New
Delhi, 22
April 2004
Ashley
Tellis, an American analyst had a ring side view of India’s
nuclear set up in the 90s and he was one of the first to tell us
about it in his excellent book, ’Nuclear India’, but his take
was that India should cap its nuclear capability. His inside
knowledge, his many contacts in high places, his charming Parsi
wife, landed him a cushy and powerful job as the Security Adviser to
the US Ambassador Blackwill.
Tellis
came from the Rand Corporation (which is funded by CIA, US Armed
Forces and Industry) to be close to the Roosevelt House on Shanti
Path in Delhi’s Embassy Row, where people die to get invited. He
learnt more about India’s Defence than anyone we know hence what
he said and wrote was watched with great interest. He gave a lecture
last month at the India Today Conclave, where he very cogently put
forward the main challenges before India’s Defence Planners.
India
had to make up its mind like China to become a great power, because
that was its destiny and in this regard India’s defence posture
was important. India was dithering on this, and except President APJ
Abdul Kalam articulating it, no one else had done much in this
regard. The Babri Masjid/Temple issue and such were more important!
To
be a great power India had to have a good economy not just be
shining. Growth rates had to be upped and Tellis did not touch on
population control but that too needs addressing.
The
Internal security structure was crucial and just creating more and
more CRPF, BSF, RR, SSB, CISG, NSG, Assam Rifles and so on ––
now numbering 800,000 –– will not give India internal security.
In the same vein a large Army and DRDO’s aim to make everything in
India would also not help and India had to put together a cheap and
effective nuclear deterrence Policy and use the international Fora
to its advantage. In this regard all thinking defence and security
personnel will enjoy the following excerpted parts of Ashley
Tellis’s excellent speech. Comments are welcome.
Challenges
Facing Indian Defense Policy In The
New
Century
By
Ashley J.
Tellis
Senior
Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington,
D.C. 20036
Transcript
of a Speech made at the India Today Conclave, New Delhi, March 13,
2004
Let
me start with a confession. I am not a security fundamentalist. I am
not one of those who believe that war makes the state and that the
state exists only to make war. States have multiple objectives many
more than are sometimes imagined and given consideration. But when
one looks at the broad sweep of history it becomes clear that
countries cannot become great powers unless, at some level, they
demonstrate mastery over the creation, deployment and the use of
military force in the service of national objectives.
For
a country like India, which essentially seeks to follow its own
path, the rise to great power status will require it to be able to
integrate the creation, deployment and use — and I use the term
"use" — in the broadest sense of the word — of
military instruments in support of national objectives. The ability
to create and use military force for national purposes is, of
course, not the only criterion for greatness.
But
it has to be an element integrated with other measures of greatness
like economic prowess, social cohesion, and political stability. In
this context, whether India can master military instruments of power
and develop the tools that have made great powers for the last two
thousand years will depend on its ability to master three macro and
five micro problems.
Macro
Issues
The
first macro problem that must be resolved, if India is to rise as a
great power, is achieving higher rates of economic growth. The
reason for that is simple. A competent military costs money and
modern defense capabilities, which are sophisticated and effective,
are priced in numbers that boggle the imagination. For a country
like India, which has to deal not simply with questions of defense
but also questions of development simultaneously, high economic
growth becomes the only solution especially in those situations when
India cannot choose between the objectives of defense and
development.
When
one begins to think of the revolution in military affairs — the
kind of capabilities today that characterize the military forces of
the great powers — it is simply impossible for India to acquire
such capabilities without sustaining economic growth of at least 7
to 9 per cent per annum consistently. China is a good example. A
country that has experienced close to double-digit growth for more
than twenty years since 1978, still finds it hard to develop the
kinds of sophisticated military capabilities it seeks to acquire
across the board. Therefore, one must be prepared for the fact that
even if the Indian economy were to grow between 7 and 9 per cent
consistently for the next twenty years, the best India would be able
to do in the area of cutting edge defense technology is to acquire
niche capabilities. But those niche capabilities may be enough for
the specific strategic circumstances that it faces.
The
second macro problem that India needs to engage and satisfy is the
development of an appropriate national vision and appropriate
institutions designed to manage the acquisition of great power
capabilities. What substantive goals, defined in terms of national
interest, does India really seek to service? The answer to this
question cannot be defined in terms of platitudes like a "just
world order." That is a useful phrase for a political campaign.
It is a terrible criterion for defense planning and force
structuring. The other aspect of this question of defining India's
goals and creating the appropriate institutions pertains to the
issue of whether India will be able to achieve the right balance
between state control and societal autonomy. It is very important to
realize that successful states in the modern era have been those
that have maintained this balance in the most creative way possible.
The
third macro challenge that I would highlight for your consideration
is whether India is capable of exploiting the existing structure of
the international system to its advantage. In this context, I think
India should get rid of the notion of a multipolar world order as a
practical outcome in the relevant future. Pursuing chimerical goals
like multipolarity does not make for good policy. The international
system, for all practical purposes, is going to remain a unipolar
system for at least the next half century. By all indicators, if you
define power in terms of comprehensive national strength, it is
unlikely that the United States will face serious peer competitors
for at least another fifty years.
