Afghanistan 末 A Re-Run Of The 1980s
International Terrorism Monitor:
Paper No.61
By B.Raman
(To be read in continuation of the
earlier paper titled "South Asia & Al Qaeda : Emerging Trends" at
http://www.saag.org/papers18/paper1797.html )
The upsurge in violence 末 partly
conventional strikes, partly acts of Terrorism 末 which one has been
seeing in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan since the end of winter
is not a copy-cat version of what has been happening in Iraq since
2003. It is more a re-run of the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s 末
this time targeted not against the Soviet communists and their
Afghan supporters, but against the "Western infidels led by the US
and the UK" and their Afghan supporters.
2. There are some new elements in the
current version, which were not there in the 1980s 末 the increasing
resort to acts of terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, for
example. But, terrorism is not the mainstay of the jihad being waged
by the Neo Taliban. It is conventional guerilla strikes.
Carefully-planned and skillfully-executed ambushes of the convoys of
the Afghan security forces and surprise attacks on posts of the
security forces----often at night 末 form the essence of the jihad.
Making the opponents bleed continuously is the tactical objective.
Not territorial control.
3. Regaining control of Afghanistan is
the strategic objective, but the Neo Taliban proposes to achieve it
not piecemeal---gaining one area after another. It proposes to
achieve it in one go when the Western forces, tired and weakened by
the continuous bleeding, decide to quit 末 as the Soviets did in
1988 末 and the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul collapses as the
Najibullah Government did in April,1992. That is its wish and
calculation.
4. The Pashtuns 末Afghan as well as
Pakistani nationals 末 are in the forefront of the Jihadi insurgency
in Afghanistan. There is very little non-Pashtun involvement on the
ground. The role of Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),
the Chechens and the Pakistani members of the International Islamic
Front (IIF) is restricted to training the Pashtuns in their camps in
North Waziristan and guiding the Pashtuns in their operations in
Afghan territory. The only reported ground involvement of the Arabs
living in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region has been in some acts of
suicide terrorism.
5. Despite the role of Al Qaeda and its
associates in the training and guidance of the Neo Taliban, one sees
less of pan-Islamic rhetoric in Afghanistan than in Iraq. The
rhetoric in Afghanistan is partly nationalistic and partly
religious. The Afghans vs the American and British occupiers. The
Muslims vs the infidels. Anti-Christian rhetoric is more in evidence
than anti-Jewish. President Hamid Karzai is projected not only as an
American stooge, but also as a Christian stooge. The Western
non-governmental organisations doing humanitarian work in
Afghanistan are projected as Christian conspirators. Whereas Al
Qaeda has, of late, been talking increasingly of a world-wide
crusader-Jewish-Hindu conspiracy against Islam, the Neo Taliban's
propaganda is relatively free of references to the so-called Hindu
conspirators.
6. When the Neo Taliban stepped up its
activities in Afghanistan starting from 2004, it projected its jihad
as against the American occupiers of Afghanistan. It has now been
projecting it as against the American-British occupation. Thus, the
UK is now being seen to be as satanic as the US.
7. In Iraq, the internal segment of the
conflict is between the Shia majority, which dominates the
Administration and the security forces, and the Sunni minority,
which finds itself marginalised in the new post-2003 political
dispensation, which is perceived by the Sunnis as the creation of
the US-led coalition. In Afghanistan, the internal segment of the
conflict is between two sections of the Pashtuns, who are Sunnis and
constitute the largest ethnic group in the country. What one is
witnessing is a conflict between anti-Western, fundamentalist Sunni
Pashtuns ( a large number of them from Pakistan) and pro-Western,
less fundamentalist Sunni Pashtuns ( all of them Afghan nationals)
serving in the Government and the security forces.
