An IDC Analysis


New Delhi, 30 May 2002

IDC has had feed back from an Indian Group which follows our Website in USA. Their views together with Ambassador Dixit's analysis in an article in HT are posted below.

We agree that USA can help India out of the impasse in Kashmir by putting pressure on Pakistan. But the catch is that the Western World are convinced that if India agrees to the LOC as the International border, then Pakistan can be made to play ball.

In any case Mrs Indira Gandhi had done so via the Simla Agreement and the Gujral doctrine was also on these lines . Even Pandit Nehru had come to that conclusion, but then since 1990, the Politics of KASHMIR alienated the people there and the Hindus fled. India did not abrogate Art 356 and the demography of the State changed. The Soviet Union collapsed and some minorities decided on Indpendence and now the Kashmiris are encouraged to sing the same tune and Musharraff is loving it.


View From USA

At St Petersburg in Russia where the US and Russian Presidents held their summit meeting, President Bush, probably for the first time, publicly called upon Musharraf to stop Pakistan's cross-border terrorism against India.

The President had been quoted by the NEW YORK TIMES of May 26, 2002 as saying,
"It is very important for President Musharraf to stop –– do what he said he's going to do in his speech on terror –– and that is stop the incursions across the Line of Control, which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan.”

The WASHINGTON POST of May 26, 2002 reported that "Gen. Pervez Musharraf, declared today that infiltration of Islamic militants into Indian-held Kashmir had stopped"

The trillion dollar question remains whether the Bush injunction would be effective and whether Musharraf is telling the truth?

American journalists, academicians and think tanks specializing on foreign policy issues, as well as the lawmakers and the administration need to carefully read the following extremely perceptive analysis of the mind of Musharraf. If they do, they are likely to say "NO" to both the above questions. And that will be a tragedy for South Asia and the World –– UNLESS President Bush makes it ABSOLUTELY CLEAR to General Musharraf that HE (BUSH) MEANS BUSINESS AND NO NONSENSE WILL BE TOLERATED. And if Musharraf does NOT behave, America has other more credible options to quickly complete the task of destroying the remnants of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban still hiding in Pakistan. God bless America and the world's democratic nations!

--Ram Narayanan



By J N Dixit

In the simmering tension between India and Pakistan, Indian policy makers would do well to try to comprehend the mindset of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, his policy orientations and actions arising therefrom.

His professional and psychological background is not just that of an army officer but that of a commando and special forces officer. His psychological make-up and mindset is essentially aggressive, operation-oriented, uninhibited about taking risks and of an inner confidence about military victories.

Add to this his deep ideological commitment to jehad and making Pakistan the most influential Islamic country in South Asia and West Asia.

He is permeated by the negative perceptions about India underpinning the partition and creation of Pakistan. Now as head of state and chief of the Pakistani Army, he controls the highest levers of power to determine Islamabad's India policies.

India should therefore have no illusions about his willingness to have reasonable compromises on issues at dispute with India. It would be relevant to mention that on returning from India after the summit meeting with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra in July 2001, he gave a private assessment to his inner circle that the Indian political leadership is indecisive and has no unity.

He went on to give the assessment that the Indian armed forces, though adequately equipped and well organised, are not backed up by assertive political will and therefore its morale is not very high. The state of morale has also been affected by prolonged ambiguities and covert military operations that Pakistan has engaged in over the last decade and more.

He had come to the conclusion that if a war occurs, Pakistan could certainly match India effectively, if not defeat India. Pakistan's policies since then clearly reflect these assessments of Musharraf.

Despite his pledge to oppose all forms of terrorism he continues to maintain the distinction between terrorism as a general phenomenon and the terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir. He continues to assert that the violent movement by the jehadis in Jammu and Kashmir is an indigenous freedom struggle to counter Indian obstinacies.
Though he banned organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and arrested large numbers of their cadres, he has released them all. The Pakistani government justified this decision by saying there was no evidence against these cadres. The leaders of these cadres are in comfortable house arrest. Their communication facilities and their arms and movements have not been subjected to any restrictions.

In fact, Pakistan has encouraged these terrorist organisations to continue their operations against India under new nomenclatures.

The high command of the Pakistan armed forces and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to infiltrate terrorist cadres into Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. With the onset of summer, when the snow melts on the mountains along the border, this infiltration as well as terrorist violence has increased.

The May 14 attack on the Indian residential military complex near Jammu and the killing of Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone clearly indicate that the planning of and support to terrorist activities from Pakistan will continue.

The Pakistani government's immediate objective is to subvert the preparations for the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly elections due this year and to ensure that they are not held.

It is also significant that Lone's murder followed his discussions with political leaders from the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir in Sharjah and Dubai. Indian intelligence agencies have clear evidence that his assassination plan was orchestrated by ISI.

Musharraf has also to divert Pakistani and Pushtun cadres of Al Qaida who have escaped from Afghanistan to some enterprises away from Pakistan proper as otherwise they will create major problems for him in his relations with the US that are based on his commitment to neutralising these jehadi cadres. So he has targeted Jammu and Kashmir.

The alienation of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian republic by parallel violent and political means remains the macro-level political objective of Musharraf's India policies.

The inescapable conclusion is that while Musharraf cooperates with the U.S.
in its campaign against terror, he will continue to nurture and sustain terrorist violence against India. The objective is to generate such pressure through these means that it compels India to come to the negotiating table on his terms.

To ensure international support to this undeclared objective, he is utilising two leverages. One, he is citing the Indian military build-up and diplomatic pressure as an argument and a threat to Pakistan from which the US and Western democracies should save him.

Two, he harps on the likelihood of his being compelled to use nuclear weapons against India which will lead to India retaliating with nuclear weapons, a situation to which the major powers of the world would be totally opposed at both the political and military levels. His strategic anticipations appear being fulfilled as shown in the high-level diplomatic pressure on India the US, Britain and other countries are generating.

Vajpayee's statement last week to soldiers that India would take decisive action against Pakistan has evoked assertive and smug response from Musharraf. Apart from affirming Pakistan's capacity and will to retaliate effectively he has reaffirmed the nuclear threat. It is clear that the US and the Western powers have a limited objective of preventing an
India-Pakistan war.

They do not assign the necessary high priority that India wants to countering jehadi terrorism against the country. Nor do they seem inclined to acknowledge a link between Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and the resulting politico-military pressures, which India is trying to generate against Pakistan.

This attitude of the major powers reduces India's options. First, it is clear that India would have to carry on its campaign against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir on its own.

Second, India should structure its Pakistan policies clearly on the predication that any decisive military option it chooses would attract opposition from the U.S. and major powers as well as the U.N.

India faces a very complex challenge of sustaining its credibility as a country capable of taking decisive action against Pakistani mischief despite high international opposition while at the same time ensuring that domestic processes of elections and reconciliation are successfully carried out.

While India mounts diplomatic, political and limited military pressure on Pakistan, the litmus test would be its success in being able to effectively neutralise Pakistan's current long-term intentions. Given developing circumstances, there does not seem to be any alternative to act decisively in operational terms against Pakistan's activities in Jammu and Kashmir.

(The writer is a former foreign secretary) (IANS)

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