Consequently,
the challenge for India becomes, can it develop a viable strategic
partnership with the United States that serves both mutual interests
and India's own unilateral interests? Can India develop a
relationship with the United States that helps it enhance and
magnify its own power? This is not to suggest that the United States
is the only power in the international system. Clearly not ––
there are many others. This is also not to suggest that India's
goals ought to consist solely of developing a relationship with the
United States, or that India somehow is constrained solely to
develop a relationship with the United States and no other. Not
true. India has the flexibility to maneuver within the interstices
of the international system. But at the end of the day, there is one
eight hundred pound gorilla that has to be engaged. And that is the
United States. That gorilla is not going to go away. That gorilla
has already put its nose for the first time in modern history, into
the physical environment of the subcontinent. And it is in India's
national interest, and important for its capacity to generate and
magnify its power, to develop a productive and a collaborative
relationship with the United States that enhances the interests of
the two countries.
Micro
Issues
First,
India has to deal with the challenge of neutering internal security
threats without undermining its capacity for effective external
defense. This is harder to do than is sometimes imagined. It is
unfortunate that the principal security threat that India is going
to have to deal with on a day-to-day basis is the threat to internal
security. There is no running away from this problem. Historically,
India dealt with this challenge by essentially throwing manpower at
the threat instead of technology. And the reason it did this was
simply because it enjoyed a surfeit of manpower and a deficit of
technology.
There
were two consequences to this strategy. One was that its approach to
preserving internal defense was probably not as effective as it
could be, because technology could provide that valuable supplement
which was not available to India. The second consequence was that
preserving internal security became extremely expensive and has now
come at the cost of being able to acquire the new technologies
required to raise a modern military force. It is a myth that India's
manpower is cheap. Maintaining the size and kind of forces that
India does, if maintained over the secular period, will undercut its
ability to acquire the kind of RMA capabilities that wins modern
wars. And this is going to require India to make very painful
choices — painful choices about reducing its manpower strength and
changing the inter-service budgetary balances, choices that it
cannot make today because of the gravity, importance, and burdens of
its internal security commitments.
The
next micro issue is the need to preserve effective external defense,
now in a nuclear shadowed environment. This brings us face to face
with the vexed question of whether India has the capacity to
successfully prosecute a limited war. Most commentary so far has
focused on the issue of limited war as an example of Indian
recklessness. People have chastised the Defense Minister, Mr. George
Fernandes, for arguing that limited war in fact represents a
solution to India's external security problems. My take on the issue
is somewhat different. I believe that limited war should be viewed
not as a product of the proclivities of the state, but rather as a
predicament resulting from a specific set of structural
circumstances. The transparent presence of nuclear weapons in the
subcontinent for the first time makes unlimited wars untenable as a
matter of state policy. This is not simply India's choice — it
actually represents a dilemma of the nuclear age. And it is a
challenge that faces India both with respect to Pakistan and with
respect to China. In both cases, unlimited war is not feasible.
There is also no guarantee that war is obsolete. And therefore the
challenge of limited war confronts India squarely, both with respect
to its northern and its western borders.
What
does limited war mean for Indian defense policy? It means that India
is now confronted with the task of being required to hit hard and
effectively enough to punish an adversary, but not hit so hard or so
effectively as to cause inadvertent escalation. This in turn leads
to questions like "how do you avoid escalation?" Most
commentaries have focused on this aspect of the problem. But there
is another aspect to the problem, which has largely escaped
attention. Because it is going to demand of India a new style of war
fighting that New Delhi traditionally has been uncomfortable with
and which historically it has been relatively incapable of. It is a
style of war fighting that puts a premium on achieving very speedy
decision on the battlefield and then terminating offensive action
either before the international community intervenes or before the
conflict degenerates into unavoidable attrition. Getting the Indian
military to successfully prosecute a fast paced war that generates
quick decisions is something that we have not seen in fifty years of
India's independence. It is also the kind of war that traditionally
the United States was not very good at. We preferred wars that
allowed us plenty of time to mobilize, plenty of time to deploy, and
then plenty of time to be able to grind down the adversary at our
convenience. If India is to be able to prosecute the opposite kind
of war, as the United States is now proficient at — fast,
decisive, and yet limited — it is going to require an investment
in new technologies and new operating skills apart from new
doctrines and new concepts of operation.
Third,
if India is to become a great power of the sort that it seeks to
become, it also has to become a net provider of regional security,
both in the sub-continental and in the extra sub-continental arenas.
This is easier said than done; yet at one level it is the
quintessential part of the definition of a great power. After all,
what is the meaning of having great power capabilities if at the end
of the day you cannot extend net security to others? And yet any
Indian attempt to provide the kind of regional security that I am
talking of, even in the sub-continental arena, is fraught with
hazards because it risks deepening intra-regional rivalries and it
risks deepening the suspicions India’s weaker neighbours have of
its capabilities and its intentions.
Finally,
will India develop the organizational structures that are required
to maintain and operate these capabilities if it seeks to provide
the kind of regional security that is to be expected of a great
power?
The
fourth micro problem pertains to whether India can acquire an
effective nuclear deterrent without breaking the bank. My view is
that nuclear weapons are important for India's security in some
limited sense, but it is also essential to remember that they are
actually relatively obsolescent technologies. Nuclear weapons are
now over fifty years old and they are generally unusable as
instruments of international politics.
The
last micro problem is the question of India's developing an
appropriate defense industrial policy that recognizes and accepts
the limits to autarky. I recognize that India's fear of
vulnerability has driven its traditional strategy of large-scale
defense import substitutions. I think the time has come though to
resist the temptation of trying to develop everything from
assault rifles to main battle tanks to advanced combat equipment.
Where
does all this imply in terms of conclusions about India's capacity
to develop the defense capabilities that would make it a great power
in this century? My argument essentially would be that its capacity
to master the creation, deployment and use of military instruments
is still not assured at this point in time.
Whether
it will succeed in this endeavor will depend greatly on how it
resolves the three macro and five micro problems that I have
identified.
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