New
Delhi, 18
June
2004
India and the United States
conducted ‘Cope India 2004’ from February 15 to 27, 2004 in
Gwalior, in which the top pilots from the two countries matched
their skills against each other in a series of joint air-combat
exercises. These were the first bilateral dissimilar air combat
exercises together, conducted by the IAF and USAF, mainly to enhance
relations and to understand each other's mutual capabilities. The US
Air Force assets participating included F-15C ‘Eagle’ aircraft
and approximately 140 personnel from the high-profile Elmendorf Air
Force Base, Alaska. The F-15Cs were equipped with the newest
long-range, high-definition radars possibly AESA (Active Electronic
Scanned Array) type. A variety of IAF aircraft participated
including Mirage 2000s, MiG-21Bisons, MiG-27s and the formidable
Sukhoi-30MK/Ks.
With more information of the post
assessment of the air exercises becoming available, it is apparent
that the IAF had scored a distinctive edge over the USAF across the
board. Therefore in our assessment Cope India 2004 should be
regarded as a “watershed” event of the IAF community, where the
IAF pilots and personnel displayed outstanding and exemplary human
resources and skills and are poised to brand themselves as top class
air-combat personnel on a global scale. According to Colonel Mike
Snodgrass, commander of the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf USAFB (United
States Air Force Base), the training standard and some of the
equipment of the IAF was decidedly better than what they had
anticipated.
The Cope India exercises consisted
of air combat manśuvres in which pilots of both sides would
practice their fighter tactics and fly against each other on a
one-on-one combat basis, as well as simulated combat scenarios.
According to US officials it was during this simulated combat, which
included both “offensive counter air” and “defensive counter
air” scenarios, that the Indians proved the most formidable. In
the offensive counter air scenarios, a small number of F-15Cs would
attempt to intercept an enemy strike aircraft en route to a target
that was guarded by a larger number of Indian fighters. In the
defensive counter air missions, the F-15Cs would attempt to defend a
target against Indian fighters.
According to Colonel Greg Neubeck,
deputy commander of operations for the wing’s 3rd Operations Group
and exercise director for Cope India, in these offensive and
defensive missions, four F-15Cs were usually flying against ten or
twelve of the same model Indian fighters. The 3rd Operations Group
was responsible for the 3rd Wing’s flying mission. He further
stated that what USAF faced was not only superior numbers, but also
IAF pilots who were very proficient in their aircraft and smart on
tactics, a tough combination for the USAF to overcome.
Indian pilots with their
Sukhoi-30s, and MiG-21Bisons did exceedingly well, surprising USAF
officers and gaining admiration. The MiG-21Bison with its latest
radar, missiles and EW (Electronic Warfare) sets sprang a major
surprise. It indicated that the lessons of Exercise-Garuda 2003 with
the French Air Force were well learnt and the complications and
techniques of BVR (Beyond Visual Range) combat were well absorbed by
the IAF within the shortest period of time.
The USAF pilots are usually trained
to operate in close cooperation of Boeing E-3B ‘Sentry’, Grumman
E-2C ‘Hawkeye’ AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) and
other ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms
and their absence in the Cope India 2004 air exercise proved to be a
great handicap to the USAF pilots. According to respected media
reports Indian pilots outflew the Americans, right through the
exercise. “On the first day all four American planes were shot
down. Never once did the Indians come off second”. According to
United States media, the F-15Cs were defeated more than 90 percent
of the time in direct combat exercises against the IAF. It should be
noted that the IAF did not field its newest “near
fifth-generation” Sukhoi-30MKI air-dominance fighters and if it
did so, the results may have been even more favourable to the IAF.
Nevertheless the IAF in sharp
contrast had the benefit of operating the two-seater Sukhoi-30MK/K
“four plus-plus-generation” fighters that was bound to have some
benefit of an air-battle-management platform if not in the same
league as the newest Sukhoi-30MKI. Not only the rear-seat occupant
WSO (Weapon System Officer), could remain focused on planning the
air-battle, but he generally could single-handedly take the vital
responsibility of launching the deadly BVR missiles after making
judicious IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) decisions.
