New Delhi, 03
February 2003
The
fifth in the series but truly a path breaking and interesting
Conference on “Asian Security and China in the Period
2000–2010,” was held at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi from
27–29 January 2003, under the aegis of the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses and its dynamic Director Dr S Santhanam. It was
all the more exciting as the Taiwanese and the PRC delegates clashed
over differing positions.
The
Conference achieved the aim of enhancing understanding among Asian
scholars and strategic analysts on Security matters affecting Asian
countries, including the role of non-Asian powers; and the
experiences of China in economic, social, political and security
reforms and their impact on other Asian countries.
Many
positive aspects relevant to Asia in the years ahead emerged, as
China continued to maintain its high growth rate, as also act as a
powerhouse of growth and engaged in greater integration with Asia.
Energy security, China’s capabilities and intentions and terrorism
dominated the discussions.
The
Conference had papers presented by 23 countries including Australia,
Bangladesh, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Israel, Krgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, USA, Uzbekistan and
Vietnam, on the following subjects spread over 9 sessions:
-
Overview
of Asian Security.
-
Economic
Reforms and Asia Security
-
China’s
Military Modernisation
-
North
& South-East Asia Perspectives
-
Southern
Asia Perspectives
-
Central
Asia Perspectives
-
West
Asia Perspectives
-
Non-Asian
Powers in Asia
-
Non-Military
Security Challenges in Asia
Shri
Yashwant Sinha, Minister for External Affairs delivered the
Inaugural Address on January 27 and the concluding session was
addressed by Shri George Fernandes, Defence Minister.
Day
1 –– 27 January, 2003
Session
I –– Overview of Asian Security from Different
Perspectives
Chairperson:
Shri MK Rasgotra, (former Foreign Secretary, India)
|
Perspectives
|
Speakers
|
India
|
Ambassador
CV Ranganathan, National Security Advisory Board
|
China
|
Dr
Xu Jian, Director, Department of International Relations,
China Institute for International Studies, Beijing.
|
USA
|
Dr
Robert Blackwill
US
Ambassador to India
|
Russia
|
Dr
Madhavan Palat, Chairman,
Centre
for Historical Studies
Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi
|
Recent
Security Initiatives in Asia
|
Prof
Satish Kumar, Former Chairman Centre for Studies in Diplomacy,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
|
Session
II –– ECONOMIC REFORMS AND ASIAN SECURITY
Chairperson:
Dr Shankar Acharya, former Economic Advisor, Government of
India
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
Economic
Liberalisation and its Impact On Asian Security
|
Dr
Charan Wadhwa, Director, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
|
China’s
Economic Reforms
|
Dr
Liu Shucheng & Dr Chang Xin, Institute of Economics,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing
|
Microelectronics
Industry in China
|
K
Santhanam, Director, IDSA and Dr K Neelakantan, former
Director, Anurag, DRDO, Hyderabad
|
Session
III –– CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNISATION AND ASIAN SECURITY
Chairperson:
Lt. Gen VK Singh (Retd.), former Director General, Military
Operations, India
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
China’s
Strategic Outlook
|
Dr
Michael Pillsbury, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the
United States, Washington, DC
|
Information
Warfare and China
|
Dr
Desmond Ball, Australian National University, Canberra
|
Taiwan’s
Security Aspects
|
Dr
Arthur Ding, Director, Institute of International Relations,
National Chengchi University, Taipei
|
Chinese
Missile and Space Warfare Capabilities
|
Dr
Richard Fisher Jr, Centre for Security Policy, Washington, DC
|
China’s
Military Capabilities, 2000–2010
|
Dr
Srikanth Kondapalli, Research Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi
|
Day
2 ––28 January, 2003
|
Session
IV –– NORTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY
Chairperson
: Ambassador Vinod Khanna
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
Korean
Peninsula-China Relations
|
Dr
Taeho Kim, Senior Fellow, Korean Institute for Defence
Analyses, Seoul
|
Northeast
Asian Security and Taiwan
|
Dr
Parris H Chang, Professor Emeritus, Pennsylvania State
University, USA
|
Mongolia-China
Relations
|
Dr
TS Batbayar, Ministry of External Affairs, Ulaan Bator
|
China
& Southeast Asia: Security Aspects
|
Dr
Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director, Institute for Defence &
Strategic Studies, Singapore
|
Political
Economy of Southeast Asia and China Interactions
|
Dr
Kusuma Snitwongse, Chairperson, Advisory Board, Institute of
Security and International Studies, Bangkok
|
Sino-Vietnamese
Relations
|
Prof
Ramses Amer, Coordinator, South East Asian Programme, Uppsala
University, Sweden
|
Session
V –– SOUTH ASIA
Chairperson:
Shri NN Vohra, Director India International Centre, New Delhi
