 6 billion for 150 warheads, Rs 3.6
billion for 45 Prithvis and Rs 18 billion for 90 Agni missiles.
Pakistan
Pakistan
undertook a program to develop nuclear weapons on 24 January 1972,
scant weeks after its crushing defeat by India in the 1971
Bangladesh war. On this date President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto committed
Pakistan to a nuclear weapon program at a meeting held in Multan.
The program initially focused on acquiring plutonium production
capability through foreign assistance - in a manner similar to the
Israeli and Indian nuclear programs. But following the May 1974
Indian nuclear test, the Pakistani program was ham-strung by the
international restrictions on plutonium production technology that
followed. The fortunes of the program turned four months later when
a Pakistani national living abroad with access to highly classified
foreign uranium enrichment technology volunteered to act as a spy,
and pass detailed information to Pakistan. This Pakistani was Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist employed by URENCO, the
tri-national European uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium.
Khan
had access to detailed plans about several enrichment centrifuge
designs, as well as comprehensive information about the parts
suppliers used by URENCO. With this information Pakistan began
purchasing enrichment components in 1975, and in early 1976 Khan
returned to Pakistan to (a few months later) take control of the
enrichment program. Little attention was paid to enrichment
technology at the time, so the Pakistani activities escaped the
notice of nations attempting to control nuclear proliferation.
Pakistan's
enrichment plant, built at Kahuta, began doing enrichment on 4 April
1978. The plant was made operational in 1979 and by 1981 was
producing substantial quantities of uranium. The facility was named
A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq on 1
May 1981.
Pakistani
work on weapon design predated both India's test and A.Q. Khan's
involvement. In March 1974 Munir Ahmad Khan, head of the Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), formed a task force consisting of
Drs. Hafeez Qureshi, Abdus Salam, Riaz-ud-Din, and Zaman Sheikh to
design a nuclear explosive. This design group was based at Wah, and
became known as "The Wah Group".
Preparations
for a nuclear test site in the Ras Koh Hills and Kharan in
Baluchistan were begun as early as 1977, and the shafts used in the
1998 tests were completed in 1980.
The
Pakistan nuclear weapons program became militarized after the 5 July
1977 coup in which Army General Zia-ul-Haq siezed control of the
government (the deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was eventually hanged on
4 April 1979). The Pakistani military has retained exclusive control
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability ever since, even during the
periods in which it has tolerated civilian rule.
The
Wah Group had a weapon design - an implosion system using the
powerful but sensitive HMX as the principal explosive - ready for
testing in 1983. The first "cold test" of a weapon (i.e. a
test of the implosion using inert natural uranium instead of highly
enriched uranium) took place on 11 March 1983 under the leadership
of Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed of the PAEC. This test was conducted in tunnels
bored in the Kirana Hills near Sargodha, home of the Pakistan Air
Force’s main airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD).
1984
saw the arrest of Pakistani nationals for smuggling krytrons and
other pulse power components useful in nuclear weapon firing
systems. It was perhaps around the end of 1984 that Pakistan first
achieved the capability to manufacture and test a nuclear explosive.
During
the latter 80s Pakistan inexorably moved toward converting its
potential capability into an actual one. The Pressler Amendment, a
congressional act passed to keep Pakistan receiving aid despite its
active weapons program, helped restrain Pakistan from moving beyond
stockpiling enriched uranium as hexafluoride gas. The 1990 crisis
with India that erupted over Indian repression in Kashmir, finally
prompted Pakistan to take the last steps. In May 1990 Pakistan
converted 125 kg of uranium hexafluoride to metal and reportedly
manufactured seven weapon cores, putting it in the position of
assembling a nuclear arsenal from stockpiled components in a matter
of days. During the Kashmiri crisis at least one complete nuclear
weapon is believed to have actually been assembled.
Excellent
U.S. intelligence provided detailed information about the status of
Pakistan's capabilities, which leaks and official discloures
gradually revealed to the public. Nonetheless Pakistan refrained
from officially declaring itself as a nuclear power, but at the same
time went to great pains to make clear its nuclear capabilities. On
7 February 1992 Pakistani Foreign Minister Shahryar Khan stated in
an interview with the Washington Post that Pakistan had the
components to assemble one or more nuclear weapons. This statement
went further than any made by other "non-weapon states" in
admitting to the existence of a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan had
previously admitted to having fabricated pits for fission weapons.