Media sources stated that those who
have read draft copies of the Cope India 2004 report say the IAF
Sukhoi-30MKs and USAF F-15 pilots were detecting each other at the
same time with their radars, but the Indian pilots were getting off
the simulated first shot with their R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) AAMs
(Air-to-Air Missiles) and often winning the long-range BVR
engagements. It should be noted that Sukhoi-30s inherently have a
very respectable internal fuel capacity to enable them to make
generous use of afterburners and establish kinematics advantage.
Similar advantage is enjoyed by the Russian R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
series of BVR AAMs with powerful motors, especially the 130
kilometres extended-ranged models. Not surprisingly, the powerful
USAF lobby is now very keen to introduce the fifth-generation F/A-22
Raptors in decent numbers to hopefully retain a technical edge. One
may only wonder at the extent of
“Outer-Air Battle” capability the IAF Sukhoi-30MKIs may
attain if equipped with RVV-AE-PD or Ks-172 ultra-long-range AAMs
now under development.
While the superb performances of
IAF Sukhoi-30s were somewhat anticipated, the performance of
MiG-21Bison came as a major “unpleasant surprise” to the USAF
officials. It also validates the claim of the Russian officials that
they are capable of successfully converting “second generation”
late-model MiG-21bis fighters to “fourth generation combat
platforms”. Inherently the significant positive attributes enjoyed
by MiG-21s were their dog fighting ability in WVR (Within Visual
Range) combat. Even the earlier models had a low corner velocity of
556 kilometres per hour and at Mach 0.5 had an instantaneous turn
rate of 11.1 degrees per second. The MiG-21Bison with more powerful
R-25 engines not only considerably bettered this performance but it
may also be credited with “jackrabbit” acceleration, a very
critical attribute in WVR combat.
Among many fourth generations
attributes added to the IAF MiG-21Bison design, the incorporation of
HMS (Helmet Mounted Sight) and high-off-boresight R-73RDM2 NBVR/WVR
(Near Beyond Visual Range/Within Visual Range) AAMs (Air-to-Air
Missiles) have turned it into a “Great Equalizer” in the WVR
combat scenario. Conceptually a small number of MiG-21Bisons
maintaining “radar silence” can be guided towards their aerial
target by a couple of Sukhoi-30s by secure data links in accordance
with MFFC (Mixed Fighter Force Concept). Upon entering into an WVR
combat envelope the MiG-21Bisons armed with HMS and deadly NBVR/WVR
missiles had the capability of destroying even fifth-generation
fighters alike F/A-22 Raptor as assessed by high-profile Fighter
Analyst Ben Lambeth of RAND Corporation. According to Lambeth “in
visual combat everybody dies at the same rate.” F/A-22 also has to
slow down if forced into a WVR combat scenario and loses the
advantage of its super-cruise attributes. The situation further
complicates if the IAF Sukhoi-30s have acquired the capability of
providing target illumination for RVV-AE (AA-12 Adder) BVR missiles
being launched from IAF MiG-21Bisons at extended ranges.
Interestingly the greatest
benefactors of Indo-US Cope India 2004 may turn out to be the U S
Aerospace giants Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Their product the
F/A-22 Raptor fifth-generation air superiority fighter may get an
extended production run to retain the American “technological
dominance”. The first USAF stealth F-117A Nighthawk has a
dedicated SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role. The F-117A
fuselage is comprised of flat panels called facets that reflect
radar energy away from the transmitter. Heat absorbing tiles around
the engine exhausts minimise the chance of IR (Infra-Red) tracking.