8. The Neo Taliban is concentrating its
jihad presently against the pro-Western Pashtuns in order to
intimidate them into changing sides and supporting it. It is not
focussing on the non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tadjiks and
the Uzbecks living in the north. Many Western analysts have been
connecting the upsurge in violence in Southern and Eastern
Afghanistan to the on-going induction of NATO forces into the region
so that the NATO could take over from the US the leadership role in
the counter-insurgency 末 with the British troops moving to the
forefront of the counter-insurgency operations.
9. This analysis is somewhat facile. The
Taliban started staging a come-back long before the decision of the
NATO to take over the counter-insurgency responsibilities. The
decision of the Taliban taken in 2003 to revive and step up its
activities on the ground in Afghanistan was an indicator of its
confidence in its newly-acquired ability to stand up and fight
against the Americans and other Western forces. It was also an
outcome of its assessment that widespread anger against the US in
the Pashtun belt on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
due to American counter-insurgency methods such as the use of the
Air Force against the jihadis causing considerable collateral damage
and reports of the violation of the human rights of those detained
at the Guantanamo Bay in Cuba had antagonised a large number of
Pashtuns, who would be prepared to co-operate with the Taliban. This
assessment has not been off the mark.
10. Two aspects of the Afghan situation
末
one positive and the other negative
末 as
compared to that in Iraq need to be underlined. The positive aspect
is that the newly-raised Afghan Army has been putting up a better
resistance against the Neo Taliban than the newly-raised Iraqi army
against the Iraqi resistance fighters and the Al Qaeda. The negative
aspect is that the new political structure of Afghanistan is weak
and relies largely on one leader 末 Mr.Hamid Karzai. In Iraq, a
plurality of leaders 末 Shias, Sunnis and Kurds 末 has come up since
2003. Political stability in Iraq does not depend on the continuance
in office of any one political leader. Political stability in
Afghanistan depends, to some extent, on the continuance in office of
one leader 末 Mr.Hamid Karzai.
11. There are two operations
simultaneously going on in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. A
counter-insurgency operation against the Neo Taliban and a
counter-terrorism operation to smoke out and neutralise Osama bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2, and other remnants of Al Qaeda
operating from sanctuaries in this region. There cannot be a
watertight division of these two operations---with the NATO forces
under British leadership concentrating on eliminating the Neo
Taliban and the American forces concentrating against the remnants
of Al Qaeda. There has to be an effective co-ordination of the two.
12. Without neutralising the sanctuaries
enjoyed by the Taliban and Al Qaeda and its associates in
Balochistan and Waziristan, the NATO forces cannot prevail in
Afghanistan. At present, they are counting on the Pakistani security
forces to neutralise the sanctuaries. While President General Pervez
Musharraf has co-operated with the West to some extent in their
operations to nab some activists of Al Qaeda, he has not extended
any co-operation against the Neo Taliban. While he admits the
possibility that some of the Al Qaeda leaders might still be
operating from Pakistani territory, he has been vehemently denying
the presence of any Taliban leaders, camps or activists in Pakistani
territory.
13. In the face of Musharraf's policy of
total denial, the only option left is for the Afghan security
agencies to undertake covert strikes against the Taliban sanctuaries
in Pakistan, without the involvement of Western officials. It does
not as yet have this capability. In the long term, the only way of
thwarting the return of the Taliban to power is by, firstly, drying
up the flow of new recruits to it from the Pashtun belt; secondly,
pressurising Pakistan to stop its clandestine support to the Taliban
and, thirdly, undertaking a rapid economic development of those
areas of Afghanistan, which have not yet been affected by the
insurgency, so that examples of the peace dividend if the people
keep away from the insurgency are there for all to see.
14. There is a need to change the
counter-insurgency methods followed in Southern and Eastern
Afghanistan. Reliance on air strikes, artillery and other heavy
weapons has to be avoided and there has to be a greater respect for
the human rights of the Pashtuns and others. Otherwise, continuing
Pashtun anger will drive more Pashtuns into the arms of the Neo
Taliban.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently,
Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com)
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