In July 1993 General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg, former army chief of
staff, acknowledge that Pakistan had conducted cold tests of nuclear
devices. And in August 1994, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said
"I confirm that Pakistan possesses the atomic bomb"
although the government repudiated the statement (but admitted
having the capability to make them).
In
1998, after the Indian Pokhran-II test series in May and India's
open declaration of its status as a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan
followed suit with its own tests. The first test was conducted in a
1 km horizontal tunnel under the mountain Koh Kambaran in the Ras
Koh Hills at 10:16:17.6 UCT (+/- 0.31 sec) on 28 May 1998 (28.7919N
64.9475E +/- 0.003 deg). Official (and semi-official) descriptions
of the tests said that five devices were successfully fired with a
combined yield of 40 kt. Independent seismic analysis set the yield
at approximately 9 kt (with a 5-20 kt possible range). The second
test of a single device was fired at 06:55:00.0 30 May 1998 UCT at
about 28.433 deg N 63.860 deg. The claimed yield was 18 kt, seismic
estimates put it at 4-6 kt (3-11 kt maximum range).
Again
following India's lead, Pakistan formally declared itself a nuclear
weapons state following the 28 May tests.
Current
Nuclear Forces
It
is estimated that Pakistan produced produced about 210 kg (range 160
- 260 kg) of HEU up to the moratorium in 1991 [Albright
and O'Neill 1998]. The current production capacity of Pakistan
is approximately 110 kg per year (range 80 - 140 kg/year), and the
cumulative production of HEU (less the HEU expended in the 1998
tests) is estimated at about 800 kg at the end of 2000 (range 665 -
940 kg) [Albright
2000]. Since a uranium weapon requires about 15 kg this equates
to a potential for 53 weapons (range 44 - 62), although somewhat
more than 15 kg may be used to produce more powerful and efficient
weapons.
In
April 1998 the unsafeguarded Kushab reactor began operating. This
reactor is a heavy water-natural uranium reactor built with Chinese
assistance and has an operating power of 50-70 MW. This reactor
should be able to produce around 10-15 kg of plutonium a year at a
60-80% load factor (the fraction of the time the reactor actually
operates). Through the end of 2000 approximately 10-28 kg is
estimated to have been separated from the fuel, a figure that is
strongly affected by how quickly the fuel is processed after
irradiation, and the effectiveness of the separation plant. Pakistan
has a pilot plutonium reprocessing plant called "New Labs"
at the Pakistan Institute of Scientific and Technical Research (Pinstech)
complex near Rawalpindi. Reportedly the New Labs facility was
expanded during the 90s to handle the full fuel load from Kushab.
CBS News reported on 16 March 2000 that US intelligence had found
evidence (such as krypton-86 emissions) that Pakistan is
reprocessing irradiated fuel from the Khushab reactor and recovering
separated plutonium. Fission weapons require 4-6 kg of plutonium, so
2-7 weapons could have been manufactured from this material.
In
addition to Kushab, Pakistan is also manufacturing reactor-grade
graphite and has its own heavy water plant both of which may be used
to build additional plutonium production reactors fueld with natural
uranium. It currently possesses two power reactors - the Karachi
Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) with an output of 137 MW electrical,
and the Chasma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP) with an output of 300
MWe. CHASNUPP is a pressurized water reactor constructed by the
China National Nuclear Corporation was completed in late 1995.
CHASNUPP began operations in November 1999 and was connected to the
power grid (run by the Karachi Electric Supply Company) on 14 June
2000. These reactors have produced 600 kg of plutonium in their
spent fuel but this plutonium remains unseparated and under IAEA
safeguards.
The
Kushab reactor could also be used to produce tritium for boosted
weapons. The production capacity for tritium would be on the order
of 100 g per year if enriched uranium is used as fuel, enough to
boost perhaps 20 weapons. Pakistan is known to be interested in
tritium, having acquired a tritium purification and production
facility, and 0.8 grams of pure tritium gas from West Germany in
1987, as well as even larger quantities of tritium from China.