The “flat panel design” has
made F-117A very difficult to control and fly and has very poor air
combat manoeuvrability. Moreover although F-117A can carry self-defence
AAMs, its internal weapon bay usually carries a combination of
Paveway series LBGs (Laser Guided Bombs) and AGM-88 HARM (High-speed
Anti-Radiation Missile). No wonder one very high-profile aviation
journalist remarked that the only air-to-air combat option an F-117A
fighter pilot may select is to make rude gestures to his adversary.
In contrast the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor airframe has a
stealthy angular but “more conventional” design. A FBW
(Fly-By-Wire) FCS (Flight Control System) and thrust vectoring
exhaust nozzles combine to make F-22 highly manoeuvrable and agile.
The high-performance turbofan engines provide ‘Super Cruise’
capability for extended periods while the AAMs and PGMs (Precision
Guided Munitions) are carried in internal weapon bays. Among primary
roles the F-22 is endowed with an array of active and passive radar
and sensors for optimum performance and the recently allotted cruise
missile interception.
Naturally when IAF pilots travel to
Alaska during July 2004 for another joint exercise, the Americans
will be well prepared. The IAF in turn will need to concentrate on
sustained offensive air-operation tactics and optimum utilization of
AWACS and IFR (In-Flight Refuelling) platforms and USAF inputs in
these areas will prove to be invaluable. Protection of operational
AWACS and IFR platforms should also be on the agenda. If possible
the emphasis should also be on simulated nuclear-delivery and SEAD
(Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) as a major aspect of the growing
Indo-US defence cooperation was to develop interoperability ––
which will depend on a number of factors which include frequency of
training exchanges, exchange of doctrines, and access to equipment.
India's desire to buy United States equipment through FMS (Foreign
Military Sale) and US willingness to sell state-of-the-art equipment
are converging –– and if more joint-exercises are held, the
greater will be the rationale for providing India access to the
weapons, communications, doctrines and technologies.
With the IAF pilots stealing the
limelight in recent times one can safely bet on the intense desire
of the Indian Naval Air Arm fighter pilots to get access to the
MiG-29Ks for operation from the aircraft-carrier ‘Admiral Gorshkov’.
‘Admiral Gorshkov’ is slated to enter Indian Navy service
sometime during 2008, but “obligatory” arrangements meanwhile
should be made for the Indian Naval Air Arm fighter pilots to
operate prototype MiG-29Ks from the Russian aircraft carrier
‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ and Dassault Rafales from the French
aircraft carrier ‘Charles de Gaulle’. Valuable experience can be
gained in both the concept of Short Take Off and Catapult Launch.
Moreover if a catapult of
sufficient power can be installed in ‘Admiral Gorshkov’ with a
proposed sufficiently elongated flight-deck, the Indian Navy may
well consider “fielding” a small batch (perhaps six) of
Sukhoi-33s “Naval Flankers” on the deck of ‘Admiral Gorshkov’
for dedicated long-range air defence and air-dominance roles, with
two more stand-by batches waiting on shore bases. Of course the
Sukhoi-33s will have to be parked on the deck itself, as they will
be unable to use the lifts and hanger of ‘Admiral Gorshkov’ even
with their folded wings and tail planes. For maintenance the
Sukhoi-33s need to be flown with ferry-tanks to shore bases where
the IAF has by now surely established a formidable maintenance
facility. A “replacement batch” meanwhile will take charge on
the aircraft-carrier deck. The MiG-29Ks in turn will perform the
dedicated role of multi-role air superiority and strike.
The process appears to be complicated and
financially expensive. But since an aircraft-carrier battle group
represents one of the most expensive military assets, even expensive
solutions are welcome. Not surprisingly modern navies have
traditionally assigned their best fighter design to their
aircraft-carriers from time to time, exemplified by United Stated
F-14 Tomcat, F-18E/F Super Hornet, F-4 Phantom, Russian Sukhoi-33
and French Rafale. Protection of a high-value aircraft-carrier
battle group always enjoyed predominant consideration and the best
course of action should be formulated and this should influence
design specifications for our indigenous ADS (Air Defence Ship).
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