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
India–China
Relations
|
Dr
KN Ramachandran, Former Research Associate, IDSA, New Delhi
|
China–Southern
Asia Relations
|
Dr
Han Hua, Institute of International Relations Beijing
University, China
|
China’s
South Asia Policy: A Bangladesh Perspective
|
M
Abdul Mannan, Bangladesh Institute of International Strategic
Studies, Dhaka
|
Pakistan–China
Relations
|
Dr
Samina Yasmeen, Senior Lecturer, Western Australian
University, Perth
|
Nepal-China
Relations
|
Dr
Dhruba Kumar, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu
|
Bangladesh-China
Relations
|
Dr
Shaheen Afroze, Senior Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of
International Strategic Studies, Dhaka
|
Session
VI –– CENTRAL ASIA
Chairperson:
Prof Devendra Kaushik, Chairman, Maulana Azad Institute for
Social Sciences, Kolkata
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
Central
Asia-China Relations : Implications for India Kazakhstan-China
Relations
|
P
Stobdan, Research Fellow, IDSA
Dr
Kamal N Burkhanov, Director, Institute of Russian &
Chinese Studies, Almaty
|
Kygyzstan-China
Relations
|
Dr
Zamira Karabaeva, Director, Centre for Middle East & South
Asian Studies, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek
|
Kygyzstan-China
Relations : Border Dispute as a Factor
|
Dr
Marat Chanachev, Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic
Studies, Dushanbe
|
Uzbekistan-China
Relations
|
Dr
Rakhimjan K Kadirov, Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic
and Regional Studies, Tashkent
|
Day
3 –– 29 January, 2003
Session
VII –– WEST ASIA
Chairperson:
Dr Gulshan Dietl, Centre for West Asian and African Studies,
Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
China-–West
Asia Relations with Special Reference to Egypt
|
Dr
Mohammad Selim, Cairo University, Egypt
|
Forced
Landing: Israel’s Security Policy towards China
|
Dr
Yitzhak Schichor, Hebrew University, Israel
|
Saudi-China
Relations
|
Dr
Abdul Karim Al-Dukhayyil, King Fahd University, Saudi Arabia
|
China’s
International Security Environment: An Iranian Perspective
|
Dr
Ahmad Sadeghi, Deputy Director, Institute of Political &
International Studies, Tehran
|
Session
VIII –– NON-ASIAN COUNTRIES IN ASIA
Chairperson:
Dr C Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor, The Hindu, New
Delhi
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
US–China
Relations
|
Dr
Harry Harding, Dean, International Affairs & Political
Science, Elliot School, George Washington University, USA
|
Russia–China
Relations
|
Dr.
Mikhail Titarenko, RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies,
Moscow
|
European
Union and China Relations
|
Dr
Valerie Niquet, Senior Researcher, Centre for the Study of
Chinese & Asian Strategy, Institute for International
Relations & Strategic Studies, Paris
|
Session
IX –– NON-MILITARY CHALLENGES IN ASIA
Chairperson:
Shri K Santhanam, Director IDSA
|
Subjects
|
Speakers
|
China’s
Energy Security Policy and Geopolitical Implications in the
Next Decade
|
Dr
Mehmet Ogutcu, OECD, Paris
|
China’s
Energy Policy and Implications to India
|
Ms
Sudha Mahalingam, Senior Fellow, IDSA
|
Seek
Jihad as far as China
|
Ahmad
Lutfi, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
|
Terrorism
in Asia Today: An Update
|
B
Raman, Institute of Topical Studies, Chennai.
|
China’s
Response to The Global Campaign against Terrorism
|
Dr
Fang Jinying, China Institute for Contemporary International
Relations, Beijing
|
China’s
Environmental Policies
|
Dr
Zheng Yuxin, Deputy Director, Insitute of Quantitative and
Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Beijing
|
Xinjiang’s
Present Challenges and Future Prospects
|
Dr
Dru C Gladney, Asia-Pacific Center, Hawaii
|
Tibet’s
Ethnic Identities
|
Vijay
Kranti, Freelane Journalist, New Delhi
|
Analysis
The
Seminar highlighted that China was poised to be well ahead of India
as a regional power and Indian leadership acknowledges it. The only
problems that China would encounter were containment by USA, energy
security, disparity in incomes between the coast and hinterland and
Uhgyar Islamic terrorism from Xinjiang. China would balance its
relations with Russia, India and Pakistan cleverly and settle the
India-China border dispute with past history and the advantage it
held in occupation of the disputed land.
In
the East, proactivity on Sikkim would die down, Tibet would continue
to simmer and some adjustments in the central sector may follow.
China has said it is too early to talk.
It
emerged that China was an economic power, with accent on its future
economy, rocketry, nuclear capability and space. This scares USA and
neighbours and every speaker said Chinese intentions were unclear.
Chinese
speakers maintained that Taiwan was an integral part of China, and
even that problem they wish to resolve peacefully. Unlike Hong Kong
and Macao that were hired off in 1842, Taiwan had broken away in
1949 and must therefore be reunited. USA was the stumbling block.