According
to A. Q. Khan, as well as other Pakistani scientists, the devices
tested in 1998 were most of all boosted weapon designs. Pakistan has
not tested a true staged thermonuclear device. This implies that
Pakistan can built pure fission or boosted fission devices with
yields ranging from sub-kiloton up to perhaps 100 kt. Higher yields
are possible, but suffer from the delivery weight limits of its
existing missiles and probable limits to Paksitani minaturization
technology. China has provided a complete tested designs for a 25 kt
pure fission weapon.
Pakistan
has been active since the early 80s in acquiring ballistic missiles
and missile technology. This has resulted in the acquisition and
development of an imposing list of missile systems (see table
below). These systems are all basically derivatives of Chinese and
North Korean technology, and in many cases are simply missile
systems imported from abroad (the M-9 and M-11) or assembled from
foreign components (the Ghauri and Ghauri-2 missiles). The Ghauri
designation refers to a muslim ruler -- Shahabuddin Ghauri -- who
repeatedly raided Hindu cities during the middle ages.
In
October 2000 it was reported that the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission's (PAEC)National Defence Complex (NDC) had begun serial
production of its 'indigenously-built' solid-fuelled Shaheen-1
("Eagle" or Hatf-4) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM),
according to local media reports quoting senior defence officials.
The Shaheen-1, with a declared range of 750 km, has officially been
flight tested only once, in April 1999. Pakistani defence officials
also said the test of the road-mobile missile was successful [Farooq
2000], [PTI
2000].
Currently
the only missiles that are beleived to be in service are the Hatf-1
and Hatf-2, the Chinese supplied M-9 abd M-11, the Shaheen-1, and
possibly the Ghauri/Ghauri-2 (basically North Korean supplied
No-dong missiles). On 13 June 1996 the Washington Post quoted a
leaked CIA draft document as saying Pakistan had "probably
finished developing nuclear warheads" for Chinese-supplied M-11
missiles. If true, it may indicate Chinese assistance minaturizing
the warhead design.
Summary of Pakistan's Missiles
|
Name
|
Alternate
Names
|
Range
(km)
|
Payload
(kg)
|
Test
Firings
|
Developer
|
Status
|
Hatf-1
|
|
80
|
500
|
April
1989
|
KRL
|
In
service since 1996
|
Hatf-1A
|
|
100
|
500
|
February
2000
|
KRL
|
In
service?
|
Hatf-2
|
|
260-300
|
500
|
April
1989
|
KRL
|
In
service?
|
Hatf-3
|
|
800
|
|
3
July 1997?
|
KRL?
|
Never
deployed
|
Hatf-4
|
Shaheen-1
|
750
|
1000
|
15
April 1999
|
NDC
|
Deployed
September 2000
|
Hatf-5
|
Ghauri-1
|
1100-1500
|
700
|
6
April 1998
|
KRL/DPRK
|
|
Hatf-6?
|
Ghauri-2
|
2000
|
500-700?
|
14
April 1999
|
KRL/DPRK
|
|
Hatf-7
|
Shaheen-2
|
2400-2500
|
1000
|
Declared
ready for test Sept. 2000
|
NDC
|
|
|
Ghauri-3?
(Ghaznavi?)
|
3000
|
|
15
August 2000??
|
KRL/DPRK?
|
|
M-9
|
CSS-6/DF-15
|
600-650
|
500
|
|
China
|
Supplied?
|
M-11
|
CSS-7/DF-11
|
300
|
500-800
|
|
China
|
30-80
supplied
|
Notes
|
1. NDC: National Defence Complex
2. KRL: A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories
3. DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
4. Hatf-2 may be a Pakistani manufactured M-11
5. Shaheen-1 believed to be based on Chinese M-9 technology
and design
6. Shaheen-2 believed to be based on Chinese M-18 or DF-21
technology and design
7. Ghauri and Ghauri-2 are believed to be DPRK (North Korea)
No-dong missiles or No-dong based designs
|
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