Taiwanese
speakers maintained that Taiwan was independent and did not want be
under Beijing’s hegemony. There were HOT EXCHANGES between PRC
Chinese and Taiwanese speakers on this score. However, Dr Fang had
the last word in reply to all –– “China today has to be
recognised as an engine of growth like Japan was in the 1980’s”.
What she implied separately was that it would be an engine without
subservience to USA.
South
East Asian speakers like Amitabh Acharya said they were carefully
evaluating China’s future ambitions which at present seemed less
aggressive.
On
India–China relations, Ramachandran explained the pre 1962, post
1962 and post May 1998 relations thus –– close, then
antagonistic and now better. He said the issues that dog
India–China relations were the border issue and Tibet –– an
issue where India does not permit the Dalai Lama to enter any
political activity but the Western powers had tried their best to fuel
it.
Chinese
speakers were worried about the return of US presence in Pakistan
and Middle East, and the coming war with Iraq. They saw it as an
irritant and hence China had to be careful with Pakistan so
that it did not fall not into a trap. The China–Pakistan
relationship was explained as very complex –– dominant state
versus small state and that relationship would continue.
Bangladesh
had good relations with China and there was mutual trust, respect
and trade ($500 million) in China’s favour. Military aid to
Bangladesh consisted of training and technology upgrades and
Bangladesh saw no threat from China. Bangladesh may sell gas to
China. It emerged that India would need more hydrocarbon energy from
external sources than China.
The
Nepal–China relations came out as most tricky.
The
aim of the Chinese
leadership was to achieve a per capita income of $5000 by 2020 which
meant a GDP of $6 trillion. China was an economic power on the rise
so the question arose –– are we looking at China’s growing
capabilities and ascribing intentions to it? (which actually
emanates from USA’s China containment policy). US speakers,
however, denied this saying they were actually investing in China
but wanted more transparency from China.
India–Pakistan
Relations
Stabilizing
the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan came out as
crucial for peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. However,
India’s overall strength with increasing inputs into its nuclear
and missile programmes, the asymmetry that already exists in the
nuclear capabilities had grown. The widening gap between the two,
further undermines the effort to stabilizing the relationship.
It
emerged that in China’s view there were countries that were in
favour of China’s interest in building a regional order with
multiple actors, while recognizing China’s importance as a
strategic power and balancer. Countries like Pakistan, North Korea,
Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia, and Central
Asian states, desire, in China’s view, that China became stronger
as a counterweight to US pressure in their domestic affairs.
The
second category comprising countries like Australia, Canada,
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, New Zealand, and
India were in favour of preserving the status quo of the existing
balance. Although they did not have a major clash of interests with
China, they would like to see a strategic advantageous position of
the USA as a counterweight to China.
A
third category were USA and Japan. They saw China’s rise as a
challenge to regional and international order and were cooperating
to build a multilateral arrangement in China’s surrounding areas
in order to counter the Chinese threat to their interests.
The
above geopolitical perceptions, perhaps, shape China’s foreign
policy and security thinking and security build-up.
Conclusion
The
modernisation of China’s military capability was imminent and
China was following the route to become a super power. Chinese
strategists had studied how USA’s Republicans helped make USA
become a super power and had read Cornelli Barnett’s ‘Death of
an Economy’ very carefully –– which in effect says –– USA
is the largest economy and is dependent on its Military Industrial
Complex (MIC) –– the greater the MIC the greater its economy.
Today weapon systems had upto 30% software and once again USA was
driving up the MIC. Cornelli’s theory was that if MIC dies US
economy would die.
India
was in a good position with the cold war gone and the baggage of the
past as history. India could maintain strategic cooperation with
Russia, cooperate with China and meet USA’s overtures and
cooperate in the Indian Ocean and open its markets. The challenge
for Asia, China and the East would be Energy Security. The great
game in Central Asian Republics, Iraq and Iran had just begun. The
tussle would be for oil and China would need to use finesse to
safeguard its interests. So too would India but it was more
vulnerable.
Finally,
what the Indian press highlighted about this Conference, were
Defence Minister George Fernandes’ comments in his closing
address. He termed the 1962 India–China incident as a “clash”
not a “war”, thus for the first time a high level leader had
downplayed the Sino–Indian prickliness. This view assumed
significance because Fernandes was known to be a China basher,
having in 1998 called it a potential threat No 1. He articulated the
new framework for Sino–Indian ties and urged an “Asian
civilisation response” to the disputes between the two countries
who were the oldest and largest states in the world and had managed
to live in harmony for 2500 years. He argued, “we need neither
ignore 1962 nor be captive to that experience”, and stressed that
as a bigger power, China had a bigger responsibility to accommodate
India’s concerns. He maintained that on Taiwan and Tibet,
India’s position was a principled one.
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